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executive summAry
Aim of the project 
The aim of the project Pricing 
Policy and Control of Tobacco 
in Europe (PPACTE) is to 
develop evidence-based policy 
recommendations to improve 
market regulation of tobacco 
products, for more effective and 
more equitable control of tobacco 
use in Europe.
Methods
To achieve this aim, PPACTE 
undertook several studies with 
different methods to provide insight 
into designing a tobacco tax policy 
within the complex European 
Union policy environment. It was 
structured in seven ‘work packages’ 
(WPs).
For one of the work packages 
(WP7), a working group of 
international experts was 
convened by the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) to produce a handbook, 
The effectiveness of tax and price 
policies for tobacco control (IARC 
Handbooks of Cancer Prevention, 
Volume 14), produced within 
PPACTE and referred to below 
as ‘the Handbook’. It contains a 
review and critical appraisal of 
the current international literature 
on the effectiveness of tobacco 
tax and price policies (Principal 
Investigator, Dr Maria Leon-
Roux, International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, France).
Over 18  000 citizens in 18 
European countries were 
surveyed with regard to their 
attitudes towards and responses 
to tobacco tax and price policies 
(WP2; Principal Investigator, Dr 
Silvano Gallus, Istituto di Ricerche 
Farmacologiche Mario Negri, 
Italy).
Time series datasets from 11 
European Union Member States 
were used to estimate the impact of 
price, income and tobacco control 
policies on the demand for tobacco 
products in each of these countries 
(WP3; Principal Investigator, 
Professor Gunnar Rosenqvist, 
National Institute for Health and 
Welfare, Finland).
Smoking is the largest single cause of death and disease, accounting for 
some 650 000 premature deaths each year in the European Union. Price and 
tax measures are recognized by the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and the World Health organization (WHo) as important instruments for 
reducing tobacco use, while generating revenue for governments.
Price and tax measures are important in the European Union for addressing 
both price harmonization and the disease burden due to tobacco use. The 
diversity of tobacco prices, smoking prevalence, tobacco market structures 
and economic and cultural environments in European Member States tend 
to make tax regulation in the European Union complex.
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Dynamic simulation models were 
adapted to assess independently, for 
each of 15 European countries, the 
present impact of their tobacco tax 
policies and other tobacco control 
policies on smoking prevalence 
and smoking-attributable deaths 
and to make predictions for 
the future (WP4; Principal 
Investigator, Professor David Levy, 
Pacific Institute for Research and 
Evaluation, United States).
Industry influence on, and 
responses to, tobacco taxation 
were examined from key informant 
interviews, analysis of tobacco 
industry documents in case-
study countries and a detailed 
analysis of data on the British 
cigarette market (WP5; Principal 
Investigator, Professor Anna 
Gilmore, University of Bath, 
United Kingdom).
A policy panel was convened to 
integrate the PPACTE findings 
and distil policy recommendations 
(WP6; Principal Investigator, 
Fiona Godfrey, International 
Union Against Tuberculosis and 
Lung Disease, France).
Main findings
Effectiveness of tobacco 
taxation for public health 
(Chapter 2)
There is substantial evidence from 
the vast body of international 
literature reviewed that tobacco 
taxation improves public health 
by preventing initiation of 
smoking among people who 
have never smoked, promoting 
cessation among current smokers 
and reducing consumption 
among continuing smokers. The 
effectiveness of tobacco taxes 
for tobacco control, as reported 
in the literature, is substantiated 
by econometric analysis of 
time series from 11 European 
countries (WP3). The results 
confirm convincingly that price is 
a major determinant of demand 
for cigarettes, with an average 
price elasticity of demand of -0.3 
to -0.4; income is also shown to 
affect demand for cigarettes, with 
an average income elasticity of 
demand of +0.3 to +0.4. Price is 
also found to be a significant factor 
in the demand for pipe tobacco 
and snus, but income appears to be 
negatively related to the demand 
for these other tobacco products. 
Price and taxation of tobacco are 
therefore key factors for public 
health as well as generators of 
national revenue.
The SimSmoke simulation 
modelling of WP4 indicates that 
increasing taxes has immediate 
effects on smoking prevalence and 
smoking-attributable mortality, 
and the effects increase over 
time. It also indicates varying 
but predictable interactive 
effects of multiple tobacco 
control interventions, including 
implementation of WHO 
MPOWER strategies.
The European survey undertaken 
for WP2 indicates that the majority 
of smokers would attempt to quit 
in response to a substantial increase 
in price. One in five smokers said 
they would quit smoking given a 
20% price increase, while a majority 
said they would quit given a price 
rise of 41–60%. Furthermore, the 
survey responses demonstrated 
strong public support for tax 
increases when at least some of the 
tax is earmarked (hypothecated) 
for supporting smoking cessation 
and prevention. Overall, 79% of 
nonsmokers and 49% of current 
smokers supported a price increase 
of 5%, with revenues allocated 
to support smoking cessation 
measures; 74% of nonsmokers 
and 40% of smokers supported 
a 20% increase in price; 76% of 
nonsmokers and 67% of smokers 
perceived provision of free smoking 
cessation support to be useful for 
controlling smoking. There is 
general support for significant and 
substantial increases in tobacco tax, 
particularly when some revenues 
are dedicated to helping smokers 
to quit. Tobacco tax increases 
are acceptable to smokers and 
nonsmokers alike. The Handbook 
gives evidence, however, that the 
tobacco industry has lobbied 
strongly against earmarking 
of tobacco tax, as it sees it as 
detrimental to its interests.
Tobacco tax structures 
and rates (Chapter 3)
At present, all countries tax 
fine-cut hand-rolling tobacco 
for roll-your-own cigarettes at 
a lower rate than manufactured 
cigarettes. Evidence from WP2 
shows that, in many European 
Union countries, considerable 
numbers of smokers, particularly 
in low-income groups, have been 
switching from manufactured 
to roll-your-own cigarettes. The 
proportion of smokers smoking 
hand-rolling tobacco was highest 
in England (32%), France (17%) 
and Finland (14%). Some tobacco 
companies are exploiting this tax 
difference further by selling kits 
to convert hand-rolling tobacco 
into cigarettes, at a price much 
lower than that of the equivalent 
manufactured cigarettes.
The conversion rate used by the 
European Union between fine-
cut and manufactured cigarettes 
is based on the assumption that a 
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roll-your-own cigarette contains 
1 g of tobacco; however, there is 
evidence from PPACTE WP2 
that the weight of one roll-your-
own cigarette is nearer to 0.7 or 
0.8 g. The ISO norm 15592–3 
for measuring tar and nicotine 
in hand-rolling tobacco gives a 
somewhat lower estimate of 0.4–
0.75 g of tobacco per hand-rolled 
cigarette.
WP5 demonstrates how tobacco 
companies seek to minimize the 
impact of any given tax structure 
by providing cheaper alternatives, 
particularly for poor smokers, who 
are the most price-sensitive, as 
shown in WP2 and WP3. WP5 
reports that “detailed analysis 
of the British market suggests a 
multifaceted strategy to keep prices 
low on the ‘ultra low’ segment of 
the market. Between 2006 and 
2009, the price of cigarettes in the 
ultra low segment increased by less 
than 1% with real price decreases 
for some brands, while mid-priced 
and economy brands increased by 
5–6%.”
These pressures have undermined 
the basis and intentions of 
European Commission legislation 
and directives for tobacco tax in the 
European Union. The main issues 
to be addressed in future European 
Union directives are: the availability 
of cheap and ultra-cheap cigarettes, 
including ‘dumped’ cheap 
cigarettes; the relatively very low 
taxes on alternative products, such 
as fine-cut tobacco for roll-your-
own cigarettes; illicit trade and 
smuggling; and the pernicious 
interference and influence 
of tobacco companies on the 
development of tobacco tax policy. 
WP5 also suggested that selling 
cigarettes below cost and low 
price-based marketing, including 
selling below the tax level, should 
be addressed. It is no easy matter 
to address all these problems or 
loopholes, but specific changes to 
the tobacco tax structure and other 
supportive legislation could go a 
long way in this regard.
Illicit tobacco trade 
(Chapter 4)
Illicit trade in tobacco includes 
smuggling and illicit production of 
tobacco products. These activities 
represent a serious threat to tobacco 
tax policy, government revenue and 
public health. Estimates from WP5 
suggest that tax avoidance and 
evasion represent about 11.8% of 
consumption in middle-income 
and 9.8% of consumption in high-
income countries. There is, however, 
little transparent or public data on 
illicit tobacco trade in European 
Union countries. Research on illicit 
tobacco trade has been carried out 
by KPMG (a consultancy firm 
providing audit, tax and advisory 
services) as part of an agreement 
between the European Union 
and the tobacco company Philip 
Morris International. According to 
the KPMG report, total cigarette 
consumption in the European 
Union was 685 billion units, 8.9% 
of which was illicit trade. A redacted 
version of the report has now been 
published, but the full version and 
its method are still confidential and 
available only to European Union 
or Member State officials.
Following lawsuits by the European 
Union against tobacco companies, 
enforceable and legally binding 
agreements have been concluded 
in recent years with Philip Morris 
International, Japan Tobacco 
International and subsequently 
with British American Tobacco and 
Imperial Tobacco. These agreements 
have had some success in reducing 
illicit trade but entail a close 
relationship between the tobacco 
industry and the European Union, 
with the industry itself monitoring 
and measuring illicit trade, in 
contravention of Article 5.3 of the 
WHO Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC). As 
shown in WP5, it is important 
for the European Commission 
to instigate monitoring of illicit 
trade that is unbiased and fully 
independent of the tobacco industry.
Parties to the WHO FCTC are 
negotiating a protocol for a universal 
system for counteracting illicit trade 
in tobacco. The main element is 
tracing (re-creation of the route 
of seized illicit cigarettes) based 
on unique, secure, non-removable 
markings on all unit packets and 
packages and outside packaging 
of cigarettes, within 5 years (and 
of other tobacco products within 
10 years) of entry into force of the 
protocol.
There is extensive illicit trade into 
the European Union, particularly 
from its eastern border with the 
Russian Federation and the Ukraine, 
indicating major supply factors. 
No public data are available on the 
extent of this illicit trade or on the 
transparency of contacts between 
the transnational tobacco companies 
and enforcement officials, including 
information on any agreements. 
Corruption contributes to the 
success of illicit trade and must be 
confronted, as shown in WP5.
Industry influence 
on tobacco taxation 
(Chapter 5)
The European Union and all 
Member States with the exception 
of the Czech Republic are Parties 
to the WHO FCTC and, under 
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Article 5.3, are bound to prohibit 
the influence of the tobacco 
industry on the formulation of 
public health policy. The WHO 
FCTC states that “in setting and 
implementing their public health 
policies with respect to tobacco 
control, Parties shall act to protect 
these policies from commercial 
and other vested interests of the 
tobacco industry in accordance 
with national law.”
As the PPACTE case studies and 
research from WP5 clearly show, 
however, governments continue 
to engage with the tobacco 
industry when formulating 
tobacco taxation policy, so 
that tobacco companies lobby 
Member State governments 
constantly and persuade them to 
keep tobacco taxes low, arguing 
incorrectly that if taxes increase 
tobacco revenue will decrease and 
smuggling will occur. It is clear 
from documents on countries 
acceding to the European Union 
(‘accession countries’) that 
transnational tobacco companies 
were greatly concerned to prevent 
any significant increase in excise 
duties on accession of the country 
to the European Union and to 
ensure that any such increases 
would be gradual. The companies 
worked collectively to prevent 
and postpone increases in excise 
and lobbied successfully for 
derogation of the excise level. As 
a result of the derogations, and 
with European Union accession 
also leading to higher incomes, 
cigarettes actually became slightly 
more affordable in some accession 
countries.
To influence policy, industry 
targeted key government officials 
at both national and European 
Union level (WP5).
Tobacco taxation and 
health inequalities 
(Chapter 6)
Groups with lower socioeconomic 
status, lower incomes or lower 
educational attainment tend to 
have a higher prevalence of cigarette 
smoking. As a consequence, the 
burden of smoking-related ill 
health and mortality (including 
lung cancer, ischaemic heart 
disease and chronic obstructive 
airways disease) is increasingly 
concentrated in these groups. 
Tobacco companies tend to target 
low-income groups, young people 
and women, considering these 
to be their growing or continuing 
markets, and therefore exacerbate 
these trends, as shown in WP5.
Conclusions and policy 
recommendations 
(Chapter 7)
The following recommendations 
derive from evidence in the 
PPACTE research work packages 
conducted over the past 3 years. 
To realize the potential of taxation 
to improve tobacco control and 
reduce the burden of disease 
caused by tobacco, future European 
Union directives must address the 
following contextual problems: 
the availability of cheap and ultra-
cheap cigarettes, including ‘dumped’ 
cheap cigarettes; the relatively very 
low taxes on alternative products, 
such as fine-cut tobacco for roll-
your-own cigarettes; illicit trade 
and smuggling; and the pernicious 
interference and influence 
of tobacco companies in the 
development of tobacco tax policy. 
Recommendation 1:
We strongly recommend a 
continuing increase in tobacco 
taxes, so that the price of cigarettes 
and other tobacco products is 
greater than the general rise in 
price of other goods and rises in 
incomes. This would make tobacco 
increasingly less affordable to 
smokers and potential smokers 
and result in increased national 
revenues from tobacco taxes for 
Member State governments.
There is general support for 
significant increases in tobacco 
tax, particularly when revenues 
are allocated to tobacco control 
measures. The European 
Commission should consider 
and act upon the high levels of 
support for substantial tobacco tax 
increases and the evidence of their 
effectiveness for public health, by 
introducing tax increases and 
encouraging Member States to 
dedicate some of the revenues 
generated to support cessation, 
public education and prevention, 
as indicated in WP2.
Recommendation 2: 
The European Commission 
should consider and act upon 
the high level of support from 
the citizens of Member States for 
substantial increases in tobacco 
taxes, particularly if some of the 
tax revenue is used to support 
cessation, public education and 
prevention.
Addressing the problem of low-
price cigarettes would require 
setting a high minimum tax 
in monetary terms for each 
country as the main tobacco tax. 
This would eliminate the tax 
advantage of cheap or ultra-low-
priced cigarettes. For example, the 
minimum excise tax plus value-
added tax (VAT) could be set 
at 80% of the weighted average 
price of cigarettes (or preferably 
83%, as in Turkey). As some 
countries have very low pre-
tax prices, the tax would have 
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to be set at a minimum in euro 
equivalents also, if greater than 
80% of the weighted average 
price, possibly initially at €125 
per 1000 cigarettes in 2012 terms, 
subsequently increasing to allow 
for future inflation and income 
changes. Member States would be 
free to, and encouraged to, set this 
minimum tax at any higher level.
Recommendation 3: 
We also suggest that selling 
cigarettes below cost and low-
price-based marketing, including 
selling below the tax level, should 
be banned, as the deleterious 
effects of these practices were 
demonstrated in WP5. Member 
States should be transparent 
about all aspects of the taxes and 
publish an annual report showing 
all aspects of tobacco taxation and 
revenue and the weighted average 
price.
Recommendation 4: 
We recommend that the European 
Commission move to a tobacco 
tax structure that makes trading 
down to cheap cigarettes less 
attractive. This would avoid the 
unintentional widening of health 
inequalities promoted by existing 
tax structures.
Frequently, while persuading 
Member States that tobacco tax 
increases reduce tax revenue or 
increase smuggling, the tobacco 
companies raise their own prices, 
particularly for higher-price 
cigarettes. This serves to increase 
industry profit, while the Member 
States miss out on potential 
increases in tobacco tax revenue 
and opportunities to optimize 
the health benefits. The industry 
recognizes the segmentation of 
the market and the low, often 
zero, price elasticity of higher-
income smokers. They raise the 
price of higher-priced cigarettes 
to subsidize the ultra-low-price 
market. Using this strategy, they 
increasingly circumvent the 
high price sensitivity (high price 
elasticity of demand for cigarettes) 
of low-income smokers and 
attempt to retain them as smokers 
by providing ultra-low-priced 
cigarettes.
Recommendation 5: 
To avoid this anomaly, we 
recommend that the ad valorem 
tax proposed above (minimum 
80%, ideally 83%) be applied to 
all cigarettes priced above the 
weighted average price. This 
means that the excise tax plus VAT 
would be at least 80% of the retail 
price, with a minimum monetary 
tax equivalent to at least 80% of 
the average weighted retail price, 
or €125 per 1000 cigarettes, 
whichever is higher. Examples of 
the effects of these rates are given 
in Annex 4.
Incomes and cost of living 
vary among Member States, 
creating differences in the level 
of affordability for a given tax or 
price. At present, the minimum 
monetary tax is set at €64 per 1000 
cigarettes, but it must be raised to 
€90 per 1000 cigarettes by January 
2014 to comply with Directive 
2010/12/EC. Even at this low 
level, some Member States, under 
pressure from tobacco companies, 
have negotiated for derogation for 
several years, allowing their taxes to 
remain at even lower levels. This has 
the effect of causing governments 
to lose valuable tax revenue and 
increase both cigarette use and 
the prevalence of disease related 
to smoking. (These Member 
States are mostly those with the 
highest smoking rates.) This also 
aggravates the problem of cross-
border shopping by neighbours 
with higher tax levels.
Recommendation 6: 
We recommend consideration of 
tailoring the minimum tax so that 
it is comparable in affordability 
between countries, thereby 
allowing higher levels to be set 
automatically in higher-income 
countries.
This adjustment could be based 
on the ‘comparative price level’ or 
‘purchasing power parity’, which 
are available for all countries. The 
basic minimum tax could be set 
for the lowest-income Member 
State and adjusted upwards for 
others. The basic minimum tax 
would then be adjusted annually 
in line with inflation, income 
levels and the relative cost of 
living. The minimum could be 
set, for example, at €125 per 
1000 cigarettes for a specific 
low-price country and adjusted 
by comparative price level for all 
other countries.
At present, all countries tax 
fine-cut hand-rolling tobacco 
for roll-your-own cigarettes at 
a lower rate than manufactured 
cigarettes. Evidence from WP2 
shows that, in many European 
Union countries, considerable 
numbers of smokers, particularly 
in low-income groups, have been 
switching from manufactured to 
roll-your-own cigarettes, thus 
avoiding the effects of tax increases 
on manufactured cigarettes. The 
conversion rate used by the 
European Union between fine-
cut and manufactured cigarettes 
is based on the assumption that a 
roll-your-own cigarette contains 
1 g of tobacco; however, there is 
evidence from PPACTE WP2 
that the weight of one roll-your-
own cigarette is nearer to 0.7 or 
0.8 g. The ISO norm 15592–3 
for measuring tar and nicotine 
8 PRICING PoLICIES AND CoNTRoL oF ToBACCo IN EURoPE
in hand-rolling tobacco gives a 
somewhat lower estimate of 0.4–
0.75 g of tobacco per hand-rolled 
cigarette.
Recommendation 7: 
We recommend that there be full 
alignment of tax rates, so that 
fine-cut tobacco for roll-your-own 
cigarettes (and also pipe tobacco) 
is taxed at the same rate as 
manufactured cigarettes and at an 
appropriate conversion rate. The 
tax should include both a specific 
component, based on the weighted 
average price of cigarettes, and an 
ad valorem component and not 
provide a choice between specific 
and ad valorem, as at present.
Illicit trade in tobacco represents a 
serious threat to tobacco tax policy, 
government revenue and public 
health. Estimates suggest that tax 
avoidance and evasion represent 
about 11.8% of consumption 
in middle-income and 9.8% in 
high-income countries, although 
some countries have been highly 
successful in combating it. There 
are, however, little transparent or 
public data on illicit tobacco trade 
in European Union countries. Tax 
verification should remain in the 
independent domain of Member 
States and not with tobacco 
companies. Sufficient resources are 
required to support strong, effective 
enforcement, with severe penalties 
for people engaging in illicit trade.
Recommendation 8: 
We recommend that, to support 
tobacco tax reforms, the European 
Union support the proposed WHo 
FCTC protocol on illicit trade in 
tobacco products. This should 
include linking codes for individual 
packs with cartons and master 
cartons, a measure that is both 
feasible and essential. It should 
also be entirely independent of 
the tobacco industry.
For this to be effective, all bodies 
engaged in tobacco production, 
distribution and retail sales should 
be licensed and independent, and 
regular audits should be conducted 
to guarantee the validity of the 
system. The current KPMG 
audit is neither independent nor 
transparent and should undergo 
peer review and be open to scrutiny. 
PPACTE will provide a brief 
critical appraisal of its method 
and findings, if they are made 
available. Smuggling of cigarettes 
is a particular problem on the 
European Union eastern border, 
and we commend the recent 
European Commission anti-fraud 
strategy to address the problem. The 
European Union must continue 
working with officials in the 
Russian Federation, the Ukraine 
and other neighbouring countries 
on upwards harmonization of 
taxes with the European Union 
(Chapter 1, WP6).
As the PPACTE WP5 case 
studies and research clearly show, 
governments continue to engage 
with the tobacco industry in 
formulating tobacco taxation 
policy, so that tobacco companies 
constantly lobby Member State 
governments to persuade them 
to keep tobacco taxes low. This 
occurs despite the requirements 
of the WHO FCTC, to which 
all Member States with the 
exception of the Czech Republic 
are signatories. Tobacco companies 
tell governments incorrectly that 
if taxes go up tobacco revenue 
will decrease and smuggling will 
greatly increase.
Recommendation 9: 
We recommend that the European 
Commission educate Member 
States and the public about the 
beneficial effects of increased 
tobacco taxes and of improved 
tobacco tax structures in terms of 
government tax revenue and better 
health of citizens. The International 
Monetary Fund recommends, 
even insists, that European Union 
countries with high debt should 
increase their tobacco taxes, and 
the European Commission should 
reinforce that policy to counteract 
the misinformation from the 
tobacco industry.
There should also be greater 
recognition of, and publicity 
about, the known influence of 
transnational tobacco companies 
on the level and structure of 
tobacco taxes, particularly to the 
public in accession countries, 
where derogations harm health 
and financial interests and also 
harm revenue and public health 
in other Member States.
Recommendation 10: 
We recommend that European 
Union institutions and Member 
States take action to ensure 
that tobacco taxation policies 
are developed without tobacco 
industry involvement, in conformity 
with Article 5.3 of the WHo FCTC.
The surveys in WP2 included 
questions on the use of and access 
to snus in 18 countries. There is no 
clear agreement about the safety 
of snus or its role or the extent to 
which it is used as an alternative 
to smoked tobacco temporarily 
or permanently or as a cessation 
method. The embargo on snus 
should remain, unless further 
research establishes unequivocally 
that snus use is safe and sustainably 
improves public health by 
increasing smoking cessation.
Furthermore, online test purchases 
of snus within WP5 showed that 
it is currently sold illegally online 
by Swedish vendors to European 
Union nationals other than Swedes. 
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This is an important finding, 
considering that the transnational 
tobacco companies have now all 
had a stake in the Scandinavian 
snus market, are profiting from 
the illegal sales and are lobbying 
to have the European Union ban 
on snus sales removed.
Recommendation 11: 
We recommend that the embargo 
on snus remain, unless clear 
evidence is provided on its safety 
and its overall beneficial effects on 
health. Reversing the European 
Union ban on snus sales without an 
appropriate regulatory framework 
would present a danger to public 
health and should therefore be 
considered extremely cautiously.
Recommendation 12: 
We recommend that the European 
Commission (which is responsible 
for ensuring that European Union 
law is correctly applied) should 
investigate illegal sales of snus 
and Sweden’s apparent failure 
to fulfil its responsibilities under 
European Union law. To remove 
any ambiguity, a specific clause 
should be inserted in the text of 
the revised Tobacco Products 
Directive, prohibiting the sale 
of snus via the Internet, with a 
clear indication of the penalties 
facing those who contravene the 
legislation.
As confirmed by WP2 surveys, 
groups with lower socioeconomic 
status, lower income or lower 
educational attainment have a 
greater tendency to smoke cigarettes. 
Therefore, the burden of smoking-
related ill health and mortality 
(including lung cancer, ischaemic 
heart disease and chronic obstructive 
airways disease) is increasingly 
concentrated in these groups. 
Tobacco companies tend to target 
low-income groups, young people 
and women, considering these to 
be their growing or continuing 
markets. The tax structure we 
propose would tend to equalize 
the tax on cheap and high-price 
cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco and 
thus help to reduce inequalities 
in smoking and smoking-related 
diseases, as indicated in WP5.
Recommendation 13: 
We recommend the tax levels and 
structures proposed above as 
important contributions to reducing 
health inequalities resulting from 
socioeconomic inequalities in the 
prevalence of smoking.
Raising tobacco taxes leads some 
smokers to give up smoking. Many 
smokers achieve this without 
much support; however, smoking 
is a serious addiction, cessation 
is difficult for many, and support 
should be offered, particularly to 
smokers in low-income groups. The 
SimSmoke analyses described in 
Chapter 2 highlight the gains that 
can be achieved from improving 
smoking cessation services, as well 
as the importance of good mass 
media campaigns to support low-
income smokers in quitting (WP4).
Recommendation 14: 
We recommend that a percentage 
of the extra revenue from increases 
in tobacco tax be earmarked 
(hypothecated) for smoking 
cessation services and well-
designed mass media campaigns, 
particularly focused on the needs 
of low-income smokers.
Given the industry’s documented 
willingness to sell ultra-low-priced 
brands at a loss and evidence of 
a growth in price-based cigarette 
marketing, our research on the 
industry pricing strategy (WP5) 
supports a prohibition on below-
cost selling and price-based 
marketing. Packages displaying 
the product price are one form 
of price-based marketing used by 
the industry. Current discussions 
on the revision of the Tobacco 
Products Directive 2001/37/EC 
include the introduction of plain 
packaging. This would prevent 
the use of price-marked packs 
and thus limit the industry’s use 
of this marketing strategy.
Researchers on this project found it 
expensive and sometimes difficult 
or even impossible to obtain 
adequate up-to-date information. 
Effective tobacco taxation policy 
requires access to the necessary 
data to allow independent 
observers to calculate the price 
and tax elasticities of demand, 
to verify the direction of tax 
revenues, to detect movements to 
lower-priced tobacco products, to 
estimate the extent of illicit trade 
and to describe annual changes in 
smoking prevalence and levels of 
initiation and relapse.
At a minimum, data on the 
following variables should 
be reported by the relevant 
government departments of 
Member States to the European 
Commission and made publicly 
available through Eurostat:
•	Annual weighted average 
price by tobacco product type 
(e.g. cigarettes, pipe and hand-
rolling tobacco, smokeless 
tobacco, including snus, snuff 
and chewing tobacco); and
•	Annual tax-paid sales or 
releases for consumption of 
tobacco, by tobacco product 
type.
To allow more detailed monitoring 
and more sophisticated analysis 
of the effectiveness of tobacco 
taxation across Europe, data on 
the following variables should 
be reported to the European 
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Commission and made publicly 
available through Eurostat:
•	Annual (or more frequent) 
weighted average price by 
tobacco product type and price 
category;
•	Annual (or more frequent) 
tax paid sales or releases for 
consumption of tobacco by 
tobacco product type and price 
category;
•	Market share by tobacco 
product type and price category;
•	Annual tobacco tax revenue;
•	Tobacco tax structures and 
rates;
•	Data on illicit trade when 
available; and
•	Lists of licensees and 
registered products.
Furthermore, Eurobarometer 
and/or national population-based 
surveys should regularly collect and 
make publicly available data on:
•	Tobacco use prevalence by age, 
gender, socioeconomic status 
and tobacco product type, with 
agreed definitions and measures. 
In particular, smoking rates at 
early ages, such as 15–17, 18–21, 
21–24 and 25–29 years are 
needed; and
•	Prevalence of former smokers 
by the number of years since 
they quit, so that cessation rates 
can be estimated and tracked.
Recommendation 15: 
We recommend that all Member 
States be required to collect data 
and make them public, to allow 
monitoring and analysis of tobacco 
taxation and smoking prevalence.
Further research is needed on the 
impact of increased flexibility in 
the tobacco excise structure on: 
the demand for cigarettes, industry 
pricing strategy and illicit trade. 
Research is needed to provide 
evidence on the methods and 
consequences of further tobacco 
tax harmonization in the European 
Union and to facilitate alignment of 
tobacco taxes in neighbouring non-
European Union states. The effects 
of changes in tax rates on revenues 
generated should be monitored. 
Research is needed into the relevant 
conversion rate between roll-your-
own and manufactured cigarettes. 
Further methods for measuring 
illicit trade are required, with more 
detailed examination of its public 
health consequences. The effects 
of Internet sales and advertising 
on smuggling and illicit trade in 
the European Union should be 
evaluated. Lastly, independent 
research into the safety and role of 
smokeless tobacco is required.
Structure of the report
Chapter 1 gives an overview 
of the policy context and 
current developments in 
tobacco taxation. Chapters 
2–7 summarize the main 
findings of the PPACTE 
research work packages, 
according to five policy 
themes: (i) the effectiveness 
of tobacco taxation for 
public health (Chapter 2), (ii) 
tobacco tax structures and 
rates (Chapter 3), (iii) illicit 
tobacco trade (Chapter 4), 
(iv) industry influence on 
tobacco tax policy (Chapter 5) 
and (v) tobacco taxation and 
health inequalities (Chapter 
6). Each chapter contains an 
overview of the international 
literature, as reviewed and 
evaluated in the Handbook, 
followed by a summary of 
the new evidence emerging 
from the PPACTE research 
work packages. Chapter 7 
concludes and summarizes 
the recommendations for 
tobacco tax policy in the 
European Union.
THE PoLICy CoNTExT
FoR ToBACCo TAxATIoN
chApter 1
1.1 Introduction
In the European Union, smoking 
continues to be the largest single 
cause of death and disease, 
accounting for over 650  000 
premature deaths each year (1). 
Europe has only 15% of the world 
population but nearly one third of 
the worldwide burden of tobacco-
related diseases (2). In addition to 
the considerable death toll from 
smoking, tobacco is estimated to 
cost the economy €98–130 billion, 
or 1.04–1.39% of the European 
Union’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) for 2000 (2).
Despite increasing awareness of the 
health consequences of smoking, a 
third of all citizens in the European 
Union over the age of 15 currently 
smoke tobacco products (3). While 
smoking prevalence trends across 
the European Union have shown 
a decline in recent years, the 
rates remain alarmingly high and 
continue to rise among females in 
some Member States. In addition, 
the average age of initiation has 
dropped to 11 years of age (2).
In response to the health, economic 
and social costs of tobacco use, 
governments have implemented 
increasingly stringent tobacco 
control regulations during the past 
two decades. Action at Member 
State level has been reinforced 
and reinvigorated by the WHO 
FCTC, a widely embraced public 
health treaty that represents a 
legally binding agreement between 
Parties to implement evidence-
based tobacco control measures (4). 
In addition to measures regulating 
the supply of tobacco products, 
the FCTC calls on Parties to 
implement measures to reduce 
the demand for tobacco products, 
including price and tax measures, 
protection from exposure to 
tobacco smoke, product content 
regulations, packaging and 
labelling regulations, education 
and awareness-raising campaigns, 
smoking cessation support and 
bans on tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship. The 
European Union and all but 
one Member State (the Czech 
Republic, at the time of writing) 
are Parties to the FCTC.
The degree of implementation of 
tobacco control policy varies among 
Member States. Joossens and Raw 
(5) quantified implementation of 
tobacco control policies at country 
level on the ‘tobacco control scale’ 
and ranked 30 countries by their 
total score on the 100-point scale. 
In 2005, only four countries 
scored 70 or more (Iceland, 
Ireland, Norway and the United 
Kingdom), two countries scored 
above 60 (Malta and Sweden), 
seven scored above 50 (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Finland, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Poland) and 
the rest scored 49 or below (6). 
In 2010, while the average score 
on the scale had increased by 5%, 
suggesting some improvement in 
the implementation of tobacco 
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control measures, a similar pattern 
emerged. The new European 
Union accession states of central 
and eastern Europe continue to 
be strongly represented among 
the countries scoring lowest on 
this scale (7).
Taxation of tobacco products is 
an important means of tobacco 
control under European Union 
competence. Previously, tobacco 
tax policies reflected the sole 
priority of creating a strong single 
market economy. Early tobacco 
tax directives issued by the 
European Union were primarily 
concerned with harmonization of 
tax structures and approximation 
of tax rates to prevent market 
distortions and create a functioning 
single market. More recently, with 
the acceptance of health protection 
of all European Union citizens 
as a mandate, the importance 
of tobacco pricing policies in 
controlling tobacco has been 
increasingly emphasized.
Currently, there are large price 
discrepancies among European 
Union Member States, despite 
attempts to harmonize tobacco 
tax rates. As of March 2011, 
tobacco prices for 20 cigarettes in 
the most popular price category 
ranged from as high as €8.50 in 
Ireland and €6.90 in the United 
Kingdom to as low as €1.87 in 
Poland, €2.03 in Estonia and €2.14 
in Lithuania. Total tax (inclusive of 
VAT) as a percentage of total tax-
inclusive retail sales price ranged 
from 71.6% in Sweden to 88.7% 
in Bulgaria (8).
Increased integration within the 
European Union and the large 
price discrepancies in tobacco 
products among Member 
States provide incentives for 
tax avoidance. Tobacco taxation 
for tobacco control is further 
complicated and undermined 
by the presence of an extensive 
eastern land border with Belarus, 
the Russian Federation and the 
Ukraine—countries with high 
prevalences of smoking, very low 
real prices of tobacco products and 
relatively weak tobacco control 
policies. This border complicates 
the policing of illicit trade and 
exaggerates ‘grey-market’ activity, 
with a particular influence in new 
European Union Member States 
such as the Baltic States, Bulgaria 
and Romania. Tax avoidance and 
tax evasion have implications for 
government revenues and the 
effectiveness of tobacco control 
policies for public health.
Furthermore, tobacco control is 
one of the few public health issues 
that has an active opponent—
the tobacco industry—which 
is making calculated strategic 
attempts to undermine policy and 
thereby minimize public health 
gains, in the interest of protecting 
profits.
Effective and equitable control of 
tobacco in the European Union 
by the use of fiscal policies is 
both significant for addressing 
the disease burden caused by 
tobacco use and highly complex, 
because of the diversity among 
Member States in their stage in 
the tobacco epidemic, their level of 
tobacco control and their tobacco 
market structure, as well as their 
economic, cultural and political 
environments.
The main aim of the PPACTE 
project is to make evidence-
based policy recommendations 
to improve market regulation 
of tobacco products, for more 
effective, equitable control 
of tobacco in Europe. To 
achieve this aim, the PPACTE 
consortium undertook several 
studies with different methods to 
provide insight into the challenge 
of designing a tobacco tax policy 
within the complex policy 
environment of the European 
Union. It was structured into 
seven work packages as follows:
•	A working group of 
international experts was 
convened to produce a 
handbook, The effectiveness 
of tax and price policies 
for tobacco control (IARC 
Handbooks of Cancer Prevention, 
Volume 14), as a deliverable of 
PPACTE, referred to below as 
‘the Handbook’. It consists of 
a review and critical appraisal 
of the current international 
literature on the effectiveness 
of tobacco tax and price 
policies (WP7; Principal 
Investigator, Dr Maria Leon-
Roux, International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, France).
•	Over 18  000 citizens in 
18 European countries were 
surveyed on their attitudes 
towards and responses to 
tobacco tax and price policies 
(WP2; Principal Investigator, 
Dr Silvano Gallus, Istituto 
di Ricerche Farmacologiche 
Mario Negri, Italy).
•	Time series from 11 
European Union Member 
States were used to estimate 
the impact of price, income 
and tobacco control policies 
on the demand for tobacco 
products in each country 
(WP3; Principal Investigator, 
Professor Gunnar Rosenqvist, 
National Institute for Health 
and Welfare, Finland).
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•	D y n a m i c  s i m u l a t i o n 
models were adapted to assess 
independently for each of 
15 European countries the 
present impact of their tobacco 
tax policies and other tobacco 
control policies on smoking 
prevalence and smoking-
attributable deaths and to make 
predictions for the future (WP4; 
Principal Investigator, Professor 
David Levy, Pacific Institute 
for Research and Evaluation, 
United States).
•	 Industry influence on and 
responses to tobacco taxation 
were examined in key informant 
interviews, analysis of tobacco 
industry documents in case 
study countries and a detailed 
analysis of data on the British 
cigarette market (WP5; 
Principal Investigator, Professor 
Anna Gilmore, University of 
Bath, United Kingdom).
•	A policy panel was convened 
to integrate the PPACTE 
findings and distil the policy 
recommendations (WP6; 
Principal Investigator, Fiona 
Godfrey, International Union 
Against Tuberculosis and Lung 
Disease, France).
1.2 Role of the European 
Union in tobacco 
control policy
The European Union’s role in 
tobacco control has evolved 
over the past 25 years. In 1985, 
the European Council called 
on the European Commission 
to launch a programme against 
cancer, in an effort to expand the 
focus of the community beyond 
economic issues to ‘areas closer to 
the concerns of ordinary citizens’ 
(2). The ‘Europe Against Cancer 
Programme’ was established, with 
the objective of reducing the 
number of cancer deaths by 15% 
by the year 2000. As the leading 
preventable cause of cancer is 
tobacco use, tobacco control was 
thereafter considered to be within 
European Union competence, as 
long as actions could be justified 
under the Single European Act 
of 1986 (2). Previously, tobacco 
control was exclusively the 
jurisdiction of individual Member 
States. Inasmuch as tobacco control 
legislation could be justified on 
the basis of improved functioning 
of the internal market, it now 
came within the competence 
of the European Union. This 
formal role of tobacco control 
was enhanced by the Maastricht 
Treaty (1993) and the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1999). Article 129 of the 
Maastricht Treaty (now renamed 
Article 152) states: “A high level 
of human health protection shall 
be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Community 
policies and activities. Community 
action, which shall complement 
national policies, shall be directed 
towards improving public health, 
preventing human illness and 
diseases, and obviating sources 
of danger to human health. 
Such action shall cover the fight 
against the major health scourges, 
by promoting research into their 
causes, their transmission and 
their prevention, as well as health 
information and education.” (9)
All legislation enacted by the 
European Union, whether in the 
form of directives, regulations or 
non-binding resolutions, requires a 
legal basis in the founding treaties 
of the European Union (2). While 
Article 152 EC obligates the 
Community to ensure a high level of 
health protection in all its policies, 
there are no explicit provisions in 
the founding treaties to give the 
European Union authority to 
regulate public health; Article 
152 (4)(c) explicitly excludes 
harmonization of Member States’ 
laws and regulations solely for the 
protection of public health. The 
legal basis for much of the tobacco 
control legislation initiated by 
the European Union is therefore 
legislation on the functioning of 
the internal market, specifically 
Article 95 EC (previously Article 
100a EC) (2).
Within tobacco control, legislation 
in the form of directives or non-
binding resolutions is initiated 
and drafted by the European 
Commission and then approved 
by the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament (10). 
European law takes precedence 
over Member States’ domestic 
law. Therefore, directives must 
be implemented by Member 
States within the defined period 
and become legally enforceable 
after the stated period (9, 10). 
(European Union tobacco control 
legislation during the period 1989–
2010 is summarized in Annex 2.)
In addition, the European Union 
played an important role in 
negotiation of the WHO FCTC. 
In 1999, the Member States agreed 
a mandate issued by the Council 
of Ministers to the Commission, 
which authorized the Commission 
to negotiate on behalf of Member 
States in areas of European 
Union competence (10). During 
negotiation of WHO FCTC 
provisions, the Commission spoke 
on behalf of all Member States 
on any issue covered by European 
Union law, and the country 
holding the rotating European 
Union Presidency presented 
agreed positions on issues outside 
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Community competence (11). At 
the periodic Conferences of the 
Parties, the European Union is an 
intergovernmental organization 
working alongside Member States’ 
representatives to prepare protocols 
and guidelines for implementation 
of provisions of the WHO FCTC 
(11).
Tobacco taxation and the 
role of the European Union
Taxation of tobacco products 
is an important area of tobacco 
control under European Union 
competence. While early tobacco 
tax directives were primarily 
concerned with harmonization of 
tax structures and approximation 
of tax rates to prevent market 
distortions and create a 
functioning single market, more 
recent directives have reflected the 
acceptance of health protection of 
all European Union citizens as a 
mandate by placing emphasis on 
tobacco control objectives.
Tobacco taxation in the European 
Union continues to be a policy 
initiative that takes place against a 
complicated backdrop of national, 
European Union and international 
interests and obligations. Guarded 
national sovereignty concerns 
compete with attempts by the 
European Commission to assert 
its control over a key area of public 
policy, and the harmonization 
requirements of the single market 
often compete with the interests 
of public health.
Legal decision-making 
procedure for European 
Union tobacco taxation
Proposals for tobacco tax directives 
are drafted by the Tax Directorate 
of the European Commission 
after a 4-year review of existing 
legislation (12) and whether it 
requires amendment. Reports on 
the implementation of existing 
legislation are generally subject to 
a public consultation (13) before 
the final proposal is published.
All such legislation must be 
adopted unanimously by a special 
legislative procedure and in 
consultation with the European 
Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee. This means that 
the European Parliament can give 
its opinion on draft legislation, but 
that opinion is not binding on the 
Council. Notwithstanding, case 
law from the European Court 
of Justice prevents the Council 
from adopting legislation under 
the special legislative procedure 
until the Parliament has given 
its opinion (14). Generally, the 
European Parliament gives a 
favourable opinion (15).
Unanimity in the adoption 
of tobacco taxation 
directives
The adoption of proposed 
tobacco taxation directives 
requires unanimous agreement 
by all European Union Member 
States. The role of this unanimity 
requirement in tobacco taxation 
legislation has not been analysed. 
The European Commission has 
suggested that the unanimity 
requirement makes it harder 
for European Union taxation 
measures to be adopted and has 
called for a move to a qualified 
majority voting (16); however, a 
treaty change would be required, 
and all treaty changes must be 
passed unanimously. Changes to 
the unanimous decision-making 
processes for taxation policy are 
unlikely to be agreed, particularly 
by Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom, which have previously 
opposed such a move to protect 
other national taxation powers.
Even with the requirement 
for unanimity, the Council has 
generally agreed to most of the 
Commission’s proposals on 
tobacco taxation, albeit with 
some compromises. The question 
for European Union tobacco 
taxation is whether the unanimity 
requirement substantially weakens 
Commission proposals or even 
acts as a limiting factor when 
proposals are being drafted. To 
secure unanimous agreement on 
proposals, longer derogations have 
been granted to many Member 
States, irrespective of whether they 
are needed. For example, of the 
Member States given derogations 
until 2018 on implementation 
of key provisions of Directive 
2010/12/EU, all except Poland 
had met and even exceeded 
the provisions by July 2011. 
Unanimous decision-making may 
render tobacco industry lobbying 
(see Chapter 5) more effective, as 
they target certain Member States, 
knowing that a veto by just one 
Member State could stop the 
whole proposal.
The internal market and the 
case for harmonization of 
indirect taxes
With a view to creating a single, 
integrated European market, the 
1957 Treaty of Rome established 
the European Economic 
Community, made it possible to 
abolish customs barriers within 
the Community and established 
a common customs tariff to be 
applied to all goods from non-
Community countries. When 
the customs union was achieved 
in 1968, it was apparent that the 
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removal of tariffs was only one 
step towards achieving a common 
market; differentials in indirect 
taxation were a source of market 
distortion and thus a barrier to the 
creation of a functioning internal 
market (17).
It was acknowledged that the 
removal of frontier controls 
in the presence of substantial 
differentials in indirect taxation 
would create distortionary trade 
flows, incentives for smuggling 
and incentives for cross-border 
shopping, all of which would have 
implications for Member States’ 
revenues and income distribution 
(17). Indirect taxes are levied in 
the country of consumption. With 
the free movement of people, it 
would be impossible to distinguish 
between legitimate travellers and 
cross-border shoppers and it would 
be unfeasible to tax individuals. 
To resolve this issue, travellers’ 
allowances were established in 
1969; however, the provision of 
these allowances faced resistance 
from Member States that feared 
revenue losses. As stated in the 
White Paper, “The very existence of 
travellers’ allowances, their modest 
amounts and the disproportionate 
difficulty in obtaining agreement to 
limited increases, all demonstrate 
that it would be impossible to 
dismantle the fiscal frontiers unless 
there was a considerable measure 
of approximation of indirect 
taxation.” (17).
The challenge posed by differential 
tax rates and structures for tobacco 
and other excisable goods was 
foreseen in the 1957 Treaty; Article 
99 provided that the Commission 
would make proposals for the 
approximation of indirect taxation 
when this would contribute to the 
establishment and functioning 
of the internal market, and 
Article 100 established the legal 
foundation to do so.
In the case of tobacco, a limited 
degree of harmonization was 
achieved through Directive 
72/464/EEC. This Directive 
defined the structures of excise duty 
on manufactured tobacco (defined 
to include cigarettes, cigars and 
cigarillos, smoking tobacco, snuff 
and chewing tobacco), provided 
for harmonization in successive 
stages and defined a range of 
relations between specific duty 
and total duty (18). While this 
Directive defined the first stage of 
harmonization, subsequent stages 
were decided after review and a 
proposal by the Commission to the 
Council and could be deferred if 
the revenue of any Member State 
would be substantially adversely 
affected. Subsequent directives 
(described in Annex 3) responded 
to issues raised in the regular 
reviews and provided for further 
harmonization by tightening 
definitions of various tobacco 
product types, setting overall 
minima, establishing reference 
values for the calculation of tax and 
allowing for progressive increases.
Overview of Council 
Directive 2010/12/EU of 16 
February 2010
As required by Directive 2002/10/
EC (see Annex 3), the Commission 
was required to report every 4 years 
on the structure and rates of excise 
duty on tobacco. In preparation 
for the 2006 report, the European 
Commission commissioned a 
study on “the collection and 
interpretation of data concerning 
the release for consumption of 
cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco 
for the rolling of cigarettes”, 
which was conducted by KPMG (a 
consultancy firm providing audit, 
tax and advisory services) and 
published in December 2005 (12).
The KPMG study was based 
on data collected for the years 
2002, 2003 and 2004 from 
Member States and the European 
tobacco industry by means of a 
questionnaire (12). The conclusion 
of the study was that, between 2002 
and 2004, the quantities released 
for consumption had decreased by 
10%, while the average tax-inclusive 
retail selling price had increased 
by 12%. This decrease in the 
quantities released was explained 
by decreases in consumption, an 
increase in circumvention (4–5% 
legitimate circumvention and 
8–9% illegitimate circumvention) 
and a switch to other tobacco 
products. Tobacco products with 
a growing market share included 
fine-cut rolling tobacco and 
cheaper cigarettes. Substitution 
of fine-cut rolling tobacco for 
cigarettes was encouraged by the 
price differential between the 
products: in 2004, the average 
tax-inclusive retail selling price of 
cigarettes was €2.37 higher than 
that of rolling tobacco. The study 
recommended a gradual increase 
in excise duty for fine-cut tobacco 
such that it would reach two thirds 
of the overall minimum excise 
for tobacco. Further, the study 
highlighted the discrepancies in 
determination and application of 
the most popular price category as 
a reference value in calculating tax 
incidence and recommended that 
it be abolished. Lastly, the report 
noted that, while the quantity of 
cigarettes released for consumption 
in the new Member States had 
decreased by 7%, total duties 
collected had increased by 17% 
and the tax-inclusive retail selling 
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price had increased by 23%. The 
new Member States were far from 
reaching European Union excise 
duty minima, and bootlegging 
and smuggling from eastern land 
borders was soaring.
Following publication of the 
KPMG report, a pre-consultation 
was conducted. Subsequently, 
bilateral discussions took place 
between the Commission, national 
administrations and stakeholders 
from tobacco manufacturing and 
health organizations.
On the basis of the KPMG 
study and the pre-consultation, 
the Commission launched a 
consultation in 2007 and released 
a reflection paper (13) highlighting 
the issues and inviting views 
from businesses involved in the 
manufacture and distribution of 
tobacco products, government 
administrations, health 
organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations and other 
organizations representing 
consumers and other stakeholders 
on the review and possible changes 
to the structure and rates of excise 
duty applied on cigarettes and 
other manufactured tobacco.
Council Directive 2010/12/EU 
of 16 February 2010 amended 
directives 92/79/EEC, 92/80/
EEC and 95/59/EC on the 
structure and rates of excise duty 
applied to manufactured tobacco 
and Directive 2008/118/EC. 
On the recommendation of the 
KPMG report, this Directive 
abolished use of the most popular 
price category as the basis for 
calculating minimum rates for 
cigarettes. Instead, it introduced 
the weighted average retail selling 
price (weighted average price) as 
the calculation base, the weighted 
average price being equal to the 
total value of all cigarettes released 
for consumption (tax-inclusive 
retail selling price) divided by the 
total quantity of cigarettes released 
for consumption.
To reflect this change in the 
reference value for calculating tax 
incidence, Directive 2010/12/EU 
requires that the overall excise 
duty (specific and ad valorem) on 
cigarettes represent 57% of the 
weighted average retail selling 
price of cigarettes released for 
consumption and maintains the 
minimum tax floor of €64 per 
1000 cigarettes, irrespective of the 
weighted average price. The escape 
clause also references the weighted 
average price: Member States that 
levy an excise duty exceeding €101 
per 1000 cigarettes on the basis of 
the weighted average price need 
not comply with the 57% rule. To 
achieve greater convergence of 
prices and reduce consumption, 
this Directive increases the 
minimum levels of taxation 
on cigarettes (as well as rolling 
tobacco). As of 1 January 2014, 
Member States are required to levy 
an overall excise duty of at least 
60% of the weighted average price, 
with a minimum tax floor of €90 
per 1000 cigarettes. The reference 
value for the escape clause is also 
increased: from 2014, Member 
States that levy an excise duty 
exceeding €115 per 1000 cigarettes 
based on the weighted average 
price will not need to comply with 
the 60% requirement. Derogations 
were introduced for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania 
until 31 December 2017.
This Directive introduced a change 
in the band of specific excise, from 
between 5% and 55% of the total 
tax burden (specific, ad valorem 
and VAT) levied on the weighted 
average price to between 5% and 
76.5% of the reference value until 
the end of 2013. In 2014, this 
band will be narrowed to 7.5% 
and 76.5%.
Directive 2010/12/EU introduced 
quantitative restrictions, limiting 
the quantity of cigarettes that 
may be brought into higher-tax 
Member States without further 
duty payment from a Member 
State applying a transitional 
period. Similarly, if a Member 
State is applying a transitional 
period and has reached a monetary 
level of €77 per 1000 cigarettes, it 
may impose a quantitative limit 
on the number of cigarettes that 
may be brought in from other 
Member States in the transitional 
phase that have not reached this 
monetary limit.
To discourage the substitution 
of fine-cut rolling tobacco for 
cigarettes in response to increasing 
cigarette prices, amendments were 
introduced to create a partial 
alignment of excise on rolling 
tobacco and cigarettes. First, the 
minimum rates of excise on fine-
cut rolling tobacco are based on 
the new weighted average price as 
the reference value for calculations. 
Secondly, the rates of excise will 
be gradually increased to make 
a better approximation between 
the rates for fine-cut tobacco and 
the rates for cigarettes, such that 
the rates on fine-cut are up to 
two thirds of those for cigarettes. 
Effective 1 January 2011, the 
minimum rate of excise on fine-cut 
tobacco was 40% of the weighted 
average price or at least €40 per 
kilogram. This will increase to 43% 
of the weighted average price or 
at least €47 per kilogram by 
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January 2013, 46% of the weighted 
average price or at least €54 per 
kilogram by January 2015, 48% of 
the weighted average price or at 
least €60 per kilogram by January 
2018 and 50% of the weighted 
average price or at least €60 per 
kilogram by 2020 (compared 
with 60% of the weighted average 
price of cigarettes and €90 per 
1000 cigarettes by 2014). Gradual 
increases were also introduced for 
cigars and cigarillos, bringing the 
minimum rate to 5% of the tax-
inclusive retail selling price or €12 
per 1000 items or per kilogram, 
with derogations for Germany 
and Hungary until January 2015. 
Similar increases were introduced 
for other smoking tobacco, bringing 
the minimum rate to 20% of the 
tax-inclusive retail selling price, or 
€22 per kilogram.
Lastly, in an effort to ensure 
uniform, fair taxation, Directive 
2010/12/EU introduced revised 
definitions of the different tobacco 
products, which serve to ensure 
that competing products are taxed 
similarly. For example, under the 
new definitions, rolls of tobacco, 
which could be considered two 
cigarettes on the basis of their 
length, should be treated as two 
cigarettes for excise purposes. 
These new definitions restrict the 
freedom of the tobacco industry 
to counter increasing excises with 
product innovations.
European Union tax directives 
allow Member States flexibility in 
designing tobacco tax policy within 
a specified framework. Figure 1.1 
shows specific and ad valorem excise 
as a percentage of the tax-inclusive 
retail selling price of cigarettes in 
European Union Member States 
in January 2011 when Directive 
2010/12/EU came into effect. 
Figure  1.2 shows the overall 
minimum excise duty as a 
percentage of the tax-inclusive 
retail selling price for 20 cigarettes 
across the European Union. These 
figures illustrate the substantial 
differences in tax structure—
whether predominately specific or 
ad valorem or a balance between the 
two—and weighted average prices 
across the European Union.
Council Directive 2011/64/EU
The most recent Directive 
(2011/64/EU) entered into force 
retroactively from 1 January 2011. 
As Council directives 92/79/
EEC, 92/80/EEC and 95/59/EC 
had been substantially amended 
several times, Directive 2011/64/
EU repealed and codified those 
directives by assembling them 
Figure 1.1. Specific and ad valorem excise as a percentage of the tax-inclusive 
retail selling price of cigarettes in European Union Member States, 2011
Figure 1.2. Overall minimum excise duty as a percentage of the tax-inclusive 
retail selling price (TIRSP) and current weighted average price for 20 cigarettes in 
European Union Member States, 2011
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into a single act (18). This 
Directive defines the various 
categories of manufactured 
tobacco (cigarettes, fine-
cut tobacco intended for 
rolling cigarettes, cigars and 
cigarillos, other smoking 
tobacco), lays down the general 
principles governing taxation 
of manufactured tobacco and 
provides for application of overall 
minima to the various tobacco 
product types as established by 
Directive 2010/12/EC.
1.3 Role of the European 
Court of Justice 
in tobacco taxation
In line with its approach in other 
areas of policy, the European Court 
of Justice has become increasingly 
involved in European Union tax 
legislation. One key area of tobacco 
taxation on which the Court has 
been asked to rule concerns the 
imposition of minimum prices 
for the sale of cigarettes. Four 
countries — Austria, France, Ireland 
and Italy — were referred by the 
Commission to the Court in 2008 
for imposing minimum prices for 
packs of cigarettes in addition to 
their existing excise tax burden 
mandated by Directive 95/59/EC.
The French Government argued 
that Article 9(1) did not establish 
the principle that manufacturers 
and importers were free to 
determine prices. It also pointed 
out that, if it was obliged to 
approve prices, that implied that it 
could reject prices set by producers. 
It also relied on the public health 
exception under Article 30 of the 
European Commission Treaty, 
Article 6 of the WHO FCTC and 
the Council Recommendation in 
the Prevention of Smoking, which 
call for higher taxes on tobacco 
products. France also argued that 
manufacturers and importers 
regularly absorbed tax increases 
and did not pass them on to 
customers, thus undermining the 
objective of higher taxes, which is 
to reduce cigarette consumption. 
France was found to be in breach 
of European Union law (19). The 
European Court of Justice came to 
the same conclusion in cases by the 
Commission against Austria (20), 
Ireland (21) and Italy (22).
These rulings were handed down 
after the political agreement on 
the draft directive was reached 
in Council, but their provisions 
are respected in the consolidated 
Directive of 2011. The WHO 
FCTC and health protection are 
mentioned, but the 2011 Directive 
remains primarily an instrument 
to further internal market 
and competition policy in the 
European Union. The overriding 
objective of European Union tax 
measures is still to open up and 
harmonize the internal market in 
tobacco products and to promote 
competition. Since the adoption 
and ratification of the WHO 
FCTC, European Union tobacco 
taxation measures now refer to the 
protection of public health, but the 
internal market and competition 
policy still take priority.
1.4 The European Union 
response to low taxes in 
the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine
European Union Member States 
that border the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine have argued that 
their ability to increase taxes is 
restricted by the low taxes in these 
neighbouring countries. A shared 
border with these two countries, 
as well as some others in the 
region (Belarus, the Republic of 
Moldova), is also likely to result 
in more smuggling of cigarette 
products (23, 24). In response, 
the European Union is developing 
links with these countries, with the 
aim of strengthening cooperation, 
especially in customs control and 
cooperation in law enforcement.
The Eastern Partnership
The Eastern Partnership was 
established in 2009. All 27 
European Union Member States 
are members, plus Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, the 
Republic of Moldova and the 
Ukraine. Belarus was a member 
but withdrew in September 
2011. The main initiatives of the 
Partnership in relation to tax and 
smuggling are:
•	New association agreements, 
including deep, comprehensive 
free-trade agreements and 
easier legitimate travel to the 
European Union, while at the 
same time increasing efforts to 
combat corruption, organized 
crime and illegal migration; and
•	Multilateral platforms to 
support countries by providing 
a framework in which common 
challenges can be addressed. 
Four policy platforms are 
proposed: on democracy, on 
good governance, on stability 
and on economic integration 
and convergence with European 
Union policies. Under the 
Partnership, the European Union 
has negotiated an association 
agreement with the Ukraine, 
which covers action on corruption, 
customs cooperation and taxation 
(25). It was finalized in late 2011 
but not signed at the summit 
between the two countries on 19 
December because of European 
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Union concerns about the 
political climate in the Ukraine 
(26).
1.5 The European 
Commission anti-fraud 
strategy
Smuggling is also addressed 
in other instruments. In June 
2011, the Commission adopted 
a Communication on its anti-
fraud strategy (27). As part of 
that strategy, the Directorate-
General for the Taxation and 
Customs Union (DG TAXUD) 
issued a plan to combat tobacco 
and alcohol smuggling (28), with 
four objectives, to:
•	Support enforcement capacity 
with technical assistance, 
capacity-building and training;
•	Strengthen disincentives 
and raise awareness (make 
smuggling less profitable);
•	Strengthen enforcement by 
better operational cooperation, 
including shared intelligence; 
and
•	Enhance international 
cooperation.
The action plan involves 
cooperation among the 27 
countries of the European Union, 
the Eastern Partnership countries 
and the Russian Federation, 
facilitated by DG TAXUD and 
the European Anti-fraud Office 
(known as OLAF from its French 
name, Office de Lutte Anti-
Fraude). Engagement with the 
Russian Federation has been more 
limited than with the Ukraine. A 
more far-reaching agreement that 
would address common issues, 
such as smuggling and organized 
crime, has been under negotiation 
for some time (29).
Corruption 
and tobacco control
Tobacco control can be influenced 
by corruption in many ways. First, 
smuggling of tobacco products 
is related to corruption, as the 
illegal tobacco market thrives in 
countries where law enforcement 
is undermined. Secondly, 
tobacco companies have a vested 
interest in attempting to inhibit 
enactment and compliance of 
effective tobacco control policies 
(30). In some cases, in the United 
Kingdom for example, tobacco 
companies have provided financial 
benefits to politicians in return for 
changes in legislation beneficial for 
their business (8, 17). In relatively 
corrupt societies therefore, 
corruption is likely to undermine 
a range of policies but particularly 
those such as price, enforcement 
of smoke-free policies and access 
to products by children.
Across the European Union, the 
prevalence of smoking tends to 
be higher in countries with more 
corruption and less wealth and 
well-being (31). Bogdanovica et 
al. related data on corruption with 
implementation of tobacco control 
policy using ‘tobacco control 
scale’ scores and corresponding 
‘corruption perception index’ 
figures for 2005, 2007 and 2010. 
In the European Union, there 
is generally less corruption in 
the Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden) and more in 
southern European countries 
(Greece, Italy) and eastern 
European countries that joined 
the European Union recently 
(Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, 
Slovakia). Bogdanovica et al. found 
that strong governance is important 
in preventing tobacco smoking, 
and strong, transparent political 
leadership plays a key role in ensuring 
that effective tobacco control policies 
are both implemented and observed 
in the European Union (31).
Corruption and organized 
crime in cigarette 
smuggling in Europe
One area of tobacco control 
policy in which corruption 
plays an important role is in 
the facilitation of smuggling, 
which, as noted elsewhere in 
this report, undermines tobacco 
tax and control policies. As 
the findings of WP2 and WP5 
indicate (see Chapter 4), a shared 
border with key neighbouring 
countries significantly increases 
the risk of cigarette smuggling, 
irrespective of lower tobacco 
taxes in the European Union 
Member States that border 
those countries. Cigarette 
smuggling is a big business in 
the European Union, largely 
aided by corruption in customs 
and other related sectors.
In a detailed study of organized 
crime and corruption in the 
European Union, Gounev 
and Bezlov analysed the links 
between illicit cigarette trade, 
corruption and organized crime 
(32). They found that, although 
“each Member State has a specific 
illegal market structure…several 
generalizations could be made 
to sketch the illegal cigarette 
markets in the European Union.” 
These included large hierarchal 
structures, large networks, small 
networks, individual smugglers 
and counterfeiting networks. The 
targets of ‘corruption pressures’ 
included customs, politicians, the 
private sector and the police. Large-
scale cross-border smuggling was 
found to give rise to large amounts 
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of corruption. The reasons given 
included relatively low salaries, 
inadequate organization of 
operations to prevent corruption, 
an organizational cultural history 
of tolerating corruption and 
lack of economic alternatives. 
Corruption was found to be 
prevalent throughout the private 
sector, ranging from the tobacco 
manufacturers themselves to 
small duty-free shops. The 
authors found that “no particular 
evidence of political corruption 
was provided, although 
allegations were made about 
existing problems in Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania”. 
It was generally considered that 
corruption was used to influence 
customs officers to provide 
protection to private sector 
players and that corruption was 
more prevalent in small border 
towns.
European Union corruption 
control and prevention
While corruption is not necessarily 
an impediment to the adoption of 
tobacco control legislation, it can 
be an impediment to its effective 
implementation. It is clearly 
important therefore that the 
European Union and its Member 
States take their obligation to 
prevent corruption seriously. 
According to the most recent 
‘corruption perceptions index’ of 
Transparency International (33), 
the performance of European 
Union Member States on 
corruption varies widely. Three 
Member States (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden) were in 
the top four globally, while four 
others (Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and 
Romania) ranked considerably 
lower.
European Union and 
Member States’ legal 
commitments on corruption
The European Union and its 
Member States are signatories 
to several anti-corruption 
mechanisms at national, 
European Union, European and 
global level:
•	A framework decision on 
combating corruption in the 
private sector (34);
•	Accession of the European 
Union to the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption 
in 2008 (35);
•	The Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union 
(the Lisbon Treaty), which 
recognizes that corruption is a 
serious cross-border problem for 
the European Union and grants 
it the power to enact legislation 
to tackle it (36);
•	The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Officials in International 
Business Transactions (Anti-
Bribery Convention) (37);
•	The Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption (38);
•	An additional protocol to the 
Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption (ETS 191), adopted 
on 15 May 2003;
•	The Council of Europe Civil 
Law Convention on Corruption 
(39); and
•	Twenty Guiding Principles 
against Corruption (resolution 
(97) 24 of the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers) (40).
Three European Union Member 
States have not ratified the 
Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption (Austria, Germany 
and Italy); 12 have not ratified its 
protocol; seven have not ratified the 
Civil Convention on Corruption 
(Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom); and three have 
not ratified the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption 
(Czech Republic, Germany and 
Ireland). The efforts of the European 
Union and Member States to 
prevent corruption can therefore 
be characterized as inconsistent 
at best. European Union 
anticorruption legislation is not 
transposed in all Member States; 
some countries have not ratified 
the most important international 
anticorruption instruments, and, 
more importantly, even where 
anticorruption institutions and 
legislation are in place, enforcement 
is often insufficient in practice (41).
The Communication proposed 
several areas of action on 
corruption:
•	A European Union 
anticorruption report to 
monitor Member States’ 
activities against corruption, 
consequently encouraging more 
political engagement;
•	European Union participation 
in the Council of Europe’s 
Group of States against 
Corruption;
•	A stronger focus on corruption 
in all relevant external and 
internal European Union 
policies, including proposals 
for legislation on asset seizure, 
and a requirement that more be 
done by neighbouring countries 
to combat corruption; and
Chapter 1. The policy context for tobacco taxation 21
•	Public–private dialogue on 
corruption (41).
In response to the consultation, 
Transparency International 
Germany noted the lack of a 
European Union strategy to 
fight corruption and proposed 
that one be prepared. This 
suggestion was not taken up in 
the 2011 Communication (42). 
It is imperative that Member 
States ratify and implement 
their existing international 
commitments, especially in the 
customs sector, where most 
corruption takes place.
1.6 Tobacco tax 
administration
To achieve the revenue objectives 
of tobacco taxation, an efficient, 
effective system for accurate 
assessment of excise liability 
and collection of tax payments 
is required. An effective tax 
administration system ensures 
good compliance with tax 
laws, while an efficient system 
ensures compliance for a low 
administrative cost relative to the 
revenue collected. These require 
both technical capacity within the 
tax administration agency and a 
well-designed, transparent, clearly 
defined tax (43).
Compliance measures
Compliance with tax directives 
can be promoted in several 
ways, including: licensing and 
registration systems, monitoring 
of domestic production and trade 
activities, requiring tax returns to 
be filed regularly, adopting state-
of-the-art tracking and tracing 
systems and ensuring a sufficient 
number of enforcement officers 
and investigators (43).
To collect excise duties, all excise 
liability must be identified. For this, 
all producers, importers, warehouse 
keepers and exporters of tobacco 
products should be required to 
register with tax authorities and 
apply for a license for production, 
distribution and retail sales. 
Furthermore, retailers should be 
required to purchase products 
only from licensed importers, 
wholesalers or producers (44).
Domestic production and trade 
can be monitored by conducting 
physical checks and accounting 
audits and using verification 
techniques, including fiscal 
markings (43). Tax authorities 
should ensure that shipments 
into and out of tobacco production 
facilities are controlled. Producers 
should be required to make records 
available for inspection by the tax 
authorities on a regular basis, and 
authorities should audit production 
and shipment records periodically 
(44). Excise duty payments are 
based on manufacturers’ declarations 
of production levels. Within the 
European Union (and Turkey), tax 
is paid within a minimum of 15 
and a maximum of 30 days after 
cigarettes leave the factories. Taxes 
on imported products are paid at the 
point of importation, and products 
are not distributed until all duties 
have been collected. Fiscal markings 
or tax stamps (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4) are a means of monitoring 
production and importation and 
allow differentiation of licit products 
from illicit ones (43). The costs of tax 
stamps are borne by the companies 
at the time of tax payment.
Countries in the European 
Union oblige warehouse keepers 
to produce, hold and distribute 
tobacco products under suspension 
of the excise duty. Tax authorities 
apply strict criteria when granting 
authorization for duty suspension, 
including preauthorization visits 
to warehouses, detailed plans for 
facilitating checks and audits and 
adequate stock control measures.
Producers can purchase a bond or 
similar security to ensure that all 
tax liabilities are paid. For bonded 
production facilities, the excise is 
levied when the excisable goods 
are removed from the facility and 
released for consumption (44). Under 
the duty suspension arrangement 
in the European Union, guarantees 
can be requested from warehouse 
keepers, the amount of which 
should reflect the risks inherent 
in the activities of the warehouse 
keeper or the registered trader; this 
requires regular review for alignment 
with changes in trade volume.
Enforcement
Tax administration can be 
strengthened by ensuring 
sufficient capacity for enforcement. 
Authorities responsible for 
administration and enforcement 
of tobacco tax policy, which 
may include police, other law 
enforcement authorities and 
public health inspectors, should be 
clearly designated and authorized 
to search, seize, retain and dispose 
of products, in line with law 
enforcement practices.
Penalties 
for noncompliance
Penalties for noncompliance with 
tax laws usually include suspension 
or cancellation of business licenses, 
fines, forfeiture of products or 
equipment or other administrative 
sanctions. Penalties and interest 
are applied to the late payment of 
taxes.
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In November 2000, the European 
Commission filed a civil action 
against Phillip Morris, R.J. 
Reynolds and Japan Tobacco 
(45), accusing the companies of 
tax evasion by their involvement 
in smuggling. In 2004, the 
European Commission and the 
10 Member States that joined 
the civil action dropped the case 
in return for a legally binding, 
enforceable agreement. This 
agreement required Philip Morris 
to pay the European Commission 
US$1 billion over 12 years and to 
make payments in the event of any 
seizures of its genuine products 
above 50 000 cigarettes in the 10 
European Union countries. If more 
than 90 million genuine cigarettes 
are seized in those 10 countries in 
any one year, Philip Morris agreed 
to pay five times the taxes due (45).
Forestalling
When manufacturers, wholesalers 
or retailers can anticipate a 
tax increase, they may increase 
production or stocks of tobacco 
products to take advantage of the 
lower tax rate. This form of tax 
avoidance is called ‘forestalling’. It 
can result in a loss to governments 
of tax revenue and the availability 
of cheaper tobacco products when 
the tax increase is significant. To 
prevent forestalling, releases for 
consumption can be restricted in 
advance of a tax increase, or tax 
administrators could be entitled 
to collect a ‘floor tax’, applying the 
new tax for the tobacco products 
that were produced and kept in 
stock before the higher tax became 
effective (43).
Contact between taxpayers 
and tax administrators
Effective administration of excise 
taxes requires well-established 
integration between taxpayers and 
the tax administrative agency to 
facilitate monitoring of production 
and verification of compliance with 
tax laws (43). Any contact between 
tax administration agencies and 
the tobacco industry should respect 
obligations under Article 5.3 of the 
WHO FCTC.
1.7 International context 
of tobacco taxation 
policy
Tobacco taxation is part of an 
ever-expanding international 
framework of policies for tobacco 
control, trade, intellectual 
property, corruption, criminality, 
foreign affairs and home affairs. 
Tobacco taxation also plays a role 
in the global economic crisis, as 
governments look to ‘sin taxes’ 
to raise revenue in dire economic 
times. It has also been considered 
a potential source of ‘own funds’ 
for the European Union budget. 
Another form of tobacco taxation—
taxing tobacco companies—is now 
being put forward as a means of 
financing long-term development 
and helping countries to meet their 
Millennium Development Goals. 
This section describes current 
developments and innovations in 
the wider international context 
with implications for European 
Union tobacco tax policy.
Tobacco taxation and 
the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco 
Control 
The importance of tobacco taxation 
as a tobacco control intervention 
measure is recognized explicitly 
in the WHO FCTC in Article 6: 
“The Parties recognize that price 
and tax measures are an effective 
and important means of reducing 
tobacco consumption by various 
segments of the population, in 
particular young persons.” It calls 
on Parties to: “Determine and 
establish their taxation policies, 
each Party should take account 
of its national health objectives 
concerning tobacco control and 
adopt or maintain, as appropriate, 
measures which may include:
•	 Implementing tax policies 
and, where appropriate, price 
policies, on tobacco products so 
as to contribute to the health 
objectives aimed at reducing 
tobacco consumption; and
•	Prohibiting or restricting, 
as appropriate, sales to and/or 
importations by international 
travellers of tax- and duty-free 
tobacco products.” (4)
The first guidelines on priorities 
for Parties after entry into force of 
the Convention were for Article 
8 (smoke-free policies). These 
were followed by the adoption 
of guidelines on Article 5.3 
(tobacco industry interference 
in health policy) (46), Article 
11 (warning labels) (47) and 
Article 13 (tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship) 
(48) at the third Conference of 
the Parties in November 2008. 
At the fourth Conference, in 
November 2010, guidelines on 
Article 12 (education, information 
and awareness raising) (49) and 
Article 14 (cessation) (50) were 
adopted.
The second Conference of the 
Parties authorized the negotiation 
of a protocol on illicit trade in 
tobacco products (51), and the first 
negotiations took place in Geneva 
in February 2008. Three further 
intergovernmental negotiating 
sessions have been held, and the 
Chapter 1. The policy context for tobacco taxation 23
final session is due to take place 
in March and April 2012.
In addition, at the second 
Conference of the Parties, 
working groups were established 
on Articles 9 and 10 (regulation 
of contents and disclosure) and 
17 and 18 (alternative crops) 
(52), and work on Article 6 was 
mandated by commissioning a 
report from the WHO Tobacco 
Free Initiative (53). The report, 
on the international evidence on 
tobacco taxation, was presented 
at the fourth Conference of the 
Parties in November 2010 (54) 
and concluded:
•	When governments set 
taxes, they should reduce 
the affordability of tobacco 
products to such an extent 
that tobacco use and its 
consequences are reduced 
significantly, particularly 
by those most at risk of 
taking up tobacco (young 
people) and those who bear 
a disproportionate burden 
of the health and economic 
consequences of tobacco use 
(economically disadvantaged 
people).
•	A tax structure that raises the 
prices of all tobacco products 
and minimizes the gap between 
the prices of low- and high-
priced brands of a given type 
of tobacco product reduces the 
opportunities for tobacco users 
to switch to cheaper brands or 
products in response to tax 
increases, thus maximizing the 
health effect of a tobacco tax 
increase.
The significant new revenue that 
can be generated by increasing 
tobacco tax could be used to 
support comprehensive tobacco 
control, thereby adding to the 
health and economic benefits of 
such an increase (54).
After considering this report, the 
Parties authorized establishment 
of a working group to elaborate 
guidelines on Article 6 (55). 
The Working Group is expected 
to make recommendations for 
adoption of guidelines at the 
fifth Conference of the Parties 
in November 2012.
Also relevant to tobacco fiscal 
policy is Article 5.3, on the 
protection of tobacco control 
policies from vested interests. 
Article 5.3 requires that all Parties, 
“In setting and implementing 
their public health policies with 
respect to tobacco control,… shall 
act to protect these policies from 
commercial and other vested 
interests of the tobacco industry 
in accordance with national law.”
To assist Parties, guidelines were 
adopted at the third Conference 
of the Parties in 2008, which 
established several principles (46):
•	Principle 1: There is a 
fundamental and irreconcilable 
conflict between the tobacco 
industry’s interests and public 
health policy interests.
•	Principle 2: Parties, when 
dealing with the tobacco 
industry or those working to 
further its interests, should be 
accountable and transparent.
•	Principle 3: Parties should 
require the tobacco industry 
and those working to further 
its interests to operate and act 
in a manner that is accountable 
and transparent.
•	Principle 4: Because their 
products are lethal, the tobacco 
industry should not be granted 
incentives to establish or run 
their businesses. 
The impact of the global 
financial crisis on tobacco 
taxation
The global financial crisis has given 
an incentive to governments to 
exploit the revenue-generating 
potential of tobacco taxes by 
introducing tax increases. Since 
2008, many European Union 
Member States have raised their 
tobacco taxes to supplement 
revenues (56). The end of the 
accession derogations on tax levels 
contributed to this trend, but some 
countries took the opportunity 
to increase taxes above the new 
minimum limits. Others have 
already reached the new tax limits 
required in Directive 2010/12/
EC, without waiting to make 
use of the further derogations 
granted to them. Some countries, 
however, such as Estonia (57), 
have delayed acquiring much-
needed revenue in order not to 
raise inflation too much. Other 
countries avoided this problem by 
removing tobacco products from 
the consumer price index, as had 
been done in Luxembourg and the 
United Kingdom. The Ukraine also 
took advantage of the crisis in 
2008 to increase taxes significantly 
in three phases over 18 months. 
(See Chapter 3 for a discussion of 
Ukrainian tax policy.)
Innovative tobacco taxation 
policies
While some governments have 
long realized the potential of 
tobacco taxation for raising revenue 
for domestic budgets, attention has 
turned recently to use of tobacco 
taxation as a source of revenue for 
funding international development. 
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Two recent initiatives have taken 
this forward: the ‘innovative health 
financing’ mechanism and the 
Gates Foundation report to the 
G20 summit in November 2011.
The taxation options being 
considered include ‘solidarity levies’ 
such as on air tickets, currency 
transactions and tobacco. It was 
considered that tobacco taxation 
could potentially generate more 
than US$ 10 billion in revenue each 
year with some of the lowest pro rata 
implementation costs (less than 5% 
of revenue per year), taking into 
account the fact that 152 countries 
already have some kind of tobacco 
taxation system in place (58).
The High-level Task Force 
on Innovative International 
Financing for Health Systems 
considered increased tobacco 
taxation to be politically feasible 
and desirable, for several reasons. 
First, tobacco taxation is not new, 
and most countries in the world 
already levy some kind of tobacco 
tax. Tax administration structures 
therefore already exist in countries, 
and no new structures would be 
necessary to collect revenues 
from this source. Additionally, 
high-income countries could 
use contributions from tobacco 
taxation to meet their target of 
0.7% of gross domestic product for 
overseas development assistance, 
and low-income countries could 
contribute to their own health-
care systems. They would also have 
greater ownership and flexibility in 
funding and be less dependent on 
aid. Both would reap the benefits 
of lower tobacco consumption and 
smoking without a reduction in 
overall tobacco tax revenues.
Tobacco taxation and accelerated 
implementation of the FCTC 
were put forward as means of 
preventing noncommunicable 
diseases and financing health 
systems at the United Nations 
General Assembly High-level 
Meeting on Noncommunicable 
Diseases in September 2011, 
although the recommendations of 
the Task Force were not referred to 
specifically (59). If the European 
Commission can propose a tax on 
financial transactions, it should 
no longer be unthinkable for the 
Commission to consider levying 
a tax on the turnover of tobacco 
companies doing business in the 
European Union.
Implications for European 
Union tobacco taxation policy
European Commission directives 
are powerful, effective instruments 
for achieving tobacco tax increases 
and offer great possibilities for 
tobacco control. The complexity 
and variety of Member 
States’ taxation structures and 
administrations, with revenue 
and political implications, pose 
significant challenges to the 
implementation of directives. All 
European Union countries (except 
the Czech Republic) and all 
significant neighbouring countries 
are Parties to the WHO FCTC. 
Compliance with requirements 
under this Convention should 
facilitate partnerships and give an 
incentive to resolve international 
border control issues and tackle 
illicit trade. Transparency in 
institutional decision-making 
and full implementation of the 
Article 5.3 guidelines are requisites 
for progress in European tobacco 
taxation policy. Implementation of 
strong anticorruption measures is 
also essential to achieving effective, 
equitable tobacco taxation in 
Europe.
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EFFECTIVENESS oF ToBACCo TAxATIoN 
FoR ToBACCo CoNTRoL IN EURoPE
chApter 2
Historically, revenue generation has 
been the main objective of tobacco 
taxation. Tobacco is a subject 
for efficient taxation, given the 
large sales volumes, the relatively 
inelastic demand, the lack of close 
substitutes and the relative ease of 
administration and enforcement 
(1). Demand for tobacco products 
is relatively ‘price inelastic’, 
meaning that the proportional 
reduction in consumption is less 
than the proportional change 
in price. As a result, significant 
increases in tobacco taxes generate 
increases in associated revenues for 
governments. Furthermore, tobacco 
taxes are relatively easy to collect 
with a low administration cost, as 
there are few producers and large 
sales volumes (1).
While tobacco taxes have long 
been used to generate revenues 
for governments, they also provide 
a means to increase the price 
of tobacco products, dissuade 
consumption and thereby improve 
public health. Economic theory 
suggests that, in a free, competitive 
market, society’s scarce resources 
are most efficiently allocated by 
the consumption decisions of 
private individuals, assuming 
that consumers are well informed 
and that the costs and benefits of 
their decisions are borne solely by 
each of them. From an economic 
perspective, regulation of the 
tobacco market through taxation is 
justified on the basis of improved 
efficiency, by correcting failures in 
the market, specifically information 
asymmetries and externalities. 
Tobacco consumers may not be 
fully aware of the risks associated 
with smoking tobacco or may not 
consider themselves vulnerable 
to such risks. Furthermore, they 
may underestimate the risk for 
becoming addicted or the costs 
associated with quitting tobacco 
use. Consumers therefore take 
a decision to consume tobacco 
products without complete 
information on the costs and 
benefits of their choice (information 
asymmetry). Moreover, the 
consumer does not bear all the costs 
associated with his or her decision 
to consume tobacco products. Some 
of the costs borne by society or by 
individuals other than the tobacco 
consumer (externalities) include 
the harm caused by second-hand 
smoke, the costs associated with 
treating tobacco-related diseases 
and the loss to society of income 
and consumption taxes due to 
lost productivity and premature 
mortality among smokers.
Economic theory further suggests 
that young people and people with 
low incomes are likely to be more 
responsive to tax and price increases, 
for several reasons. First, the greater 
the proportion of an individual’s 
disposable income spent on a good, 
the more responsive the individual 
will be to price changes. The 
proportion of disposable income 
spent on cigarettes is likely to be 
greater among young smokers 
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than among adult smokers (2) and 
among people with lower incomes 
than those with higher incomes, 
as people in lower socioeconomic 
groups are more likely to smoke 
and be heavy smokers than those 
in higher socioeconomic groups 
(3–5). Secondly, young people have 
a greater propensity to discount the 
future costs of smoking in terms of 
the associated health consequences 
and place greater emphasis on 
the short-term costs, such as 
the price of tobacco (2). Thirdly, 
young people are more likely to 
have a shorter smoking history 
than adults and therefore be more 
responsive to a change in price 
than those who are more addicted 
(6). Furthermore, young people 
are both directly affected by price 
increases and indirectly affected by 
peer and parental influence. Peers 
and parents influence smoking 
through role modelling; an effect of 
price increases on peer and parent 
smoking will have an incidental 
effect on young people due to 
reduced modelling (7–10).
Over 100 studies have been 
published worldwide on the 
impact of tobacco prices on the 
demand for tobacco products. Early 
empirical literature was based on 
aggregate data—data pooled for all 
relevant individuals for the relevant 
variables—typically produced 
by government agencies. The 
proportion of studies of tobacco 
demand based on aggregate data 
has been declining relative to 
studies based on microeconomic 
or household cross-sectional data 
(11). Individual-level data allow 
researchers to estimate the impact 
of price or income changes on the 
consumption of tobacco products 
in different population groups (by 
e.g. age, gender, socioeconomic 
group) or to determine changes 
in smoking prevalence due to the 
effect of price on initiation and 
cessation or smoking intensity 
(the amount consumed by people 
who continue to use tobacco) (11). 
Much recent empirical work has 
been based on large data sets from 
surveys and the unique research 
design resulting from the separate 
legislative, excise tax and retail 
pricing systems of the many states 
and territories of the United States 
of America. There is also a growing 
body of literature from other high-
income countries and low- and 
middle-income countries.
Regardless of the data type or 
empirical strategy used, one of 
the aims of all studies of tobacco 
demand is to estimate price 
elasticity, which indicates by what 
percentage the quantity demanded 
changes in response to a 1% 
change in price. Estimates of price 
elasticity allow prediction of the 
probable decrease in consumption 
corresponding to a change in the 
tax-inclusive price of tobacco and 
the subsequent implications for 
government revenue.
The following sections summarize 
a comprehensive review of the 
literature conducted as part of 
the PPACTE project (WP7) and 
published in the IARC Handbooks 
of Cancer Prevention as Volume 14, 
Effectiveness of tax and price policies 
for tobacco control (11).
2.1 Summary review 
of studies of tobacco 
demand based on 
aggregate data
Despite many differences in 
research methods, estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand for 
tobacco products are robust. All 
the empirical studies of aggregate 
demand reviewed included 
cigarette price as a determinant 
of cigarette consumption, and the 
estimates of price elasticity varied 
from -0.15 to -0.90 in studies in 
the United States (12–40), from 0 
(not significant) to -1.2 in studies 
in other high-income countries (4, 
41–78) and from -0.2 to -0.8 in 
low- and middle-income countries 
(76, 79–106).
Most of the aggregate demand 
studies in Europe were conducted 
in the United Kingdom. With 
two exceptions, all the estimates 
of price elasticity in these studies 
lie between -0.2 and -0.6. Stone 
(1945) (41), Prest (1949) (42) and 
Koutsoyiannis (1963) (43) were 
the first to estimate demand for 
tobacco in any country. The study 
of Townsend (1987) (4) was unique 
in that elasticity was measured 
for different social classes in the 
United Kingdom; she found that 
unskilled male workers were more 
responsive to price changes than 
male professionals. Expanding on 
this study, Townsend, Roderick 
and Cooper (1994) (63) estimated 
price elasticity for different 
socioeconomic and age groups 
from aggregate data and found 
that females were more sensitive 
to price changes than males and 
that elasticity was inversely related 
to social class. Young men were not 
price-responsive, but young women 
were.
Duffy (1991) estimated ‘own 
price’ and cross-price elasticity 
in the demand for cigarettes and 
alcoholic drinks (beer, wine and 
spirits) from aggregate data in the 
United Kingdom with an ‘almost 
ideal demand system’ (59). He 
found that cigarettes and alcoholic 
drinks were not complementary 
goods, implying that consumption 
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of cigarettes did not significantly 
increase with a decrease in the price 
of alcohol, or vice versa. Escario 
and Molina (2004) used a similar 
modelling approach in Spain but 
for three different types of tobacco 
product: Virginia tobacco, black 
tobacco and cigars (75). They found 
that price elasticity fell in absolute 
terms between 1964 and 1995. The 
price elasticity for all the tobacco 
products considered was negative, 
and Virginia tobacco and cigars 
were more price-sensitive than black 
tobacco. Furthermore, Virginia and 
black tobacco were found to be 
substitutes in consumption, as were 
black tobacco and cigars, meaning 
that the consumption of one product 
increased with an increase in the 
price of the other product. Virginia 
tobacco and cigars were complements 
in consumption.
Mindell and Whynes examined 
substitution between manufactured 
cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco 
in the Netherlands (69). They 
found that, when the price of hand-
rolled cigarettes increased by a 
greater proportion than the price of 
manufactured cigarettes, the decline 
in consumption of manufactured 
cigarettes was accompanied by 
a decline in that of hand-rolled 
cigarettes, suggesting the importance 
of taxing hand-rolling tobacco at the 
same or higher rate than cigarettes.
Several studies were conducted 
in Greece to estimate the price 
elasticity of demand (43, 55, 65, 66). 
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou 
(1997) estimated a dynamic 
specification of demand and found 
a short-run elasticity of -0.33 and 
a long-run elasticity of -0.60 (66). 
Other studies showed a short-run 
price elasticity of -0.01 to -0.08 
(55), while Koutsoyiannis (1963) and 
Cameron (1997) found that price 
was a nonsignificant determinant of 
consumption (43, 65).
Studies to estimate price elasticity, 
also based on aggregate time series 
data, have been conducted in 
European Union accession states, 
including Estonia (88) and Poland 
(80), a candidate country, Turkey 
(93, 105), and an eastern border 
country, the Ukraine (104). The 
estimates were -0.11 in Poland, 
-0.32 to -0.34 in Estonia and 
-0.09 to -0.44 in Turkey. Price was 
a nonsignificant determinant of 
demand in the study in the Ukraine. 
Most of the estimates indicate that 
the demand for tobacco in low- 
and middle-income countries lies 
between -0.2 and -0.8, suggesting 
that demand is less price-inelastic. 
Therefore, the populations of low- 
and middle-income countries are 
more responsive to price increases 
than those of high-income 
countries.
Overall, these findings imply 
that the demand for cigarettes is 
relatively price-inelastic, suggesting 
that excise taxes are effective for 
reducing cigarette consumption 
while still yielding revenue for 
governments. An increase in 
the excise tax increases the retail 
price of cigarettes, which in turn 
decreases cigarette consumption. 
Furthermore, as demand for 
cigarettes is price-inelastic, the 
increase in price will be greater 
than the decrease in consumption. 
Therefore, total tax revenue is likely 
to rise when taxes rise, as the tax 
increase more than compensates for 
declining consumption.
In many studies, the impact of 
income on smoking behaviour has 
been estimated simultaneously with 
the income elasticity of demand, 
i.e. the proportional change in 
consumption in response to a 1% 
change in income. Generally, the 
evidence suggests that income is a 
significant determinant of tobacco 
product demand. Estimates of 
income elasticity in Europe are 
between 0.07 and 1.2 (11). While 
there is no consensus on the 
value of the income elasticity of 
demand for tobacco products for 
all countries, the value is generally 
between 0 and 1, suggesting that 
tobacco consumption increases as 
income grows. There is no evidence 
that income elasticity has changed, 
except in the United States, where 
it has declined (11). Therefore, in 
a growing economy, the price of 
cigarettes would have to increase at 
the same rate as income to prevent 
tobacco from becoming more 
affordable and to prevent rises in 
consumption.
2.2 Summary of 
studies of tobacco 
demand based on 
microeconomic data
Individual or household data are 
being used in more and more 
studies to assess the impact of 
tobacco product taxation and 
prices on tobacco use. Survey 
data have been used to examine 
the differential impacts of tax and 
price on tobacco use in population 
subgroups defined by gender, age, 
socioeconomic status and other 
characteristics, as well as to assess 
the separate effects of price on 
aspects of tobacco use, including 
prevalence, frequency, intensity, 
initiation, uptake and cessation 
(11). Most of the studies based 
on survey data were conducted 
in the United States, because of 
the extensive subnational and 
temporal differences in taxes and 
prices. These studies show that 
smoking prevalence, frequency and 
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intensity are negatively related to 
cigarette taxes and prices. As with 
the elasticity estimates obtained 
from aggregate data for the United 
States, most of the estimates for 
total elasticity fall in the range 
-0.2 to -0.6; approximately half the 
impact of price is on the decision to 
smoke (prevalence) and the other 
half on the number of cigarettes 
smoked by continuing smokers 
(107–125). The few studies in the 
United States in which gender 
differences in price elasticity were 
considered show that smoking is 
more responsive to price among men 
than women (117, 118, 121, 126).
Several studies of smoking cessation 
among adults show that higher taxes 
and prices reduce the duration 
of smoking, increase interest in 
quitting, boost quit attempts and 
increase the number of smokers who 
successfully quit smoking (122, 127–
129). A few studies found similar 
effects of tax and price on the use 
of other tobacco products, such as 
smokeless tobacco and cigars, and 
gave some evidence for substitution 
among tobacco products in response 
to changes in the relative prices of 
these products (115, 116, 130). 
Similarly, studies in the United 
States based on cross-sectional or 
longitudinal data consistently found 
that higher prices lead to smoking 
cessation among young people and 
deter progression to later smoking 
uptake (123, 131–137).
Some studies have addressed 
the impact of taxes and price on 
smoking initiation among young 
people (123, 127, 129, 132, 133, 
138–148). Studies based on cross-
sectional data are subject to the 
measurement error inherent in 
use of retrospective measures of 
initiation. Most studies based on 
longitudinal data show that higher 
prices of cigarettes significantly 
decrease smoking initiation among 
young people, while lower prices 
increase initiation (11).
While several studies based on 
survey data of adult tobacco use 
have been conducted in other 
high-income countries, relatively 
few provided estimates of the 
effects of tax and price on tobacco 
use, largely because of the limited 
variation in price within most 
countries. Studies on price elasticity 
and adult smoking based on 
survey data have been conducted 
in Italy (72), Spain (129) and the 
United Kingdom (63). The general 
finding was that the prevalence and 
intensity of cigarette smoking are 
inversely associated with price (the 
price elasticity estimates varying by 
country), consistent with estimates 
based on aggregate data in high-
income countries other than the 
United States.
Survey-based studies of adult 
tobacco demand have been 
conducted in low- and middle-
income countries including Bulgaria 
(149), Estonia (88), Poland (150) 
and Turkey (93), many based on 
data from household expenditure 
surveys. The sophistication of the 
methodological approaches used 
and the price elasticity estimates 
vary considerably; however, these 
studies generally confirm that 
various aspects of tobacco use are 
responsive to price, higher prices 
reducing smoking prevalence and 
intensity (11).
No clear pattern emerges from 
the small number of studies from 
countries other than the United 
States concerning substitution 
among tobacco products in 
response to relative changes in 
their prices.
2.3 New evidence on the 
effectiveness of tobacco 
taxation for tobacco 
control from the PPACTE 
project
The PPACTE project built upon 
existing evidence for the use of 
tobacco taxation as a public heath 
measure in a number of ways. First, 
previous studies to estimate the 
elasticity of demand for tobacco 
products are based on different 
variables, inconsistent data sources 
and different methods (151, 152). 
The PPACTE project analysed 
demand for tobacco with similar 
data sets for different countries 
over longer periods, with a 
consistent strategy for estimation 
and for model-building (153). 
Furthermore, a novel approach 
to estimating the effect of other 
tobacco control policies on demand 
was applied consistently to all the 
time-series datasets used (154). 
Secondly, the PPACTE project 
examined the potential impact 
on smoking prevalence rates and 
smoking-attributable deaths of 
increasing tobacco taxes to 70% 
of the tax-inclusive retail price 
(exclusive of VAT) in 15 European 
countries (155–169). Thirdly, the 
PPACTE project collected recent 
and consistent survey data from 
18 European Union Member 
States on individual responses to a 
hypothetical cigarette price increase 
and support for both tobacco tax 
increases and the hypothecation of 
additional tobacco tax revenues for 
public health purposes (170). 
Econometric analyses of 
demand for tobacco in 11 
European countries (WP3)
Few studies have been conducted 
on the impact of tobacco price on 
tobacco product demand with data 
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from European Union Member 
States. In the available published 
European studies, varying 
specifications were used for the 
included variables, inconsistent 
data sources and divergent 
empirical strategies and modelling 
approaches. The PPACTE project 
analysed demand for tobacco in 
similar data sets from different 
countries over longer periods 
(30–60 years), with a consistent 
estimation strategy and model-
building approach. The aims of 
these analyses were to: (i) estimate 
the price elasticity of demand 
for selected tobacco products in 
countries with suitable data sets; 
(ii) investigate whether cigarettes, 
pipe and hand-rolling tobacco and 
snus are substituted for each other; 
(iii) evaluate the impact of non-
price tobacco control policies on 
consumption; (iv) evaluate the 
extent to which the estimates 
of price elasticity of demand for 
tobacco products differ in Europe; 
and (v) assess the extent to which 
demand for tobacco products can 
be controlled by price measures. 
Analyses were conducted in 11 
Member States where suitable 
national aggregate time series 
datasets could be obtained for a 
sufficient duration. The countries 
were Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom.
A complete description of the 
methods used can be found 
elsewhere (153). In brief, the 
annual time series covered periods 
ranging from 30 to 60 years that 
ended in 2009.  The analyses 
addressed factors affecting per 
capita consumption of tobacco 
products (cigarettes and, where 
appropriate, pipe and hand-
rolling tobacco or snus). Per capita 
consumption was the dependent 
variable, while the real price of 
tobacco products, real disposable 
income per capita and a tobacco 
control policy index quantifying 
implementation of tobacco control 
policies at country level were the 
explanatory variables. On the 
basis of the theory of demand and 
addiction, conventional, partial 
adjustment and rational addiction 
models were applied. In view of 
the non-stationarity of time series 
data, error correction models were 
also considered. Dynamic models 
were estimated by instrumental 
variables methods (2SLS) and 
the Engle-Granger two-step 
procedure. The estimated models 
were tested for autocorrelation in 
residuals, and recursive estimation 
was used to assess the estimated 
error correction models.
The results obtained with the 
preferred models indicate a 
negative relation between cigarette 
consumption and cigarette price, 
higher prices being associated 
with lower consumption. This 
relation was apparent in both 
the short and the long term. This 
negative relation is illustrated in 
Figures  2.1–2.11, which show 
trends in per capita cigarette 
consumption and the real price 
of cigarettes over the 30–60-year 
period in the countries studied. 
For cigarettes, short-run price 
elasticity estimates of demand 
obtained from our preferred 
models ranged from -0.30 to -0.40, 
suggesting that a 10% increase in 
the real price of cigarettes will 
reduce cigarette consumption 
by 3–4%. Outside this range 
are Ireland, with an elasticity 
estimate of -0.27, Germany, with 
an elasticity estimate of -0.79 (or 
-0.67 depending on the model 
chosen), and Austria, with a price 
elasticity estimate close to zero 
and statistically insignificant. In 
agreement with other studies, 
these estimates of price elasticity 
suggest that demand for tobacco 
is price-inelastic: the reduction in 
consumption is proportionately 
less than the increase in price. 
Therefore, increasing the price 
by raising taxes will discourage 
consumption and increase 
government revenues. These results 
lend weight to the considerable 
body of international evidence 
for using tobacco taxes as a 
public health measure to dissuade 
consumption of tobacco in the 
European context.
Similarly, a negative relation 
was found between the price of 
pipe and hand-rolling tobacco 
and its consumption in Finland, 
with a price elasticity of demand 
of -0.43, and between price and 
consumption of snus in Sweden, 
with an elasticity estimate of 
-0.24 (Figures 2.12–2.13). These 
own-price elasticity estimates lie 
between -0.2 and -0.4, similar 
to the estimates for cigarettes. 
Moreover, pipe tobacco was found 
to be a substitute for cigarettes 
in Finland, with a cross-price 
elasticity of 1.7, implying that 
a 10% increase in the price of 
cigarettes would result in a 17% 
increase in the consumption of 
pipe and hand-rolling tobacco 
(Figure 2.12).
These analyses show a positive 
relation between real disposable 
income and cigarette consumption, 
suggesting that consumption of 
cigarettes increases as income 
increases. While the estimates 
of income elasticity in this study 
vary between 0.1 in Italy and 1.2 
in Sweden, most fall within a range 
of 0.1–0.6, with the median and
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typical estimates between 0.3 
and 0.4. In other words, a 10% 
increase in income increases 
consumption by 3–4%. In 
contrast, a negative relation was 
found between income and the 
consumption of pipe and hand-
rolling tobacco in Finland and the 
consumption of snus in Sweden. 
This might suggest that users of 
pipe and hand-rolling tobacco 
in Finland and users of snus in 
Sweden with higher income will 
switch from these products to 
cigarettes and that users of pipe 
and hand-rolling tobacco and snus 
are poorer than cigarette smokers.
These findings suggest that the 
planning of tobacco price and tax 
policies must take into account 
the effect of real income growth 
on cigarette consumption. The 
real price of cigarettes must 
increase above the rate of income 
growth to prevent increases in 
the affordability of cigarettes 
and consequent increases in 
consumption. Furthermore, these 
findings suggest that taxation of 
pipe and hand-rolling tobacco and 
snus should be kept in line with 
that of cigarettes to discourage 
product substitution.
Predicting the impact of 
raising tobacco taxes on 
smoking prevalence and 
smoking-attributable deaths 
in the SimSmoke model of 
tobacco control policy (WP4)
While the econometric analyses 
described above are empirical 
evaluations of the impact of 
price, income and tobacco control 
policies on the consumption of 
tobacco products, the SimSmoke 
simulation model of tobacco 
control policy draws together 
data from various sources to 
distinguish the effect of tobacco 
control policies implemented by 
European countries from long-
term trends, to evaluate the effects 
of tobacco control policies on 
smoking prevalence and related 
mortality, and to consider the 
potential impact of stronger policy 
alternatives in these countries.
SimSmoke contains a population 
model, a smoking model, a 
smoking-attributable death model 
and policy modules. It considers 
the effect of cigarette taxation, 
smoke-free legislation, advertising 
bans, health warnings, media and 
educational campaigns, cessation 
treatment and restrictions on 
sales to and by young people both 
independently and as part of a 
comprehensive tobacco control 
strategy (171–173). The model 
begins with a baseline year, before 
major policy changes, for which a 
large-scale survey of smoking rates 
is available. To validate the model, 
predictions of smoking rates 
are compared with actual rates 
from surveys, from the baseline 
year through 2010 or the most 
recent date of a national survey. 
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SimSmoke then predicts the effect 
on smoking prevalence rates and 
smoking-attributable deaths of 
stronger policies fully consistent 
with the WHO FCTC and 
MPOWER recommendations 
and compares the effect to the 
status quo, in which policies are 
held constant at 2010 levels. For 
WP4, country-specific models 
were developed for Albania, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
the Russian Federation, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey and the Ukraine. 
(Country reports containing 
model assumptions, methods 
and findings are available at www.
ppacte.eu)
In the SimSmoke model, when 
taxes change, an equation 
translates changes in the tax 
rate (as a percentage of price) 
into changes in price, assuming 
that tax increases are passed on 
to consumers and not under- or 
over-shifted. Changes in price 
are then translated into changes 
in smoking prevalence by an 
equation dependent on price 
elasticity estimates, as described 
by Levy, Cummings and 
Hyland (172). In the models for 
Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Sweden, a 
price elasticity of -0.3 was applied 
to people aged 15–17 years, -0.2 
to those aged 18–24 years, -0.15 
to those aged 25–34 and -0.1 to 
those aged 35 and over. In the 
models for Finland, France, Italy, 
Poland, the Russian Federation, 
Spain, Turkey and the Ukraine, a 
price elasticity of -0.3 was applied 
to people aged 15–24, -0.2 to 
those aged 25–34 and -0.1 to 
those aged 35 and over.
Country-specific data on excise 
duty rates were used for 2010, as 
the baseline from which future 
tax changes were measured. Rates 
of excise (specific and ad valorem, 
exclusive of VAT) were obtained 
from the WHO MPOWER 
report (174) or the European 
Commission excise duty tables for 
2010. For all years before 2010, 
a cigarette price index of actual 
Country
Excise as 
percentage 
of retail price 
in 2010
Absolute change in annual smoking-attributable deaths 
(deaths averted) due to a tax increase
2020 2030 2040 Cumulative
Poland 68 502 1302 1572 27 094
Czech Republic 64 383 907 1042 19 008
Spain 64 807 2241 2881 46 737
Turkey 63.6 1900 5878 8729 124 915
France 63.6 1277 3470 4511 73 568
Great Britain 63 1234 2957 3493 62 753
Ireland 63 128 357 467 7474
Germany 60 3121 7596 8582 158 468
Finland 60 210 513 585 10 702
Italy 58.5 2138 5021 5519 105 204
Netherlands 57 830 1960 2149 40 839
Sweden 52 445 953 938 19 873
Ukraine 43.3 7804 17 193 18 258 362 542
Russian Federation 21.5 31 111 75 654 96 273 1 619 165
Not valid for direct comparison among countries, given differences in model assumptions and data inputs
Table 2.1. Absolute change in annual smoking-attributable deaths (deaths averted) if tax is increased to 70% of 
price relative to the status quo
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prices deflated by the consumer 
price index was used.
The SimSmoke models consider 
the impact of increasing 
tobacco taxes (specific and ad 
valorem, exclusive of VAT) to 
70% of the price. Table  2.1 
shows the absolute change in 
smoking-attributable deaths 
(deaths averted) as a result of 
increasing tobacco taxes to 70% 
of tobacco price, relative to the 
status quo scenario in which 
all policies are held constant at 
2010 levels. The estimate for a 
particular year represents deaths 
in that year alone, whereas the 
cumulative estimate is for the 
years 2011–2040. Tables  2.2 
and 2.3 show the percentage 
change in smoking prevalence 
(measured relative to the status 
quo in a particular year) if the 
tax were increased to 70% of the 
price, with all other policies held 
constant at 2010 levels, for males 
and females. The variation in the 
percentage effects on prevalence 
is due mainly to the difference 
between the 2010-specific tax 
rate and the 70% tax rate.
In general, this model showed 
how the prevalence of smoking 
among young people declines 
more than among adults as a 
result of tax increases. This is the 
main reason that taxes continue 
to reduce adult smoking rates over 
time. The projected number of 
deaths reflects the effectiveness of 
a tax policy in reducing smoking. 
The effects of tobacco taxes on 
the number of deaths are delayed 
not only because the effects 
of cessation on death rates are 
relatively slow but also because 
the greatest effects are on the 
prevalence among young people. 
Changes in the prevalence among 
the young do not avert deaths for 
at least 20 years.
Country
Excise as 
percentage  of 
retail price in 
2010
Smoking 
prevalence 
at status quo 
2010 (%)
2011 2020 2030 2040
Poland 68 35.5 -2.0 -2.7 -3.4 -4.2
Czech Republic 64 34.6 -5.1 -6.6 -8.3 -9.9
Spain 64 31.7 -4.5 -6.1 -8.4 -10.3
Turkey 63.6 43.4 -5.6 -6.9 -8.2 -9.3
France 63.6 27.1 -5.7 -7.5 -9.3 -10.6
Great Britain 63 22.8 -5.6 -7.5 -9.4 -11.1
Ireland 63 26.1 -6.7 -8.6 -10.8 -12.9
Germany 60 31.3 -6.0 -7.5 -9.0 -10.4
Finland 60 25.2 -9.1 -12.4 -15.7 -18.5
Italy 58.5 26.8 -7.3 -9.0 -10.9 -12.6
Netherlands 57 29.6 -8.3 -10.3 -12.5 -14.5
Sweden 52 12.6 -11.5 -13.7 -16.7 -20.0
Ukraine 43.3 49.6 -18.3 -20.3 -23.0 -25.7
Russian Federation 21.5 61.1 -17.7 -22.7 -28.2 -32.5
Not valid for direct comparison among countries, given differences in model assumptions and data inputs
Prevalence estimates for ages ≥ 15 in Czech Republic, Finland and Turkey; 16–85 in Sweden; ≥ 16 in Spain; ≥ 18 in France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine; and 18–85 in Germany, Italy and the Great Britain
Table 2.2. Percentage change in male smoking prevalence if tax is increased to 70% of price with all other policies 
held constant at 2010 levels
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The predictions shown above 
are based on the assumption 
that all other policies are held 
constant at 2010 levels. The 
model predictions suggest that, 
in each country, substantial 
reductions in smoking prevalence 
and lives lost due to smoking 
can be realized by increasing 
tobacco taxes alone. Moreover, 
when tobacco tax increases form 
part of a comprehensive tobacco 
control strategy in which stronger 
laws on smoke-free air and 
restrictions on sales to and by 
young people are implemented, 
strict tobacco advertising and 
marketing bans are promulgated, 
strong tobacco health-warning 
labels are required, high-
publicity media campaigns are 
coordinated with other policies, 
strong comprehensive smoking 
cessation treatment services are 
provided and all policies are 
enforced, considerable reductions 
in smoking prevalence and 
smoking-attributable mortality 
can be achieved. Because of the 
natural progression of tobacco-
related illnesses, early reductions 
in smoking prevalence have a 
relatively small short-term impact 
on the number of smoking-
attributable deaths but a much 
larger long-term impact.
In some of the countries 
considered, such as the Czech 
Republic and Poland, tobacco 
product prices are lower than in 
other countries and in relation 
to the standard of living. In 
these countries, excise duties, 
as a proportion of the tax-
inclusive retail selling price, are 
relatively high. In other countries, 
such as Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, tobacco product prices 
are relatively high and the excise 
duties as a proportion of the tax-
inclusive retail selling price are 
somewhat lower. The divergence 
among European Union Member 
States in the rates of tobacco 
Country
Excise as 
 percentage 
of retail price 
 in 2010
Smoking 
 prevalence 
at status quo 
(2010)
2011 2020 2030 2040
Poland 68 24.1 -1.9 -2.5 -3.1 -3.6
Czech Republic 64 23.1 -4.8 -6.0 -7.4 -8.7
Spain 64 21.7 -4.8 -6.4 -8.4 -10.1
Turkey 63.6 16.1 -5.8 -7.0 -8.2 -9.2
France 63.6 22.9 -5.5 -6.8 -8.2 -9.6
Great Britain 63 20.5 -5.6 -7.5 -9.4 -10.9
Ireland 63 25.1 -6.9 -8.6 -10.5 -12.4
Finland 60 18.6 -9.3 -12.0 -14.8 -17.6
Germany 60 21.4 -6.0 -7.4 -8.8 -10.1
Italy 58.5 15.0 -7.1 -8.4 -10.0 -11.6
Netherlands 57 24.9 -8.2 -10.1 -12.0 -13.7
Sweden 52 20.9 -12.4 -15.0 -17.9 -20.9
Ukraine 43.3 16.1 -18.4 -20.0 -22.1 -24.6
Russian Federation 21.5 16.6 -18.1 -22.0 -26.3 -29.9
Not valid for direct comparison among countries, given differences in model assumptions and data inputs
Prevalence estimates for ages ≥ 15 in Czech Republic, Finland and Turkey; 16–85 in Sweden; ≥ 16 in Spain; ≥ 18 in France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine; and 18–85 in Germany, Italy and the Great Britain
Table 2.3. Percentage change in female smoking prevalence if tax is increased to 70% of price, with all other 
policies held constant at 2010 levels
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excise as a proportion of price 
and the absolute value of excise 
duties highlights the need for 
a specified monetary minimum 
specific tax floor to achieve 
appreciable increases in the tax-
inclusive retail selling price and 
corresponding improvements in 
health outcomes.
European survey on 
economic aspects of 
smoking: perceptions 
and attitudes to increasing 
tobacco taxes (WP2)
When insufficient data are 
available for time series analyses 
of cigarette demand and there 
is insufficient variation in price 
within a country to conduct 
a meaningful cross-sectional 
analysis of price elasticity, an 
alternative approach to assessing 
responses to price and tax increases 
is to ask individuals about their 
hypothetical responses to tax 
increases of different magnitudes. 
The two work packages described 
above involved secondary analyses 
of routinely collected data and 
relied on the provenance and 
availability of such data. In 
WP2, an extensive survey was 
conducted in 18 European Union 
Member States to fill gaps in 
the available data on smoking 
prevalence and consumption, 
allowing comparisons among 
countries (170).
European data on the willingness 
of smokers to quit in response 
to an increase in cigarette price 
are scarce. In a study in Italy, 
21% of smokers stated that 
they would reduce and 10% 
said they would stop smoking 
after a €1.00 increase in price 
(175). In the Eurobarometer 
survey in 2009, 50% of smokers 
claimed that price influenced 
their choice of cigarettes (176); 
however, this degree of influence 
varied considerably: in Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Romania, Turkey and 
The former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, price was as or 
more important than taste. The 
International Tobacco Control 
Policy Evaluation Project showed 
that the proportion of smokers 
who often or very often thought 
about the money they spent on 
cigarettes in the past month was 
less than 25% in the Netherlands, 
almost 50% in Germany and 
almost 60% in France (177, 
178). To add to this evidence 
base, the PPACTE survey 
collected recent, comparable, 
individual-level survey data on 
smokers’ anticipated responses 
to a hypothetical price increase. 
In the WP2 survey, people were 
also asked whether they would 
support tobacco tax increases if 
part of the additional revenue 
were allocated to public health 
interventions.
Data were collected during 
face-to-face interviews between 
January 2010 and July 2010 
in 18 European countries by 
standardized methods. Details 
are given in the full report 
(170). The 18  056 participants 
(8653 men and 9403 women) 
aged 15 years and older1 were 
representative of the national 
general population in terms of 
age, sex, rural and urban location 
and socioeconomic characteristics 
in each country. Surveys were 
conducted in Albania, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, England, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain and Sweden. 
Survey respondents were asked if 
they would quit smoking, smoke 
less tobacco or change their 
tobacco use to compensate for 
the price increase (e.g. substitute 
cheaper products for cigarettes) in 
response to a 20% increase in the 
price of manufactured or hand-
rolled cigarettes.
Figure  2.14 shows the 
distribution of current smokers 
according to their main response 
to a hypothetical 20% increase in 
the price of a pack of cigarettes. 
Overall, 14.2% of current smokers 
said they would quit smoking, 
30.6% would consume fewer 
cigarettes, 21.5% would engage in 
compensatory behaviour (13.7% 
would switch to cheaper brands 
and 3.8% to hand-rolling tobacco, 
3.5% would switch at least part 
of their smoking consumption 
to illegal or smuggled cigarettes, 
0.5% would switch to or also 
use smokeless tobacco including 
snuff, snus or chewing tobacco, 
and 33.6% would not change 
their smoking habit). Participants 
in Romania and Spain indicated 
that they would be most 
responsive to hypothetical price 
increases, with 80.3% and 75.9% 
of current smokers reporting that 
they would change their smoking 
habit in some way in response to 
the price increase, respectively, 
while participants in Finland 
and France would be least 
responsive, with 45.8% and 49.3% 
of respondents claiming they 
would not change their smoking 
behaviour in response to a 20% 
price increase, respectively. The 
proportion of current smokers 
 
1 In Croatia, England, Finland, Greece, Hungary and Poland, participants aged 18 years and older were recruited.
40 PRICING PoLICIES AND CoNTRoL oF ToBACCo IN EURoPE
who would switch to smokeless 
tobacco was lower in Portugal 
(0.0%) and Hungary (0.3%) and 
was higher in Bulgaria (11.2%) 
and Latvia (18.6%), while the 
proportion of current smokers 
who would switch to smokeless 
tobacco was higher in Poland 
(1.4%) and Sweden (2.0%).
Current smokers were asked if they 
intended to quit smoking within 
the next 6 months (Figure 2.15). 
Overall, 36.0% of current 
smokers said they intended to 
quit smoking (34.1% of men and 
38.3% of women). Among male 
current smokers, the proportions 
of men who said they intended 
to quit smoking were lowest in 
Hungary (7.7%) and the Czech 
Republic (10.9%) and highest 
in Spain (56.7%) and Romania 
(61.0%). Among female current 
smokers, the proportions of 
women who said they intended 
to quit smoking were lowest in 
Hungary (10.0%) and Austria 
(14.7%) and highest in Poland 
(54.3%) and Spain (57.6%).
Respondents were then asked 
what percentage increase in 
the current cigarette price 
would encourage them to quit 
completely. Figure  2.16 shows 
the percentage distribution of 
current smokers according to the 
percentage increase in the price of 
cigarettes that would encourage 
them to quit smoking completely. 
Overall, 20.5% of current smokers 
reported that they would quit 
in response to a 20% increase 
in price, 19.1% reported they 
would quit in response to a 
21–40% increase, 18.2% would 
quit with an increase of 41–60%, 
6.3% would quit with an increase 
of 61–80%, and 35.7% said that 
it would take a price increase 
of more than 80% for them to 
quit. The proportions of current 
smokers who reported that they 
would quit smoking completely 
in response to an increment 
of 20% or less were lower in 
Hungary (6.8%) and Latvia 
(6.9%) and higher in Ireland 
(30.0%) and Romania (31.3%). 
The proportions of current 
smokers who reported that they 
would quit smoking completely in 
response to an increment of five 
Figure 2.15. Percentage distribution of current smokers who reported that they intended to quit 
smoking within the next 6 months, separately for men and women, overall* and by country, 
sorted by the prevalence of participants answering “Yes, I want to quit” among men and 
women combined (ascending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed with weighting for each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
Figure 2.14. Percentage distribution of current smokers according to their main response to a 
20% increase in the price of a pack of cigarettes, overall* and by country, sorted by the prevalence 
of participants answering “I would not change my smoking habit” (descending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England  
*Computed with weighting for each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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or more times the current price 
were lower in Hungary (0.5%) 
and Portugal (4.0%) and higher 
in Albania (16.3%) and Latvia 
(16.5%).
In the literature review carried out 
for the Handbook, only four studies 
on the attitudes and perceptions 
of adults to increasing cigarette 
prices were identified in Europe: 
three in Italy (175, 179, 180) and 
one in Germany (181). These 
studies suggest that a substantial 
proportion (generally 30–50%) of 
the population would support tax 
increases, with appreciably more 
support (60–80%) if revenues from 
tax increases were allocated to 
tobacco control. Current, ex- and 
‘never’ smokers were asked about 
their attitudes to an increase in 
the price of a pack of cigarettes 
and were asked to assume that the 
revenue from the increase would 
be allocated to support smoking 
cessation, such as free access to 
anti-smoking centres and free 
smoking cessation products. 
Figures 2.17 and 2.18 show the 
distribution of participants by 
smoking status according to 
their attitude to a 5% and a 20% 
increase in cigarette price. Overall, 
78.7% of nonsmokers and 49.2% 
of current smokers were in favour 
of a 5% increase in prices if the 
revenues were used for tobacco 
control. Moreover, 73.6% of 
nonsmokers and 39.6% of current 
smokers were in favour of a 20% 
increase in price.
Respondents were asked how 
useful they perceived various 
tobacco control measures to be in 
reducing tobacco use (Figure 2.19). 
Overall, 55.0% of respondents 
(61.8% of nonsmokers and 36.9% 
of current smokers) perceived 
tobacco taxation to be a useful 
means for reducing tobacco use. 
There were substantial differences 
among countries in perceptions of 
the effectiveness of pricing policies 
to control tobacco: only 19% of 
respondents in Hungary perceived 
price to be a useful tobacco control 
measure, while over 65% of 
respondents in Albania, Finland 
and Italy considered tobacco price 
and tax increases as useful tobacco 
control measures.
Figure 2.16. Percentage distribution of current smokers according to the amount of increase in 
price of cigarettes that would persuade them to quit smoking completely, overall* and by country, 
sorted by prevalence of participants quitting for a 20% increase or less (ascending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010  - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed with weighting for each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
Figure 2.17. Percentage distribution of the European population by smoking status according 
to their attitude to a 5% increase in cigarette prices, overall* and by country, sorted by 
prevalence of participants reporting strong or moderate support (ascending order)  
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010  - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed with weighting for each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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Figure 2.18. Percentage distribution of the European population by smoking status according to their attitude to a 
20% increase in cigarette prices, overall* and by country, sorted by prevalence of participants reporting strong or 
moderate support (ascending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed with weighting for each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
Figure 2.19. Percentage distribution of the European population according to their perception of the effectiveness 
of raising the price of cigarettes for controlling and limiting tobacco use, overall* and by country, sorted by the 
prevalence of people who consider the tobacco control strategy to be useful - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed with weighting for each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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2.4 Policy implications 
of PPATCE findings 
on the effectiveness 
of tobacco taxation 
for public health
Use of tobacco taxes 
as a public health measure
There is substantial evidence that 
increases in tobacco taxes improve 
public health by preventing 
initiation, promoting cessation 
among current smokers and reducing 
consumption among continuing 
smokers. These changes can be 
expected to have substantial health 
benefits. Governments should 
continue to increase tobacco taxes 
so that the real price of cigarettes 
and other tobacco products is 
raised above the general rise in the 
prices of other goods and incomes, 
making tobacco increasingly less 
affordable to smokers and potential 
smokers, while increasing tobacco 
tax revenues.
Taxation of types 
of tobacco product 
Evidence from demand analyses 
suggests that other tobacco products 
may be substituted for cigarettes as 
the price of cigarettes increases (or 
as income decreases), with tobacco 
users consuming more substitute 
products (e.g. hand-rolling tobacco 
or snus). This suggests that tobacco 
tax rates should be comparable 
for all tobacco products and that 
increases in rates should apply to all 
tobacco products simultaneously to 
prevent product substitution.
Consideration 
of income growth
To better counteract the impact of 
increasing real disposable income 
on tobacco consumption, tobacco 
taxation policy must take into account 
the development of real disposable 
income. Other factors being constant, 
the real prices of tobacco products 
would have to increase at or above 
the rate of real disposable income 
growth to prevent tobacco products 
from becoming more affordable.
Data availability
Evaluation of the effectiveness 
of tobacco taxation in Europe is 
constrained by the availability 
of and access to comparable, 
adequate data sets. At a minimum, 
data on the following variables 
should be reported by the relevant 
government departments of 
Member States to the European 
Commission and made publicly 
available through Eurostat:
•	Annual weighted average 
price by tobacco product type 
(e.g. cigarettes, pipe and hand-
rolling tobacco, smokeless 
tobacco, including snus, snuff 
and chewing tobacco);
•	Annual tax-paid sales or 
releases for consumption of 
tobacco by tobacco product; and
•	Annual household disposable 
income.
Summary
The vast body of international literature provides 
substantial evidence that tobacco taxation 
improves public health by preventing initiation 
of smoking, promoting cessation among current 
smokers and reducing consumption among 
continuing smokers. The effectiveness of 
tobacco taxes for tobacco control is further 
substantiated by econometric analyses 
covering periods of 30–60 years for 11 
European countries. The SimSmoke simulation 
model suggests that increasing taxes has 
immediate effects on smoking prevalence and 
smoking-attributable mortality, with the effects 
growing over time. Moreover, the European 
survey indicates that most smokers would 
attempt to quit in response to a 60% increase 
in price and that approximately two thirds of 
nonsmokers and over one third of smokers 
perceive price to be an effective measure for 
limiting tobacco use. Not only are tobacco tax 
increases effective in reducing tobacco use 
and its associated burden of disease, but they 
are also acceptable to European citizens, with 
support from smokers and nonsmokers alike.
The extent to which public health benefits from 
tobacco taxation is influenced not only by the 
structures and rates of excise taxes but also 
by the extent to which these structures and 
rates are harmonized across regions, thereby 
decreasing the incentives for illicit trade. In 
addition, the effectiveness of tobacco taxation 
for public health depends on the extent to which 
the tobacco industry passes on tax increases 
to the consumer, rather than under-shifting the 
tax by decreasing their profit margins, and the 
success of tobacco companies’ efforts to lobby 
governments for weaker tax policies. Tobacco 
tax structures and rates, illicit tobacco trade 
and tobacco industry influence on tobacco tax 
policy are discussed in turn in the following 
sections.
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To allow more detailed monitoring 
and sophisticated analysis of the 
effectiveness of tobacco taxation 
in Europe, data on the following 
variables should be reported to the 
European Commission and made 
publicly available through Eurostat:
•	Annual (or more frequent) 
weighted average price by tobacco 
product and price category and
•	Annual (or more frequent) 
tax-paid sales or releases for 
consumption of tobacco by 
tobacco product type and price 
category.
Furthermore, Eurobarometer 
and/or national population-based 
surveys should regularly collect 
and make publicly available data 
on the:
•	Prevalence of tobacco use by 
age, gender, socioeconomic status 
and tobacco product, with agreed 
definitions and measures; (In 
particular, smoking rates at ages 
such as 15–17, 18–21, 21–24 and 
25–29 are needed).
•	Prevalence of former smokers, 
by number of years since 
quitting, so that cessation rates 
can be estimated and tracked.
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ToBACCo TAx STRUCTURES 
AND RATES
chApter 3
3.1 Tobacco tax 
structures and their 
implications
Excise duties can be specific or ad 
valorem. A specific excise is levied 
as a fixed monetary amount of tax 
per quantity, volume or weight of 
tobacco, while an ad valorem excise 
is levied as a percentage of some 
measure of product value (currently 
the weighted average price of 
tobacco). In a purely specific excise 
structure, the same fixed monetary 
amount is applied to all tobacco 
products of a given quantity, 
volume or weight, irrespective of 
their pre-tax price. This structure 
tends to discourage consumption 
of tobacco products, irrespective 
of their price. A specific excise 
structure has the advantage of 
being easy to administer and 
narrows the gap between low- 
and high-priced tobacco brands. 
The fixed monetary amount does 
not, however, automatically keep 
pace with inflation and must be 
adjusted regularly. A purely ad 
valorem structure tends to lead 
to lower prices, with a wider gap 
between low- and high-price 
brands. While a purely ad valorem 
structure keeps pace with inflation, 
it is more complex to administer. 
To combine the best elements of 
both the specific and the ad valorem 
structure, the two can be combined 
into a mixed structure that can give 
preference to the ad valorem or the 
specific element, depending on the 
objectives.
An ad valorem system can also be 
combined with a minimum tax 
floor. Minimum excise duties are 
effectively specific excise duties and 
represent a fixed monetary amount 
per quantity, volume or weight that 
applies if the ad valorem excise falls 
below a minimum floor. In this 
system, lower-priced products are 
taxed at the specific minimum rate, 
while higher-priced products are 
taxed at the ad valorem rate. The 
most complex structure is a mixed 
specific and ad valorem excise 
with a minimum tax floor. The 
advantages and disadvantages of 
each tax structure and their effects 
on prices, consumers, revenue and 
manufacturers are summarized in 
Table 3.1.
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The structure and rates of excise duties influence the prices of different 
products, government tax revenues, the quality and variety of products on 
the market, the administrative burden, the profits and competitive positions 
of tobacco producers and the distribution of income (1). This section gives 
an overview of available tax structures and their implications for public 
health, government revenues, administration and the tobacco industry and 
then presents the current tobacco tax directive and its implementation, and 
the implications of PPACTE findings for tobacco tax structures and rates.
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Element
affected 
Tax and price structure of excise duty
Specific excise Ad valorem Mixed Ad valorem with a specificminimum floor
Mixed with a specific
minimum floor
Prices
Tends to lead to relatively higher 
prices. 
Tax increases may lead to over-shifting 
or upwards product substitution.
Lower prices than with specific excise 
Tax increases may lead to down-
trading or price reductions  
(under-shifting).
Effect depends 
on which element 
(ad valorem or 
specific) prevails.
Minimum tax functions as a specific duty and ensures a relatively higher 
price for low- (and medium-) priced products
Inflation
Real value will be eroded by inflation, 
unless adjusted in line with inflation
Real value will be preserved as prices 
increase, to the extent that tobacco 
prices follow inflation.
Real value of the specific element 
will be eroded by inflation.
Real value of the minimum floor will 
be eroded by inflation.
Real value of the specific tax and 
the minimum floor will be eroded by 
inflation.
Inflation
The minimum floor may be (partly) 
adjusted for inflation if it is a 
percentage of the excise due on 
the weighted average price or of a 
premium price category subject to 
ad valorem taxation (e.g. the ‘most 
popular price category’ in most 
European Union Member States).
Product quality and variety 
Upgrading effects tend to reduce the 
relative tax on high-quality products, 
which provide an incentive for better 
quality and greater variety of products.
The multiplier effect provides 
a disincentive to costly quality 
improvements.
The effect depends on which 
element (ad valorem or specific) 
prevails.
The multiplier effect of the ad 
valorem element provides a 
disincentive to costly quality 
improvements.
The multiplier effect of the ad 
valorem element provides a 
disincentive to costly quality 
improvements.
Budgetary stability and 
forecasting
More stable than ad valorem; easy to 
forecast
Vulnerable to changes in consumers’ 
and producers’ behaviour; difficult to 
forecast
More specific, or a minimum tax floor will entail more budgetary stability.
Real value of taxes and 
prices
Should be adjusted periodically for 
inflation
May have to be adjusted periodically 
for down-trading or price reductions
May have to be adjusted 
periodically for inflation, down-
trading or price reductions
May have to be adjusted 
periodically for inflation, down-
trading or price reductions
May have to be adjusted 
periodically for inflation, down-
trading or price reductions
The greater the reliance of the structure on specific or minimum duties, the less vulnerable it becomes to down-
trading or price reductions but the more it can be eroded by inflation.
Cross-border operations 
(private imports and illicit 
trade)
With the same tax level at the weighted average price, purely specific taxation 
in one country or jurisdiction and purely ad valorem taxation in a neighbouring 
country could result in cross-border flow of premium brands from one country to 
the second, with cheap brands flowing in the opposite direction.
Mixed tax structures and tax structures that include a minimum floor are less vulnerable to the induction of 
cross-border flow.
Administrative requirements 
Lower than for other indirect taxes (e.g. VAT, sales tax)
No price monitoring required for tax 
purposes; only the volume or weight 
must be ascertained.
Requires price monitoring Requires price monitoring Requires price monitoring Requires price monitoring
Profits of tobacco producers
Higher tax-to-price ratio for cheaper 
market segments and higher profits for 
the manufacturer
A higher absolute amount of tax for 
premium market segments, because 
any increase in the producer price will 
be taxed
Smaller gap between the tax-to-
price ratio for the cheaper and for 
the premium market segments than 
with a purely specific system.
The minimum floor may ensure a 
high absolute amount of tax and 
consequently a high tax-to-price ratio 
for cheaper market segments. 
The ad valorem ensures the desired 
tax-to-price ratio for premium market 
segments (equal to the ad valorem 
rate).
The minimum floor ensures a high 
tax to price ratio for cheaper market 
segments. 
The ad valorem element will apply 
to premium market segments.
Market shares; protection of 
domestic producers Tends to favour premium brands
May protect cheaper domestic brands 
against more expensive international 
brands
A more specific or a minimum tax floor tend to favour more expensive brands.
VAT, value-added tax
Table 3.1. Effects of idfferent tax and price structures of excise duties
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Element
affected 
Tax and price structure of excise duty
Specific excise Ad valorem Mixed Ad valorem with a specificminimum floor
Mixed with a specific
minimum floor
Prices
Tends to lead to relatively higher 
prices. 
Tax increases may lead to over-shifting 
or upwards product substitution.
Lower prices than with specific excise 
Tax increases may lead to down-
trading or price reductions  
(under-shifting).
Effect depends 
on which element 
(ad valorem or 
specific) prevails.
Minimum tax functions as a specific duty and ensures a relatively higher 
price for low- (and medium-) priced products
Inflation
Real value will be eroded by inflation, 
unless adjusted in line with inflation
Real value will be preserved as prices 
increase, to the extent that tobacco 
prices follow inflation.
Real value of the specific element 
will be eroded by inflation.
Real value of the minimum floor will 
be eroded by inflation.
Real value of the specific tax and 
the minimum floor will be eroded by 
inflation.
Inflation
The minimum floor may be (partly) 
adjusted for inflation if it is a 
percentage of the excise due on 
the weighted average price or of a 
premium price category subject to 
ad valorem taxation (e.g. the ‘most 
popular price category’ in most 
European Union Member States).
Product quality and variety 
Upgrading effects tend to reduce the 
relative tax on high-quality products, 
which provide an incentive for better 
quality and greater variety of products.
The multiplier effect provides 
a disincentive to costly quality 
improvements.
The effect depends on which 
element (ad valorem or specific) 
prevails.
The multiplier effect of the ad 
valorem element provides a 
disincentive to costly quality 
improvements.
The multiplier effect of the ad 
valorem element provides a 
disincentive to costly quality 
improvements.
Budgetary stability and 
forecasting
More stable than ad valorem; easy to 
forecast
Vulnerable to changes in consumers’ 
and producers’ behaviour; difficult to 
forecast
More specific, or a minimum tax floor will entail more budgetary stability.
Real value of taxes and 
prices
Should be adjusted periodically for 
inflation
May have to be adjusted periodically 
for down-trading or price reductions
May have to be adjusted 
periodically for inflation, down-
trading or price reductions
May have to be adjusted 
periodically for inflation, down-
trading or price reductions
May have to be adjusted 
periodically for inflation, down-
trading or price reductions
The greater the reliance of the structure on specific or minimum duties, the less vulnerable it becomes to down-
trading or price reductions but the more it can be eroded by inflation.
Cross-border operations 
(private imports and illicit 
trade)
With the same tax level at the weighted average price, purely specific taxation 
in one country or jurisdiction and purely ad valorem taxation in a neighbouring 
country could result in cross-border flow of premium brands from one country to 
the second, with cheap brands flowing in the opposite direction.
Mixed tax structures and tax structures that include a minimum floor are less vulnerable to the induction of 
cross-border flow.
Administrative requirements 
Lower than for other indirect taxes (e.g. VAT, sales tax)
No price monitoring required for tax 
purposes; only the volume or weight 
must be ascertained.
Requires price monitoring Requires price monitoring Requires price monitoring Requires price monitoring
Profits of tobacco producers
Higher tax-to-price ratio for cheaper 
market segments and higher profits for 
the manufacturer
A higher absolute amount of tax for 
premium market segments, because 
any increase in the producer price will 
be taxed
Smaller gap between the tax-to-
price ratio for the cheaper and for 
the premium market segments than 
with a purely specific system.
The minimum floor may ensure a 
high absolute amount of tax and 
consequently a high tax-to-price ratio 
for cheaper market segments. 
The ad valorem ensures the desired 
tax-to-price ratio for premium market 
segments (equal to the ad valorem 
rate).
The minimum floor ensures a high 
tax to price ratio for cheaper market 
segments. 
The ad valorem element will apply 
to premium market segments.
Market shares; protection of 
domestic producers Tends to favour premium brands
May protect cheaper domestic brands 
against more expensive international 
brands
A more specific or a minimum tax floor tend to favour more expensive brands.
VAT, value-added tax
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3.2 Structures and rates 
of taxes as set out in 
excise directives
Member States of the European 
Union must apply a mixed 
structure with a minimum tax 
floor. Effective 1 January 2011 to 
31 December 2013, the specific 
component applicable to cigarettes 
may not be less than 5% or more 
than 76.5% of the total tax burden, 
including the specific excise, and 
the ad valorem excise and VAT 
levied on the weighted average 
retail selling price. From 1 January 
2014, the specific component must 
fall within the range 7.5–76.5% 
of the total tax burden. While the 
upper limit has been increased 
to enable those Member States 
that rely on a specific component 
to continue to apply increases 
in the interest of public health, 
the lower limit was not raised 
accordingly. Although such a 
measure is necessary to maintain a 
minimum level of harmonization, 
it was strongly opposed by some 
Member States. Consequently, 
the proportion of specific versus 
ad valorem excise and VAT as a 
percentage of the total tax burden 
varies widely across the European 
Union (Figure 3.1).
3.3 Adjustment of the 
overall minimum tax
As incomes and costs of living 
vary among Member States, 
the minimum monetary tax is 
currently set at only €64 per 
1000 cigarettes. This minimum 
tax must be raised to €90 per 
1000 cigarettes over the 5 years 
following the 2010 Directive. 
Even at this low level, some 
Member States, under pressure 
from tobacco companies, have 
negotiated for derogation for 
several years, to allow their taxes 
to remain even lower. This has 
the effect of causing governments 
to lose valuable tax revenue and 
increasing cigarette use and the 
prevalence of disease related to 
smoking (mainly in Member 
States with the highest smoking 
rates). This also aggravates 
problems of cross-border 
shopping by neighbours with 
higher taxes.
As incomes and costs of living 
vary among Member States and 
proposals for Directives require 
unanimous agreement among 
Member States, the minimum 
monetary tax required by the 
current Directive (2010/12/
EC) is set at a low level (€64 
per 1000 cigarettes). The 
overall minimum tax could be 
adjusted by the comparative 
price level or purchasing power 
parity, which are available for 
all European Union Member 
Figure 3.1. Specific and ad valorem excise and VAT as a percentage of the total tax burden in European Union 
Member States, 2011
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States. The basic minimum tax 
could be set for the States with 
the lowest income and adjusted 
upwards for each other State. In 
countries with higher prices, the 
minimum would be set as above 
and adjusted upwards annually 
above inflation and income 
changes. The basic minimum tax 
would then be adjusted annually 
in line with inflation and income 
levels and the relative cost of 
living by comparative price level 
or purchasing power parity. For 
example, the minimum tax could 
be set at €125 per 1000 cigarettes 
for one low-price country and 
adjusted by comparative price 
level for all other countries.
To illustrate this adjustment, 
Gallus and colleagues (2) 
compared several indexes that 
could be used to adjust the 
monetary minimum tax to 
standardize the price of a pack 
of Marlboro cigarettes in 42 
European countries. The indexes 
were GDP per capita, GDP based 
on purchasing power parity, GDP 
in purchasing power standard 
and comparative price level, all 
equal to 100 for the 27 Member 
States in 2010. Table 3.2 shows 
the comparison between the 
price of a pack of 20 Marlboro 
cigarettes after adjustment with 
these indexes for 42 countries. 
GDP per capita was available 
for 40 countries, GDP based on 
purchasing power parity for 41 
countries, GDP in purchasing 
power standard for 34 and 
comparative price level for 34 
countries. Table  3.3 shows the 
correlation coefficients between 
the various indexes. Table  3.4 
shows discrepancies between 
the different measures of prices 
according to quintiles and shows 
that the choice of index has 
significant consequences for 
the price of a pack of cigarettes 
by country. For example, the 
Netherlands has a relatively 
low price (first quintile) when 
standardization by GDP on 
purchasing power parity or GDP 
in purchasing power standard is 
used but a relatively high price 
(fourth quintile) when adjusted 
for comparative price level. On 
the contrary, Latvia has a relatively 
low price (fourth quintile) when 
adjusted by comparative price 
level but a relatively high price 
(fourth quintile) when adjusted 
by GDP on purchasing power 
parity or in in purchasing power 
standard (2).
The index considered for 
adjusting the overall monetary 
minimum tax should be: available 
for most countries (both Member 
States and candidate countries), 
provided by an institutional 
authority (Eurostat), stable, 
updated annually and published 
by a single source (2).
Table 3.3. Correlation coefficients (r) among prices of 20-cigarette packs of 
Marlboro, after standardization for four indexes
Index Price of one pack of Marlboro after standardization
GDP per capita 1.00
GDP based on PPP 0.70 1.00
GDP in PPS 0.61 0.98 1.00
CPL 2010 0.14 0.60 0.71 1.00
GDP per capita GDP based  on PPP GDP in PPS CPL 2010
CPL, commodity price level; GDP, gross domestic product; PPP, purchasing power parity; PPS, 
purchasing power standard
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3.4 Differential taxation 
of tobacco products
Directive 2010/12/EU applies 
different overall minimum rates 
to different tobacco products 
(Table  3.5). Price differences 
among products provide an 
incentive for tobacco companies to 
innovate and exploit preferential 
excise rates and an incentive for 
consumers to substitute cheaper 
products for more expensive ones 
when faced with tax increases. 
When tax structures allow price 
differences among brands within a 
product type, tax increases create an 
incentive for consumers to switch 
to cheaper brands within a product 
type. The effects of differences in 
tobacco tax rates and prices and 
the associated policy implications 
are discussed below.
In the interests of ‘uniform and 
fair taxation’, Directive 2010/12/
EU clarified the definitions of 
cigarettes, cigars, cigarillos and 
fine-cut and other smoking tobacco 
to address product innovations 
designed to exploit preferential 
excise rates.
A case study of industry influence 
in Poland, conducted by Clifford 
and colleagues for WP5 (3), shows 
how the industry exploited the 
lack of a legal distinction between 
pipe and hand-rolling tobacco. 
In Poland, there was a dramatic 
increase in the sales of hand-rolling 
tobacco between 2002 and 2004 
(Figure  3.2). The Government 
responded by increasing the excise 
on hand-rolling tobacco, making 
it as expensive as the cheapest 
cigarettes. After this excise increase 
in 2004, sales of pipe tobacco rose 
dramatically, and, shortly thereafter, 
there was a fall in the market share 
of hand-rolling tobacco, from 8% 
to 1.5%. A similar pattern was 
seen elsewhere recently (4). This 
suggests that hand-rolling tobacco 
was being inappropriately sold as 
pipe tobacco to capitalize on the 
lower excise levels on pipe tobacco.
The tighter definitions of tobacco 
products introduced in Directive 
2010/12/EU do not adequately 
address this problem: the lack of a 
legal distinction between smoking 
tobacco that is and is not intended 
for rolling makes it possible to 
sell fine-cut tobacco at the lower 
tax rate, by claiming that it is 
Year
Cigarettes 
 (EUR per  
1000 cigarettes)
Fine-cut smoking 
tobacco  
(EUR per kilogram)
Cigars & cigarillos 
(EUR per 1000 items 
or kilogram)
Other smoking 
 tobacco 
(EUR per kilogram)
2011 64 40 12 22
2013 47
2014 90*
2015 54
2018 60
2020 60
Derogation until 2017 for Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania
Table 3.5. Overall excise duty minima by tobacco product type as established in 
Directive 2010/12/EU
Figure 3.2. Retail volumes of pipe and hand-rolling tobacco in Poland, 1997–2010 
From reference (5)
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‘not intended’ for rolling. While 
the excise on fine-cut tobacco 
intended for rolling into cigarettes 
is to increase substantially in steps 
until 2020, there is no stipulated 
requirement for a similar increase 
in excise on other smoking tobacco, 
widening the difference between 
the excise rates on the two product 
categories. Unless tobacco excise 
rates are harmonized for all tobacco 
product types, the transnational 
tobacco companies can be expected 
to continue product innovation 
in order to exploit loopholes in 
product definitions and benefit 
from preferential rates (3).
3.5 Substitution of 
hand-rolling tobacco for 
cigarettes
As early as 2002, Commission 
reviews of directives related to 
tobacco excise acknowledged that 
excise rates on fine-cut tobacco 
should be aligned with those 
applied to cigarettes in order to 
discourage substitution. Reviews 
before the 2010 Directive also 
recommended better alignment 
of rates for fine-cut tobacco and 
cigarettes and a gradual upwards 
adjustment of rates on fine-cut 
tobacco. Specifically, a report 
commissioned from KPMG 
concluded that price differences 
between cigarettes and fine-
cut rolling tobacco encouraged 
substitution and recommended 
a gradual increase in the excise 
duty on fine-cut tobacco, so that 
it would reach two thirds of 
the overall minimum excise for 
tobacco.
Between 2002 and 2010, per 
capita (≥ 15 years) releases for 
consumption of fine-cut tobacco 
for hand-rolled cigarettes increased 
in many European Union countries 
Figure 3.3. Releases for consumption per capita (≥ 15 years) of fine-cut tobacco 
in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, 2002–2010
From  http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/
tobacco_products/rates/tobacco_releases_consumption.pdf.
Figure 3.5. Releases for consumption per capita (≥ 15 years) of fine-cut 
tobacco in 11 other European countries, 2002–2010 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/tobacco_
products/rates/tobacco_releases_consumption.pdf.
Figure 3.4. Releases for consumption per capita (≥ 15 years) of fine-cut 
tobacco in Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom, 2002–2010 
From http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/
tobacco_products/rates/tobacco_releases_consumption.pdf.
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(Figures  3.3–3.5). Notable 
exceptions to this trend were 
Belgium and the Netherlands, 
where per capita consumption of 
hand-rolling tobacco had been 
consistently higher than in other 
European Union countries since 
2002 but had decreased slightly 
by 2010. Other exceptions were 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
where marked reductions in per 
capita releases of hand-rolling 
tobacco for consumption were 
observed (Figure 3.3). According 
to these data, marked increases in 
releases of fine-cut tobacco were 
seen in Cyprus, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland and Spain.
Overall, the releases for consumption 
of tobacco within the European 
Union (excluding Romania) 
decreased between 2002 and 2010; 
however, the share of fine-cut tobacco 
increased (Figure 3.6).
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the 
shares of fine-cut tobacco and 
cigarettes as a percentage of total 
releases for consumption in 2002 
and 2010, respectively. In most 
countries, the share of fine-cut 
tobacco increased between 2002 
and 2010, but it remained at less 
than 10% in over half of European 
Union Member States. 
At present all countries tax fine-cut 
tobacco for hand-rolled cigarettes 
at a lower rate than manufactured 
cigarettes. As a result, in many 
European Union countries, 
smokers have been switching from 
manufactured cigarettes to hand-
rolled cigarettes. An estimate of the 
cross-price elasticity of demand for 
hand-rolling tobacco with respect 
to cigarette price, based on an 
econometric analysis of over 40 
years of aggregate time-series data 
from Finland (WP3), suggests 
that hand-rolling tobacco use is a 
substitute for cigarettes in Finland, 
with a cross-price elasticity 
estimate of 1.7. This implies 
that a 10% increase in cigarette 
price increases consumption of 
hand-rolling tobacco by 17% (6). 
Cross-sectional, self-reported 
data from 19 European Union 
Member States, however, show no 
correlation between the price of a 
pack of cigarettes, standardized 
by purchasing power standards, 
and the proportion of hand-
rolled cigarettes on total cigarette 
consumption. While the former 
analysis is more robust, it is 
limited to one country. The latter 
analysis suggests that, at least in 
some European countries, price 
differences between brands of 
manufactured cigarettes do not 
explain the high prevalence of 
hand-rolling tobacco use.
Furthermore, the proportion of 
smokers of hand-rolling tobacco 
was highest in England (32%), 
France (17%) and Finland 
(14%) (WP2) (7). European 
Commission data on releases for 
consumption suggest that per 
capita consumption among people 
aged 15 years and over has risen in 
the European Union overall and 
markedly in Cyprus, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Poland and 
Spain. Furthermore, the share of 
fine-cut tobacco as a proportion 
of total releases for consumption 
(cigarettes and fine-cut) has risen 
in the European Union, with a 
corresponding reduction in the 
share of cigarettes. Some tobacco 
companies are exploiting this tax 
difference further by selling kits to 
convert hand-rolling tobacco into 
cigarettes at a much lower rate. The 
preferential excise rate on fine-cut 
tobacco gives cigarette smokers a 
cheaper alternative, and they may 
Figure 3.6. Releases for consumption of cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco in the 
27 European Union Member States (except Romania), 2002–2010 
From http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/
tobacco_products/rates/tobacco_releases_consumption.pdf. 
Fine-cut tobacco converted to billions of pieces on the basis that 0.8 g of fine-cut tobacco 
is equivalent to one cigarette per piece
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switch to hand-rolled cigarettes 
when the tax on manufactured 
cigarettes increases, allowing them 
to maintain their consumption. As 
a result, the efficacy of cigarette tax 
increases for controlling tobacco 
use is drastically reduced.
Directive 2010/12/EU provides 
for substantial increases in excise 
rates on fine-cut tobacco between 
2010 and 2020. Specifically, the 
Directive states that “Member 
States shall apply an excise duty 
which may be: a) either an ad 
valorem duty calculated on the basis 
of the maximum retail selling price 
of each product, freely determined 
by manufacturers established in 
the Union and by importers from 
third countries…; or b) a specific 
duty expressed as an amount per 
kilogram…; or c) a mixture of both, 
combining an ad valorem element 
and a specific element” (176/29). 
The Directive also establishes that, 
effective 1 January 2011, rates 
applying to fine-cut tobacco must 
be at least 40% of the weighted 
average retail selling price, or €40 
per kilogram, increasing to 50% 
of the weighted average price or 
€60 per kilogram by 2020, with 
established milestones that must 
be achieved by 2013, 2015 and 
2018.
While the current Directive 
is a step in the right direction, 
PPACTE findings suggest that 
the increases it established do 
not go far enough to reduce 
the incentive for consumers to 
substitute preferentially taxed and 
thus cheaper fine-cut tobacco for 
cigarettes.
To levy comparable rates of excise 
on fine-cut tobacco for rolling 
cigarettes and on manufactured 
cigarettes, the weight of tobacco 
Figure 3.7. Manufactured cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco as a percentage 
of releases for consumption, 2002
From http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/
tobacco_products/rates/tobacco_releases_consumption.pdf. 
Fine-cut tobacco converted to billions of pieces on the basis that 0.8 g of fine-cut 
tobacco is equivalent to one cigarette per piece
Figure 3.8. Manufactured cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco as a percentage 
of releases for consumption, 2010
From http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/
tobacco_products/rates/tobacco_releases_consumption.pdf. 
Fine-cut tobacco converted to billions of pieces on the basis that 0.8 g of fine-cut 
tobacco is equivalent to one cigarette per piece
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used to prepare hand-rolled 
cigarettes and manufactured 
cigarettes must be established. The 
current conversion rate suggests 
that 1 kg of fine-cut tobacco is 
equivalent to 1000 cigarettes (1 
g  =  1 cigarette); however, this 
is considered to be inaccurate, 
particularly with the increasing 
use of dry ice-expanded tobacco 
manufacturing processes, which 
reduces the mass of tobacco 
in a manufactured cigarette. 
According to the ISO norm 
on measuring tar and nicotine 
in hand-rolled cigarettes (ISO 
15592–3), there are 0.4–0.75 
g of tobacco per hand-rolled 
cigarette. This suggests that 
1333–2500 hand-rolled cigarettes 
can be made from 1 kg of fine-cut 
tobacco, rather than 1000.
An estimate of the average 
weight in grams of a hand-rolled 
cigarette was obtained from data 
in the PPACTE WP2 survey on 
daily consumption of and weekly 
expenditure on manufactured 
and hand-rolled cigarettes. 
Respondents were asked to show 
or recall the weight in grams of 
the last pack of hand-rolling 
tobacco they had purchased and 
how much they paid for it. The 
weight in grams per cigarette was 
calculated on the basis of data 
for 185 smokers of hand-rolled 
cigarettes:
Table 3.6 shows the mean 
(± standard deviation), median and 
interquartile range of the weight 
of one hand-rolled cigarette, 
Table 3.6. Weight of one hand-rolled cigarette overall and by country, sex, 
age, education and smoking intensity
N Mean (± SD)
Median 
(IQ range)
Total 185 0.94 (± 0.54) 0.79 (0.56–1.22)
Country
England 37 0.70 (± 0.51) 0.50 (0.38–0.71)
Finland 28 1.11 (± 0.42) 1.11 (0.76–1.38)
France 32 1.13 (± 0.58) 0.89 (0.80–1.39)
Greece 37 0.69 (± 0.28) 0.59 (0.48–0.89)
Ireland 12 0.74 (± 0.41) 0.54 (0.47–0.85)
Spain 13 1.26 (± 0.58) 1.15 (0.75–1.63)
Others 26 1.18 (± 0.63) 1.04 (0.71–1.70)
Sex
Male 130 0.94 (± 0.51) 0.75 (0.56–1.29)
Female 55 0.97 (± 0.60) 0.86 (0.48–1.19)
Age group (years)
< 25 32 0.76 (± 0.30) 0.70 (0.55–0.93)
25–44 79 1.02 (± 0.60) 0.86 (0.56–1.38)
45–64 67 0.95 (± 0.54) 0.76 (0.58–1.29)
≥ 65 7 0.84 (± 0.50) 0.57 (0.36–1.19)
Education
Low 49 0.99 (± 0.57) 0.86 (0.58–1.30)
Medium 77 0.92 (± 0.58) 0.72 (0.48–1.19)
High 59 0.93 (± 0.44) 0.88 (0.56–1.22)
Cigarette consumption (per day)
< 20 111 0.99 (± 0.55) 0.86 (0.56–1.29)
≥ 20 74 0.88 (± 0.51) 0.71 (0.56–1.14)
From PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 
IQ, interquartile
Grams per cigarette = 
weekly expenditure / cost 
of latest pack x grams per 
pack / days per week / 
cigarettes per day
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overall and stratified by country, 
sex, age, education and number 
of cigarettes per day. As estimates 
for ‘heavy smokers’ (those smoking 
> 20 cigarettes per day) and the 
median rather than the mean are 
likely to be more accurate, 0.7–0.8 
g per hand-rolled cigarette appears 
to be a reasonable estimate of the 
weight. This implies that 1 kg of 
fine-cut tobacco yields 1250.0–
1482.6 cigarettes, a narrower and 
lower range than that indicated by 
the ISO standards.
3.6 Down-trading from 
more expensive to 
cheaper brands
When faced with tobacco 
tax increases, price-sensitive 
consumers may continue 
smoking manufactured cigarettes 
but ‘trade down’ to a cheaper 
brand rather than switching to a 
cheaper product (e.g. hand-rolled 
cigarettes). Industry pricing can 
undermine the effectiveness of 
tobacco tax increases by creating 
price differentials between brands, 
so that consumers can trade down 
to cheaper brands when taxes 
increase. Industry activities to 
undermine tobacco excise policy 
are described in detail in Chapter 
5 and elsewhere (4, 8–10); a brief 
summary of the findings and 
implications for tax structures and 
rates are given here.
Detailed analysis of data from 
the British market suggests that a 
multifaceted strategy is being used 
to keep prices low on the ultra-
low price segment of the cigarette 
market. Between 2006 and 2009, 
the gap between the most and least 
expensive brands widened, with a 
broader range of prices available 
within each segment; the weighted 
average price of ultra-low price 
brands did not increase in real 
terms, while the average prices 
of the other brand segments did. 
An examination of trends in the 
prices of the best-selling brands 
during the same period showed 
that the price of ultra-low-price 
brands increased by less than 
1%, with real price (i.e. inflation-
adjusted) decreases in some cases. 
Meanwhile, the price of premium 
brands increased by 3–5% and the 
price of mid-price and economy 
brands by 5–6%. Furthermore, 
examination of patterns of price 
changes (net of tax) over the same 
3-year period suggests that, while 
tax increases are generally being 
over-shifted, tax increases are 
under-shifted on the ultra-low-
price brands.
Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the industry is cross-
subsidizing cheaper brands with 
profits from more expensive 
brands (8). As a result of this 
pricing strategy and the growth 
in the number of ultra-low-
price brands, consumers have 
greater opportunities to down-
trade from more expensive to 
cheaper cigarettes—and the 
market share of ultra-low-price 
brands has increased in response. 
These findings, combined with 
an analysis of British survey data 
showing who is smoking these 
cheap cigarettes (see Chapter 6) 
(8), industry documents on the role 
of cheap cigarettes (11), industry’s 
willingness to under-shift taxes 
(9) plus interviewee responses 
in the WP5 country case studies 
(9), suggest that the availability 
of cheap cigarettes undermines 
tobacco tax policy, allowing price-
sensitive smokers—particularly the 
young and poor—to continue to 
initiate and maintain their smoking 
habits. While this analysis is based 
on British data, Euromonitor data 
suggest that the market share of 
cheap cigarettes is growing in 
other countries, including Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovakia and Sweden (12).
Under-shifting of tobacco taxes 
can be discouraged by substantially 
increasing tobacco excise taxes with 
a predominantly specific excise. 
Furthermore, an excise structure 
that is predominantly specific or 
has a high minimum floor and a 
low ad valorem component helps 
to reduce the price differential 
between the highest- and lowest-
priced brands.
While over-shifting of excise 
increases is not a public health issue, 
it reflects a missed opportunity for 
governments to increase excise 
rates and thus increase revenues 
(9). It is clear that the transnational 
tobacco companies prefer small, 
gradual tax increases (4, 9, 10), 
and evidence is beginning to 
appear that gradual tax increases 
are more easily absorbed by 
consumers and therefore facilitate 
tax over-shifting, leading to greater 
industry profit margins (9). Large 
excise increases are likely to benefit 
public health to a greater extent 
than incremental increases (9), the 
difference accruing as government 
revenue rather than industry profit 
(13). Further empirical work is 
needed to explore this issue.
3.7 Reference value 
for calculating tax 
incidence
Before implementation of Directive 
2010/12/EU, the reference value 
for calculating tax incidence was 
the most popular price category, 
which is the category of cigarettes 
sold most during the previous 
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year. The report commissioned by 
the European Commission from 
KPMG included several criticisms 
of the most popular price category 
concept. First, it was differentially 
interpreted and applied in different 
Member States. Further, the most 
popular price category can be 
the cheapest category in some 
Member States and the highest 
in others, not necessarily reflecting 
their purchasing power. Secondly, 
the impact of the most popular 
price category on the total market 
was hard to measure. Thirdly, the 
most popular price category in the 
current year is based on data for the 
previous year. Fourthly, it is open 
to manipulation by the tobacco 
industry.
In response to these criticisms, 
Directive 2010/12/EU established 
use of the weighted average 
price as the reference value. The 
weighted average selling price is 
calculated in reference to the total 
value of all cigarettes released for 
consumption, based on the retail 
selling price including all taxes, 
divided by the total quantity of 
cigarettes released for consumption 
in the preceding calendar year. A 
comparison of the overall weighted 
average price, the retail price index 
for cigarettes (United Kingdom 
Government measure for cigarettes) 
and the most popular price category 
in the United Kingdom between 
2001 and 2010 indicated that the 
last two give an inflated picture of 
cigarette price increases over time 
(Figure 3.9) (8). Use of the most 
popular price category to assess 
the impact of increases in tobacco 
taxation on the retail price of and 
demand for cigarettes is flawed, in 
that it can under- or overstate the 
increase in cigarette taxes depending 
on whether the most popular price 
category is in the high price category, 
as in the United Kingdom, or in a 
lower price category. Figure  3.9 
shows a comparison of the most 
popular price category and weighted 
average price as of January 2011 in 
the European Union. While the 
weighted average price is a more 
stable, transparent measure than 
the most popular price category 
for monitoring price trends, price 
trends must also be monitored by 
price segment.
3.8 Tobacco tax 
structures and rates 
in eastern border 
countries: the Russian 
Federation and the 
Ukraine
As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
tobacco taxation in the European 
Union is complicated and is 
undermined by the presence of an 
extensive eastern land border with 
Belarus, the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine, countries with 
high prevalences of smoking, very 
low real prices of tobacco products 
and relatively weak tobacco control 
policies. This border compromises 
the policing of illicit trade and 
exaggerates grey-market activity, 
particularly in the new European 
Union Member States, with 
implications for government 
revenues and public health. Given 
the effect of tobacco tax policy in 
these neighbouring countries for 
policy in the European Union, 
PPACTE commissioned reports 
on the Ukraine (conducted by H 
Ross, M Stoklosa and K Krasovsky) 
(14) and the Russian Federation 
(conducted by H Ross, M Stoklosa 
and P Kuznetsova) (15), which are 
summarized below.
Cigarette excise tax policy 
in the Ukraine
Shortly after gaining independence 
from the Soviet Union, the Ukraine 
passed a law setting the excise tax on 
cigarettes to 70% of the ex-factory 
price in January 1993. This tax 
was gradually reduced in 1994 to 
40% and 10% of the ex-factory 
Figure 3.9. Comparison of most popular price category per 1000 cigarettes and 
weighted average retail selling price per 1000 cigarettes in the European Union, 
in euros  
From European Commission excise duty tables, 2011
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price for filtered and unfiltered 
cigarettes, respectively, as a result 
of tobacco industry lobbying (16). 
This tax cut resulted in lower-than-
expected tax revenues, prompting 
the Government to improve tax 
collection by introducing excise 
tax stamps in 1996 (17) and to 
increase cigarette excise taxes each 
year between 1996 and 1999. In 
1996, the ad valorem excise tax 
was replaced by a specific excise 
tax (16), and by 1999 it reached 
UAH10 (€2.2) per 1000 filtered 
and UAH7 (€R1.5) per 1000 
unfiltered cigarettes, representing 
on average 8.6% of the retail price 
for filtered cigarettes. Starting in 
July 1999, an ad valorem excise 
tax of 5% of the wholesale price 
of both filtered and unfiltered 
cigarettes was introduced, in 
addition to the specific tax. This tax 
increase was earmarked entirely for 
the country’s pension fund. In May 
2001, the 5% earmarked tax was 
replaced by an earmarked specific 
tax of UAH2.5 per 1000 cigarettes. 
The tax earmarking ended in 
January 2004 with a complete 
overhaul of the tobacco excise 
system, and the specific excise 
system was replaced by a mixed 
system with both ad valorem and 
specific components. This time, 
the ad valorem excise tax rate was 
based on the retail rather than 
the ex-factory cigarette price in 
order to avoid tobacco industry 
tax circumvention1. The tax base 
plays an important role, as it is 
directly related to the tax burden2. 
This change in the tax system 
resulted in at least a 9% increase 
in the cigarette excise tax (14, 17).
The Government of the Ukraine 
began to formulate comprehensive 
tobacco control policies in late 
2005, adopting a tobacco control 
law that included annual increases 
in tobacco excise taxes (14). 
Additionally, in 2006, the Ukraine 
ratified the WHO FCTC. Article 
6 of the Convention calls for 
implementation of tax and price 
policies on tobacco products by 
each Party in order to reach health 
objectives, including reducing 
tobacco consumption. There were, 
however, only modest increases 
in cigarette taxes between 1999 
and 2008. In 2008, the Ukrainian 
Parliament approved multiple, 
Figure 3.11. Relative income price (affordability) of cigarettes in the Ukraine, 
2002–2010 
The relative income price is the percentage of annual per capita income (measured as 
gross domestic product) required to purchase 100 packs of cigarettes; the lower the price, 
the more affordable cigarettes are. Cigarette prices from reference (18), gross domestic 
product from reference (19) and method from reference (20) 
 
1 This tax circumvention consisted of the industry selling cigarettes to distributors at a reduced price in order to reduce its 
ad valorem tax liability while recovering a large share of the retail margin from the distributors in a separate transaction (4). 
 
2 A change in the tax base changes the tax burden (the amount of tax collected per pack) even if the tax rate stays constant. In the Ukraine, 
the base for the ad valorem excise tax was the ex-factory price in the 1990s, the maximum retail price minus VAT minus total excise between 2004 
and 2009 and the maximum retail price minus VAT from 2009 to the present. These changes facilitated an increase in the cigarette tax burden.
Figure 3.10. Nominal and real prices of cigarettes in the Ukraine, 2002–2010 
2002 is the base year for inflation adjustment. 
Cigarette prices from reference (18) and inflation from reference (19)
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minimal. According to the Global 
Adult Tobacco Survey conducted 
in 2010, about 1.5% smokers had 
a pack without Ukrainian health 
warnings (22), a possible sign that 
these cigarettes had been imported 
illegally, although some could have 
been obtained legally in duty-free 
shops.
Therefore, the decline in cigarette 
sales in the Ukraine in 2008–
2010 was due partly to lower 
sizeable tax increases, in part as 
a response to the Government’s 
budgetary crisis.
Until the sizeable tax increase in 
September 2008, cigarette prices 
grew very little and did not keep 
pace with inflation. Between 2002 
and 2008, the real (inflation-
adjusted) price of filtered cigarettes 
in the Ukraine fell by nearly 
one third, and rising disposable 
income made cigarettes even more 
affordable. In addition, owing to 
the relatively small share of tax in 
retail prices, the tobacco industry 
was able to absorb part of the tax 
increase, thus contributing to the 
decline in real cigarette prices (14).
The large increases in tobacco taxes 
in 2009 and 2010 could no longer 
be absorbed by the industry, and 
cigarette prices began to rise. The 
industry increased the cigarette 
prices more than the tax increase 
in order to increase its profit 
margins (14). As a result of both 
the tax policy and the industry 
price strategy, the real price of 
filtered cigarettes increased by 
126% between August 2008 and 
December 2010, rising faster than 
real income. The affordability of 
cigarettes, measured as the relative 
income price3, declined during this 
period (Figures 3.10 and 3.11).
The substantial increases in 
cigarette excise taxes resulted 
in higher cigarette prices and 
contributed to a decline in 
cigarette sales (Figure 3.12). Per 
capita cigarette sales fell by 13% 
between 2008 and 2009 and by an 
additional 15% between 2009 and 
2010. It should be noted that about 
30% of cigarettes legally sold in the 
Ukraine are illegally exported out 
of the country (14). According to 
a report by the World Customs 
Organization, the number of 
cigarettes exported illegally from 
the Ukraine decreased in 2009 
from that in previous years, 
although the number of large 
cigarette seizures is still highest 
(21). It is likely that the tax and 
price increases contributed to the 
decline in illegal exports; illegal 
cigarette import to the Ukraine is 
Figure 3.12. Cigarette sales and consumption in the Ukraine are negatively 
related to cigarette prices: inflation-adjusted retail price for filtered 
cigarettes and per capita cigarette sales 
2002 is the base year for inflation adjustment.
Figure 3.13. Tax revenue increases when tobacco tax increases: total excise 
tax as a percentage of retail price for filtered cigarettes and inflation-adjusted 
monthly tobacco tax revenues in the Ukraine 
January 2007 is the base for inflation adjustment. 
From reference (23) 
 
3 Relative income price is the percentage of annual per capita income (measured as GDP) required to purchase 100 packs of cigarettes. 
The lower the price, the more affordable cigarettes are.
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consumption and partly to a 
decline in illicit cigarette exports. 
According to the State statistics 
committee, the prevalence of daily 
smoking among people aged ≥ 18 
years in 2010 was 24.0%, a decrease 
from 25.5% in 2009 and 27.5% in 
2008. Thus, between 2008 and 
2010, the daily smoking prevalence 
decreased by 3.5 percentage points 
or 13%. The household survey data 
showed a decrease in the average 
number of cigarettes smoked daily 
during the same period.
The changes in tobacco tax rates and 
industry price have led to higher 
tobacco tax revenues since 2008, 
in spite of falling consumption: an 
additional UAH1.1 billion (€0.14 
billion) were collected in 2008, 
UAH5.5 billion (€0.49 billion) 
more in 2009 and UAH4 billion 
(€0.38 billion) more in 2010 in 
comparison with previous years. 
Total excise tax revenue on filtered 
cigarettes amounted to more than 
UAH13 billion (€1.23 billion) 
in 2010, equal to nearly 2% of 
Ukrainian GDP (Figure  3.13) 
(14). Total cigarette excise tax in 
2009 was still, however, lower than 
the tobacco excise tax revenues in 
other former Soviet republics that 
are now part of the European 
Union (Table 3.7).
Cigarette excise tax policy 
in the Russian Federation
In the Russian Federation, cigarette 
taxes and prices are among the 
lowest in the world. Cigarettes 
were subjected to a turnover tax in 
the Soviet era (27), but the cigarette 
tax regime underwent major 
changes after the country began its 
transition from a centrally planned 
to a market economy in 1991. The 
current system is characterized by 
differential treatment of filtered 
and unfiltered cigarettes and, since 
1997, by the use of excise stamps 
(28). Tobacco excise tax is collected 
at Federal level.
In the 1990s, cigarette excise taxes 
were extremely low. By 1998, these 
taxes amounted to RUB6 (€0.24) 
per 1000 unfiltered and RUB12 
(€0.48) per 1000 filtered cigarettes, 
and the price of filtered cigarettes 
was RUB8.92 (€0.36) per pack, 
according to the Russian Federal 
State statistics service (Rosstat)4. 
From 1999, nominal excise tax rates 
increased incrementally, but these 
increases did not exceed the level 
of inflation. As a result, cigarettes 
became cheaper in real terms each 
year until 2007 (Figures 3.14 and 
3.15).
The 2003 excise tax reform 
introduced an ad valorem excise 
tax of 5% of the wholesale price 
and increased the cigarette-specific 
excise tax to RUB50 and RUB19 
per 1000 filtered and unfiltered 
Table 3.7. Tobacco excise tax revenue per smoker in selected countries in 
Europe in 2009
Country Tobacco excise tax revenue per smoker (EUR)
Russian Federation 38
Ukraine 64
Lithuania 183
Latvia 215
Romania 229
Estonia 331
Poland 334
Bulgaria 351
Hungary 367
Slovakia 399
Slovenia 469
Czech Republic 497
Germany 520
United Kingdom 614
Spain 632
France 742
Greece 770
Italy 820
Tax revenues from references (23–25); numbers of adult smokers from reference (26) 
 
4 Based on average prices of local filtered and foreign filtered cigarettes, weighted by the sales volume
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cigarettes, respectively. The excise 
tax system was again redesigned in 
2007 (29) to tackle a tax evasion 
scheme by the tobacco industry, 
which involved the industry 
selling cigarettes to distributors at 
a reduced price in order to reduce 
its ad valorem tax liability and to 
recover a large share of the retail 
margin from the distributors in 
a separate transaction (30). The 
new excise tax system is based on 
the maximum retail (rather than 
wholesale) price indicated on the 
cigarette pack and published by 
the Ministry of Finance (from 
the industry price list) as the 
basis for calculating tax liability. 
Manufacturers are allowed to 
change their maximum retail price 
once a month (31). The tax base 
plays an important role, as it is 
directly related to the tax burden5. 
Since 2007, the Ministry of 
Finance has specified a minimum 
excise tax rate per 1000 cigarettes 
(30). The 2007 excise tax was 
increased to RUB100 (€2.86) per 
1000 filtered cigarettes plus 5% of 
the maximum retail price, and the 
total excise tax was prohibited from 
falling below RUB115 (€3.28) per 
1000 cigarettes. The 2007 rate for 
unfiltered cigarettes was raised to 
RUB45 (€1.28) per 1000 cigarettes 
plus 5% of the maximum retail 
price, with the total excise tax 
not allowed to fall below RUB60 
(€1.71) per 1000 cigarettes. The 
sale of filtered and unfiltered 
cigarettes without the maximum 
retail price printed on the pack was 
forbidden as of 1 January and 1 
July 2008, respectively.
The Russian Federation acceded 
to the WHO FCTC on 3 June 
2008, and ratified the treaty 
in April 2010. The country is 
therefore obliged to take measures 
to prevent the spread of tobacco 
use, including implementation of 
effective tax and price policies.
The first steps towards meeting this 
obligation were taken slowly. The 
specific excise tax increased yearly 
at an average of 27% for filtered 
and 42% for unfiltered cigarettes 
between 2007 and 2010. At the 
same time, the ad valorem excise 
tax rate went up by 0.5 percentage 
points each year for both filtered 
and unfiltered cigarettes. As 
a result, the retail volume of 
unfiltered cigarettes decreased 
from 15.5% of the total cigarette 
market in 2005 to 4% in 2010 (32), 
and the real (inflation-adjusted) 
price of cigarettes went up in 
2008. In the same year, the tobacco 
industry changed its strategy: it 
stopped shielding its customers 
from inflation, passed new taxes 
on to consumers and even raised 
Figure 3.14. Share of taxes in nominal filtered cigarette prices in the Russian 
Federation, 2000–2010 
From reference (33) 
Figure 3.15. Share of taxes in real (inflation-adjusted) filtered cigarette prices 
in the Russian Federation, 2000–2010 
2000 is the base year for inflation adjustment. 
Cigarette prices from reference (33) and inflation from reference (19)
 
5 A change in the tax base changes the tax burden (the amount of tax collected per pack), even if the tax rate stays constant. In the Russian 
Federation, the base for the ad valorem excise tax was the wholesale price between 2003 and 2006 and the maximum retail price between 
2007 and the present. These changes facilitated an increase in the cigarette tax burden.
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its own prices to increase its profit 
margin (Figure 3.15). The total tax 
rate (excise plus VAT) reached 
34% of the average retail price in 
January 2010 (33).
Despite the tax increase in 
2010, real cigarette prices fell 
by 16% between 2000 and 2010 
(Figure 3.15). In addition, rising 
disposable income during this 
period increased the affordability 
of cigarettes (Figure 3.16).
The decrease in real cigarette 
prices and the increase in their 
affordability led to increased 
consumption, per capita, cigarette 
consumption doubling between 
1990 and 2010 (17). The average 
Russian citizen smoked 2726 
cigarettes in 2010, the second 
highest per capita consumption 
rate in the world (outranked only by 
Greece) (17). Figure 3.17 shows the 
inverse relation between cigarette 
consumption and real cigarette 
prices between 2000 and 2010.
Changes in tobacco taxes and 
industry prices between 2000 and 
2010 led to rising tobacco excise 
tax revenues. The revenue increased 
rapidly with every increase in 
tobacco taxes, regardless of the 
recent fall in per capita cigarette 
consumption. Tax collection in the 
Russian Federation is facilitated 
by a high market concentration, 
whereby 98% of the cigarette 
volume in 2010 was sold by only 
five tobacco companies ( Japan 
Tobacco International, Philip 
Morris International, British 
American Tobacco, Imperial 
Tobacco Group and Donskoy 
Tabak OAO) (32). In 2010, total 
excise tax revenue on cigarettes 
reached RUB106.3 billion (€2.64 
billion), a sixfold increase over 
2000 after adjustment for inflation 
Figure 3.16. Relative income price (affordability) of filtered cigarettes in the 
Russian Federation, 2000–2010
The relative income price is a percentage of annual per capita income (measured as gross domestic product) 
required to purchase 100 packs of cigarettes; the lower the price, the more affordable cigarettes are. Cigarette 
prices from reference (33), gross domestic product from reference (19) and method from reference (20) 
Figure 3.17. Cigarette consumption increases as real cigarette prices go 
down: inflation-adjusted retail price for filtered cigarettes and per capita 
cigarette consumption in the Russian Federation 
2000 is the base year for inflation adjustment. Cigarette prices from reference (33), inflation 
from reference (19) and cigarette consumption measured from sales from reference (17)
Figure 3.18. Tobacco excise tax and excise tax revenue: total excise tax as a 
percentage of retail price for filtered cigarettes and inflation-adjusted annual 
tobacco tax revenues in the Russian Federation 
2000 is the base year for inflation adjustment. 
Cigarette prices from reference (33) and tax revenues from reference (24) 
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(Figure  3.18). This amount is, 
however, tiny in comparison with 
the tobacco excise tax revenue 
collected per smoker in other 
European countries (Table 3.7).
While the tax structures of the 
Russian Federation and the 
Ukraine have moved towards 
that of the European Union, and 
these countries have substantially 
increased tobacco taxes in recent 
years, the rates of excise are still 
far below those applied in the 
European Union (Figure 3.19).
In the Ukraine in December 
2010, the average share of excise 
tax was 43.3% in filtered and 
38.3% in unfiltered cigarette 
retail prices, while the average 
excise tax collected per pack 
was only UAH3.47 (€0.33) and 
UAH1.42 (€0.13), respectively. 
This is substantially less than the 
European Union requirement 
that the excise tax represent not 
less than 57% of the retail price 
and amount to at least €1.28 per 
pack. The excise tax is also well 
below the WHO recommendation 
that it constitute at least 70% 
of the retail price of tobacco 
products (34). Additionally, the 
total tax (including VAT) on 
unfiltered cigarettes (UAH2.05 
as of December 2010) is about a 
half the tax on filtered cigarettes 
(UAH4.08 as of December 2010), 
allowing consumers to avoid the 
taxes by switching brands (down-
trading).
Likewise, the Russian excise tax 
rate is well below the WHO 
recommended 70% share of excise 
tax in tobacco retail prices (34). In 
2010, the average price of cigarettes 
reached RUB32.57 (€0.81), the 
excise tax representing about 
19% of the retail price of filtered 
cigarettes (9). Prime Minister Putin 
signed a ‘national anti-tobacco 
concept’ in October 2010, one 
goal of which is to increase tobacco 
excise taxes gradually, keeping both 
the ad valorem and the specific 
components. The current law, 
which came into effect in January 
2011, requires that cigarette excise 
tax rates be the same for filtered 
and unfiltered cigarettes by 2012 
and that by 2013 the increase in 
the specific portion of the excise 
tax be 64% for filtered and 84% 
for unfiltered cigarettes, while 
the ad valorem tax will go up by 1 
percentage point (12). The concept 
calls, however, for much larger 
tax increases. It envisions that by 
2015 the Russian Federation will 
reach the the WHO Regional 
Office for Europe average excise 
tax level of 2010, which was 63% 
of the retail price. If the concept 
is implemented, the excise tax per 
pack of cigarettes will reach about 
RUB73 by 2015, far above the rate 
of RUB7 in 2011. The most recent 
announcement by the Russian 
Government, however, appears 
to favour a conservative approach 
to tobacco taxation, limiting the 
annual increase in excise duty on 
tobacco to an average of 40–42% 
annually (13).
Despite planned increases in 
tobacco tax rates over the next 
few years, the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine will continue 
to be behind the rest of Europe 
when the tax increases outlined 
in European Union tax Directive 
2010/12/EU take effect in 2014.
3.9 Policy implications 
of PPACTE findings on 
tobacco tax structures 
and rates in Europe
Tax structure
To discourage consumers from 
substituting hand-rolled cigarettes 
for manufactured cigarettes, excise 
taxes applicable to fine-cut tobacco 
for hand-rolled cigarettes should 
be fully aligned with those on 
manufactured cigarettes on the 
basis of a more realistic conversion 
rate. Furthermore, excise rates on 
all tobacco product types should 
Figure 3.19. Tax as a percentage of retail selling price in selected European 
countries, 2010 
Data for Europe from reference (25); calculations for the Russian Federation based on data from 
reference (33) and for the Ukraine from reference (35)
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be aligned to prevent the industry 
from exploiting preferential tax 
rates on fine-cut or other tobacco.
Adjustment of the overall 
minimum tax
The overall minimum tax should 
be adjusted so that it is comparable 
in affordability among countries, 
thereby allowing higher levels to 
be set automatically for higher-
income countries. The adjustment 
could be made by the comparative 
price level or by purchasing power 
parity, which are available for all 
European Union Member States. 
The basic minimum tax could be 
set for the lowest-income Member 
States and adjusted upwards for 
wealthier States. In countries with 
higher prices, the minimum would 
be set as above and adjusted upwards 
annually above inflation and income 
changes. The basic minimum tax 
would then be adjusted annually 
in line with inflation and income 
levels and the relative cost of 
living by comparative price level 
or purchasing power parity; the 
minimum could be set, for example, 
at €125 per 1000 cigarettes for 
a specific low-price country and 
adjusted by comparative price level 
for other countries.
The index considered for adjustment 
of the overall monetary minimum 
tax should be available for most 
countries (both European Union 
Member States and candidate 
countries), provided by an 
institutional authority (Eurostat), 
stable, updated annually and 
published by a single source (2).
Data availability
Monitoring of cigarette prices 
is inadequate. The ‘most popular 
price category’, which was 
previously used as the reference 
value for calculating tax rates, was 
interpreted variably in different 
Member States. For example, on 
the British cigarette market, the 
most popular price category was 
interpreted as the recommended 
retail price at which the greatest 
number of cigarettes were sold, 
regardless of the number of brands 
that were sold at this price (8). As 
a result, the most popular price 
category in the United Kingdom 
reflected the price of premium 
brands and, by failing to account 
for the growth in volume of ultra-
low-priced brands, has exaggerated 
price increases. Directive 2010/12/
EU introduced the weighted 
average price as the new reference 
value for determining tax rates. 
While this value will give a better 
overall picture of price trends, price 
trends should also be monitored 
by price segment. Obtaining data 
on price trends by price segment, 
which are currently available 
only from commercial sources, is, 
however, prohibitively expensive. 
Therefore, governments should 
require industry to provide brand- 
and category-specific prices 
routinely and should make the data 
available to researchers for detailed 
monitoring of price trends and the 
effectiveness of tax policy (8).
Eastern border countries: 
the Russian Federation and 
the Ukraine
The European Commission should 
continue its partnerships with eastern 
border countries and encourage 
further upwards harmonization of 
tax rates in those countries with 
that of the European Union. The 
Russian Federation and the Ukraine 
should continue to increase taxes 
substantially, allowing the specific 
component to drive these increases 
and ensuring annual adjustment for 
inflation to prevent cigarettes from 
becoming increasingly affordable as 
incomes grow.
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ILLICIT ToBACCo TRADE 
IN EURoPE
chApter 4
The implications of illicit tobacco 
trade for tobacco control policy 
in Europe were introduced in 
Chapter 1 of this report. Beginning 
with brief definitions of the terms 
used, this section is a summary of 
PPACTE findings on the illicit 
tobacco trade in Europe, drawing 
on the literature reviewed in the 
Handbook (WP7), evidence 
from the European survey on 
the economic aspects of smoking 
(WP2) and a report by Joossens 
commissioned for PPACTE on the 
causes of illicit trade and the policy 
options for addressing it (WP5).
4.1 Definitions
Tax avoidance refers to legal 
methods of paying less or no tobacco 
tax, while tax evasion refers to illegal 
methods of circumventing tobacco 
taxes (1). Tax avoidance involves, 
for example, purchasing tobacco 
products in lower-tax jurisdictions 
for personal consumption within 
customs constraints (e.g. cross-
border shopping, tourist shopping, 
duty-free shopping, internet 
purchases) (2). Tax evasion involves 
the purchase of small or large 
quantities of smuggled and illicitly 
manufactured tobacco products 
and may involve criminal networks, 
tobacco companies or other large-
scale operators (1).
Smuggling is one type of illicit 
trade and refers to illegal trading 
of products across borders. Small-
scale smuggling, or bootlegging, 
involves the purchase by individuals 
of quantities of lower-taxed 
tobacco products in quantities 
exceeding customs regulations, for 
smuggling across borders for resale 
in higher-tax jurisdictions. Large-
scale smuggling involves the illegal 
transport, distribution and sale of 
large quantities of tobacco products, 
generally avoiding all taxes (1). This 
typically involves large organized 
crime networks, which transport 
recognized international brands 
over long distances using ‘in-transit’ 
regimes and tax-free zones and 
sophisticated distribution systems 
in the destination countries (3).
Illicit trade is a much broader 
concept than smuggling and is 
defined in Article 1 of the WHO 
FCTC as “any practice or conduct 
prohibited by law and which 
relates to production, shipment, 
receipt, possession, distribution, 
sale or purchase including any 
practice or conduct intended to 
facilitate such activity” (4). Illicit 
trade includes both smuggled and 
illicitly manufactured tobacco. 
Illicit manufacture refers to the 
production of tobacco products 
contrary to law—taxation law, 
licensing or monopoly law—
that restricts the manufacture of 
tobacco products. This type of tax 
evasion includes underreporting of 
actual production quantities and 
diverting the difference through 
illegal channels or complete lack 
of reporting and diversion of all 
manufactured product to black 
markets (3). One form of illicit 
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(5) found that eliminating the 
illicit cigarette trade in the United 
Kingdom would reduce cigarette 
consumption by 5.0–8.2% and 
lower the tobacco-attributable 
death toll by 4000–6560 premature 
deaths per year.
Experience in several European 
countries suggests that an increase 
in cigarette taxes can result in 
increased smuggling but a decline 
in total cigarette consumption. Two 
sizeable tobacco tax increases in 
Sweden (in December 1996 and 
August 1997) led to a 43% increase 
in average cigarette prices but also 
to an increase in the estimated 
amount of cigarette smuggling 
(from 200 million cigarettes in 1996 
to 500 million in 1998). Smoking 
prevalence declined, particularly 
among children and young adults. 
In addition, tobacco tax revenue 
rose by 9% in 1997 from that in 
1996 (7, 8). After the Swedish 
Government responded to pressure 
to reduce cigarette smuggling and 
reduce the cigarette tax in August 
1998, per capita tax-paid cigarette 
sales increased but the tax revenue 
went down (3).
France nearly doubled its nominal 
cigarette retail price between 
September 1991 and December 
1996 (a 74% increase in real terms) 
by increasing tobacco taxes. Over 
the same period, cigarette sales fell 
from 97 billion cigarettes in 1991 to 
83 billion in 1997, adult smoking 
prevalence decreased from 40% in 
1991 to 34% in 1997 (9), and the 
smoking prevalence among young 
people (12–18 years) fell from 
30% in 1991 to 25% in 1997 (10). 
Tobacco tax revenue rose from 32 
billion French francs in 1991 to 
57 billion French francs in 1996, 
while illicit cigarettes maintained 
a relatively unimportant share 
of the market (about 2%) (9). 
France’s efficiently controlled retail 
environment, in which all tobacco 
retailers have to hold a license, 
partly explains its relatively low 
level of illicit cigarette trade.
A study in the United Kingdom 
showed that higher taxes increased 
the prices of both legal and 
illegal tobacco products and led 
to an overall decline in tobacco 
consumption (11). The price 
elasticity of duty-paid tobacco 
also increased after 1995, however, 
when cigarette smuggling began 
to increase, so that some of the 
decrease in legal consumption was 
replaced by an increase in illegal 
consumption.
Merriman, Yurekli and Chaloupka 
(12) analysed data for 23 European 
countries in 1989-1995 and 
predicted that a tax increase 
in one country would increase 
cigarette bootlegging, but that 
coordinating these increases with 
those in neighbouring countries 
would reduce the incentive for 
this type of tax avoidance. For 
example, a unilateral 10% price 
increase in Germany would reduce 
the total consumption by three 
cigarette packs per capita per year 
but would reduce the sales by six 
packs, as three packs would be 
bootlegged to Germany from other 
countries. With a multilateral 
price increase, the consumption 
in Germany would still fall 
by three packs per capita, but 
domestic sales would fall by only 
four packs (one pack still being 
supplied from other countries). 
The health impact of a tax increase 
is therefore independent of the 
coordination of tax increases, but 
the impact on revenue depends on 
such coordination. If incentives 
for bootlegging in Europe 
manufacture is counterfeit tobacco 
production, which involves the 
production and distribution of 
products bearing a trademark 
without the approval of the 
trademark owner. These products 
are illegally produced, often bear 
counterfeit tax stamps and are 
distributed through established 
networks of large-scale smuggling 
operations (2).
4.2 Public health 
implications of tobacco 
tax avoidance and 
evasion
Tobacco tax avoidance and evasion 
undermine the effectiveness of 
tobacco taxation by providing access 
to cheaper tobacco products, and 
they weaken the impact of other 
tobacco control policies and increase 
health disparities, while reducing 
government revenues (2, 5).
The price of illicit tobacco products 
relative to legal products varies by 
country, the location of the selling 
point, the brand name and the 
perception of the quality of the illicit 
cigarettes; however, illicit tobacco 
is generally substantially cheaper 
than comparable legal tobacco. 
Several studies have addressed the 
price gap between legal and illegal 
products and estimated the impact 
of this difference on tobacco use 
and on public health. Joossens et al. 
(6) analysed data from 84 countries 
and estimated that the global 
average cigarette price in 2007 
was about 3.75% lower because 
of illicit trade in cigarettes. If the 
global illicit cigarette market had 
been eliminated in 2002, 164 000 
premature deaths would be averted 
each year from 2030 onwards, 
preventing almost 1 million 
tobacco-related premature deaths 
by 2036 (6). Similarly, West et al. 
Chapter 4. Illicit tobacco trade in Europe 77
disappeared, legal cigarette sales 
would increase by 3%. If foreigners 
had no incentive to buy cheaper 
cigarettes in a country, that 
country’s domestic sales would fall 
by 1%. For example, a unilateral 
10% cigarette price increase in 
Germany would reduce the annual 
cigarette sales by six packs per 
capita but would increase annual 
cigarette purchases abroad by 
three packs per capita, resulting 
in a reduction of three packs per 
capita in consumption.
Studies in Europe and North 
America have consistently shown 
that increasing cigarette taxes reduces 
consumption and increases revenues, 
even in the presence of illicit cigarette 
trade. Furthermore, eliminating the 
supply of illicit tobacco results in 
larger-than-average reductions in 
smoking among young people and 
the poor, who are disproportionately 
affected because of their higher 
price sensitivity (13, 14) and greater 
likelihood of accessing cheaper 
sources of tobacco (15).
The illicit tobacco trade undermines 
the effectiveness not only of tobacco 
taxation but also of other tobacco 
control policies. For example, there 
is some evidence that vendors of 
smuggled cigarettes are less likely 
to comply with restrictions on 
sales to and by young people, and 
smuggled products are less likely to 
bear health warning labels in local 
languages (3, 16, 17).
4.3 Determinants of  
illicit tobacco trade: a 
summary of the literature
A comprehensive review of the 
international literature on tobacco 
tax avoidance and evasion conducted 
for the Handbook (WP7) identified 
the main determinants of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion.
Determinants 
of tax avoidance and 
small-scale smuggling
The extent of tax avoidance and 
small-scale smuggling is determined 
primarily by differentials in price 
between neighbouring jurisdictions 
(2). In general, the larger the 
price differential, the greater 
the incentive to engage in tax 
avoidance, as the difference in price 
minus any transaction costs (such 
as time and travel) represents the 
net gain from tax avoidance (18). 
Several studies have addressed the 
impact of price and tax differentials 
on tax avoidance and small-scale 
smuggling in Europe (12, 19–21) 
and the United States (22–24).
Taal et al. (19) analysed sales and 
survey data for 1993–2000 in 
Estonia, a country with a high 
incentive for bootlegging and 
cross-border shopping. During 
this period, cigarette prices were 
up to four times lower than in 
neighbouring Finland and Sweden 
(but considerably higher than in the 
neighbouring Russian Federation). 
They found that illegal purchases of 
cigarettes by Estonians represented 
a fairly small proportion of the total 
cigarette market; however, legal 
cigarette purchases by tourists and 
foreign visitors (not part of local 
consumption) were significant, 
representing up to 50% of legal 
sales. Finnish authorities confirmed 
that legal cross-border cigarette 
shopping by Finnish travellers 
amounted to 12% of total national 
sales in Finland in 1996 (25).
Buck et al. (20) showed that in the 
early to mid-1990s there was little 
incentive for cross-border shopping 
for cigarettes between France and 
Britain, and the savings on 800 
cigarettes bought in France and 
taken back to Britain would be 
outweighed by the cost of the trip. 
Cross-border shopping existed at 
that time, but only when smokers 
were already across the border for 
other reasons. Estimates by the 
United Kingdom Department of 
Customs and Excise confirmed that 
legitimate cross-border shopping 
was a minor problem in 1997, when 
legitimate personal imports of 
tobacco products represented less 
than 0.5% of total cigarette sales 
(26). The situation changed at the 
end of the 1990s, when cigarette 
prices in the United Kingdom 
increased by about 25% between 
1997 and 2000. The United 
Kingdom Treasury estimated that 
the market share of illicit cigarettes 
rose from about 3% in 1996–1997 
to about 18% by 1999–2000 (27).
Similarly, in France, the substantial 
increases in tobacco tax in 2003 and 
2004 that led to higher cigarette 
prices were blamed for an increase 
in cross-border purchases of 
tobacco products (both legal and 
illegal), from a negligible amount 
to 14–17% of total sales in 2005 
and 2006 (21).
In general, studies in the United 
States showed that cigarette 
demand was sensitive to differences 
in price between the state of 
residence and neighbouring states, 
such that an increase in the price 
of tobacco in a neighbouring state 
increased tobacco consumption in 
the state of residence (22). Inversely, 
an increase in price in the state of 
residence increased the likelihood 
of purchasing cigarettes in a 
neighbouring state (24). Evidence 
suggests that, while tax avoidance 
increases immediately after a tax 
increase, this tends to decrease with 
time (24, 28).
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Determinants of tax evasion
The determinants of tax evasion 
are far more complex than those 
of tax avoidance and small-scale 
smuggling. The tobacco industry 
has claimed that high tobacco 
taxes drive large-scale smuggling 
(29) and use this argument to 
lobby governments to keep tax 
rates low (30). The literature 
suggests, however, that large-
scale smuggling tends to be more 
frequent in countries with lower 
cigarette prices (and usually lower 
cigarette taxes) than in countries 
with higher prices (and usually 
higher taxes) (6, 31). While a 
high tax margin may provide 
an initial incentive to smuggle, 
smuggling appears to be driven 
by several factors, including the 
level of corruption (7, 12, 32), the 
presence of informal distribution 
networks (3, 12, 31, 33), the extent 
of organized crime, the degree of 
cross-border trade and the strength 
of border controls (3, 34), the 
severity of penalties, the capacity 
to administer and enforce tax 
systems (33), the extent to which 
foreign and domestically produced 
products are differentially taxed 
(35–37) and the strategies of 
tobacco companies (38–41).
4.4  Extent of illicit 
tobacco trade in Europe
Measuring illicit tobacco trade 
is methodologically challenging, 
for many reasons. First, it is an 
illegal activity, and illegal traders 
are unlikely to document their 
activities. Secondly, data on illicit 
trade are difficult to collect, as law 
enforcement agencies often do not 
publish information about all their 
activities, in the interests of security 
and confidentiality. Thirdly, all the 
available methods of measuring 
illicit trade are limited, and the data 
sources used may bias the estimates.
Few studies of the extent of the 
illicit tobacco trade in Europe were 
identified in the literature review 
conducted for the Handbook. 
The limited empirical evidence 
indicates that tax evasion is 
much more widespread than tax 
avoidance, that cigarette tax evasion 
is more prevalent in countries that 
have lower cigarette prices and 
lower cigarette taxes and that the 
size of the illicit market is inversely 
related to a country’s income (2).
Merriman, Yurekli and Chaloupka 
(12) analysed cigarette sales data 
for 1989–1995 from 18 European 
countries and estimated that the 
share of cigarettes acquired by 
bootlegging and/or cross-border 
shopping accounted for about 
3% of domestic consumption in a 
typical European country.
According to a Eurobarometer 
survey of 26 500 people in 
European Union Member States, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Norway in 
December 2008, just over one tenth 
of European Union citizens (12%) 
had seen tobacco products being 
sold in the past 6 months which they 
thought might have been smuggled 
into the country. The proportion of 
respondents who reported having 
seen potentially smuggled tobacco 
products being sold in the previous 
6 months was highest in Lithuania 
(36%), followed by Greece (25%), 
Poland, Hungary and Latvia (22–
24%). In Belgium, Denmark, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, only 5% of respondents 
reported having seen potentially 
smuggled tobacco products in the 
previous 6 months. In Norway, the 
country with the highest cigarette 
prices in the world, where in 
January 2008 a packet of Marlboros 
cost €8.15, only 6% of survey 
respondents reported that they had 
seen tobacco products during the 
past 12 months that they believed 
had been smuggled. In Lithuania, 
the country with the lowest 
cigarette prices in the European 
Union, where in January 2008 a 
packet of Marlboro cost €1.36, the 
percentage of respondents giving 
this answer was 36% (42).
On the basis of an analysis of 
data collected by the professional 
services company KPMG, the 
European Commission estimated 
that, in 2004, total market 
penetration of the illicit cigarette 
trade represented approximately 
8–9% of cigarette sales within the 
European Union (which had 25 
Member States at the time) (43). 
It also noted that the illicit market 
share in the new European Union 
Member States (Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) 
was far higher than the previous 
average. This report is limited 
because it is based on cigarette 
seizures in the European Union 
and on studies provided by the 
tobacco trade and governments; 
however, the overall figure of 
8–9% appears to be a reasonable 
estimate, as it falls between the 
higher estimates from the United 
Kingdom and eastern and central 
European countries and the lower 
estimates from southern European 
countries like Italy and Spain.
KPMG continued its research on 
illicit trade as part of its obligations 
under the 2004 agreement between 
Philip Morris International and 
the European Union. According to 
the KPMG report, total cigarette 
consumption in the European 
Union in 2009 was 685 billion units, 
and contraband trade accounted 
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for 8.9% of total consumption 
(44). The content of the KPMG 
report was made public only 
in August 2011, after a formal 
request based on European Union 
legislation regarding public access 
to documents (Regulation No. 
1049/2001 of May 2001).
British American Tobacco 
commissioned similar studies, with 
no transparency in reporting the 
methods or definitions used, and 
found that the percentage of untaxed 
cigarettes in 2010 was highest in 
Lithuania (49%), Latvia (41%) and 
Norway (33%) (M. Ross, personal 
communication). It is unclear what 
British American Tobacco measured 
in this study. There is known to 
be significant legal cross-border 
shopping in Norway but negligible 
illicit trade. For example, consistent 
with the data for Norway from the 
Eurobarometer survey, Lund (45) 
The analysis by WP5 suggests that, before Bulgaria 
acceded to the European Union, the transnational 
tobacco companies benefited from and actively 
participated in illegal importation of their cigarettes into 
Bulgaria and that Bulgaria in turn served as a point of 
transit to other closed markets, including Italy, Turkey 
and the former Soviet Union. This provides further 
evidence of the widespread use by transnational 
tobacco companies of smuggling as a market access 
strategy (47–52). Furthermore, the duty-free business 
was used to disguise illicit trade. As duty-free zones 
have been shown to serve as portals for smuggling 
elsewhere (53–56), this confirms that duty free zones 
should be ended. A document from British American 
Tobacco makes this explicit, stating that “most 
importers use the duty free facade to import goods 
and get around paying full duties” (57). 
Despite the apparent change in the nature of 
cigarette smuggling in most of Europe after the legal 
proceedings in 2000 (58) and subsequent settlements 
with the European Commission (59–63), there is some 
evidence that the involvement of transnational tobacco 
companies in cigarette smuggling continued after 2000 
and up until 2010. For example, Gallaher International 
(part of Japan Tobacco International from 1999) was 
found to be complicit in smuggling up to 2003 (46, 64), 
and work by the Center for the Study of Democracy 
and trends in official import figures implied ongoing 
involvement of tobacco companies (including Philip 
Morris) (65). Their continued involvement would be 
consistent with the fact that import duties in Bulgaria 
remained high until 2007, making legal imports less 
profitable. Recently exposed complicity of Japan 
Tobacco International in smuggling in 2009–2010 
shows that the company continued to be involved 
in smuggling into and through the European Union, 
despite agreeing with the European Commission in 
2007 to “proactively investigate all claims of smuggling” 
(66). 
The marked change in the rhetoric of the transnational 
tobacco companies on tobacco smuggling after 
accession of Bulgaria to the European Union is 
notable. From public silence on the issue during 
the time that the companies relied on smuggling to 
stimulate demand before market entry, the tobacco 
companies and other industry representatives now 
regularly discuss cigarette smuggling, propounding 
the idea that stability of cigarette excise rates is key to 
preventing smuggling (46). This argument has been 
made in personal meetings with Bulgarian ministers (in 
2009), and interviews suggest that it is widely accepted, 
even in the public health community in Bulgaria (46). 
Press coverage of the cigarette smuggling issue also 
gives this one-sided view. Furthermore, we obtained 
data to suggest that, as in Poland (67), the industry may 
exaggerate the extent of illicit trade in Bulgaria. overall, 
this suggests that education on cigarette smuggling 
is needed, including the role of transnational tobacco 
companies, and also on the use of independent data 
on the extent of the problem, rather than relying on 
industry-commissioned research, such as that of 
KPMG (46, 68). 
Corruption and possible political involvement in the 
illicit trade are underlying concerns, and Bulgartabac 
is probably also involved (65, 69, 70). This is consistent 
with evidence from Montenegro of high-level political 
involvement in cigarette smuggling (71, 72) and of the 
complex links between cigarette smuggling, corruption 
and organized crime (73, 74).
Box 4.1. Tobacco industry complicity in smuggling: findings from the PPACTE WP5 
Bulgarian case study (46)
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calculated that one fourth of the 
sales in 1997–2001 in Norway were 
untaxed, with 24% attributed to 
cross-border shopping and only 1% 
to smuggling.
As shown in Box 4.1, case study 
findings by WP5 from Bulgaria 
and Poland suggest that the 
tobacco industry might exaggerate 
the extent of illicit trade as part of 
their argument against increases 
in excise duty. For example, Phillip 
Morris reported in 2010 that the 
prevalence of illicit trade in Bulgaria 
represented 34% of total market sales 
(75), while independent data from 
the PPACTE WP2 survey suggest 
a 14.5% prevalence in that year (76).
European survey on the 
economic aspects of smoking: 
purchasing patterns and 
latest pack (WP2)
To obtain updated, comparable 
estimates of the extent of tax 
avoidance in 18 strategically 
selected European Union Member 
States, respondents to the 
European survey on the economic 
aspects of smoking (WP2) were 
asked about their purchasing 
patterns and to show their latest 
purchased pack of cigarettes or 
hand-rolling tobacco. Among 
current smokers, an average of 
88.1% bought cigarettes from 
legal tobacco shops (including 
vending machines), 4.9% from 
other countries or duty-free 
shops and 3.6% from smuggled 
sources. On average, 3.4% smoked 
cigarettes offered by their peers 
and 0.1% bought cigarettes over 
the Internet (76) (Figure 4.1). The 
proportion of current smokers 
who reported that they smoked 
cigarettes from other countries 
or duty-free shops was higher in 
Austria (12.3%), Finland (13.2%) 
and France (13.2%). More current 
smokers reported smoking 
smuggled cigarettes in eastern 
European countries, particularly 
in Bulgaria (12.2%) and Latvia 
(25.9%). Overall, 8.4% of current 
smokers had bought smuggled 
cigarettes in the past 30 days, 
representing at least 1% of their 
total cigarette purchases (76).
Overall, 73.9% of current smokers 
agreed to show the interviewer 
their latest purchased pack of 
cigarettes or hand-rolling tobacco. 
Figure 4.2 shows the percentage 
Figure 4.1. Percentage distribution of current smokers according to where 
they bought their packs of cigarettes during the past 30 days, overall* and 
by country, sorted by percentage buying from legal shops and from vending 
machines (ascending order).  
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
* Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
Figure 4.2. Percentage distribution of current smokers according to the 
type of their latest pack of cigarettes, overall* and by country, sorted by 
’20-cigarette pack’ (ascending order).  
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
* Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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distribution of current smokers by 
the type of their latest purchased 
tobacco product and by country. 
Overall, 81.6% of current smokers 
had bought a pack of 20 cigarettes, 
4.3% a pack of 10 cigarettes, 10.9% 
hand-rolling tobacco and 3.3% 
another type of tobacco product. 
The highest proportion of smokers 
showing hand-rolling tobacco 
was observed in England (31.8% 
overall, 38.2% of men and 24.9% 
of women), followed by France 
(17.0% overall) and Finland (14.0% 
overall) (76).
Figure 4.3 shows the percentage 
distribution of current smokers 
by type of health warning on their 
latest pack of cigarettes. Overall, 
93.1% of current smokers showed 
a tobacco product with a health 
warning in the local language and 
1.1% a pack with no health warning. 
The prevalence of current smokers 
showing a pack with a health warning 
in a foreign language was lowest in 
Portugal (0%) and Greece (0.3%) 
and highest in Austria (12.2%) and 
Latvia (26.1%). The prevalence of 
current smokers showing a pack 
with no health warning was lowest 
in England, France, Portugal and 
Sweden (0%) and higher in Latvia 
(5.2%) and Croatia (8.6%) (76).
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution 
of current smokers by the type of 
tax stamp (banderole) on their 
latest pack of cigarettes. Overall, 
89.5% of current smokers showed 
a product with a tax stamp in the 
local language and 4.5% in a foreign 
language, 1.7% showed a pack with 
a tax stamp removed or destroyed 
and 4.4% had either a duty-free 
pack or a pack with no tax stamp. 
Current smokers showed a tobacco 
product with a foreign stamp most 
often in Latvia (26.3%), followed by 
France (11.0%) and Austria (9.6%). 
The largest proportion of smokers 
showing a duty-free pack or one 
with no tax stamp was in England 
(15.2%), followed by Bulgaria (8.3%) 
and France (7.7%) (76).
4.5 Policy options 
to tackle illicit tobacco 
trade in Europe
Sweeting, Johnson and Schwartz 
(77) extensively reviewed the 
effectiveness of measures to address 
the illicit trade of cigarettes, including 
a systematic literature review, key 
informant interviews and expert 
Figure 4.3.Percentage distribution of current smokers according to the 
type of health warning on their latest pack of cigarettes, overall* and by 
country, sorted by ‘local language’ (ascending order). 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
Figure 4.4. Percentage distribution of current smokers according to 
the type of tax stamp on their latest pack of cigarettes, overall* and by 
country, sorted by ‘local stamp’ (ascending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
 * Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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focus panels. They presented several 
case studies from the European 
Union, which experienced significant 
cigarette smuggling in the 1990s.
Case studies of illicit trade 
in Europe
In the United Kingdom, large 
quantities of genuine, domestically 
produced cigarettes were exported 
to dubious export markets and 
then imported back into the 
United Kingdom illegally through 
smuggling networks (29). Thus, 
many of the cigarettes exported 
to Europe by American tobacco 
companies under the transit regime 
were lost in transit and siphoned off 
into the illegal markets of Germany, 
Italy, Spain and other European 
Union countries.
Illicit trade has declined during the 
past decade, from 21% to 13% in the 
United Kingdom and from about 
15% to 1–2% in Italy and Spain, 
largely as a result of anti-smuggling 
measures (77). The United Kingdom 
introduced scanners to detect 
containers and placed prominent 
fiscal marks on packs. They also 
increased their punitive measures, 
hired more customs officers and held 
Parliamentary hearings to expose 
tobacco industry export practices. 
The United Kingdom’s strategy 
for tackling illicit trade involved 
strong cooperation among different 
agencies and was continuously 
updated to improve intelligence, 
risk profiling and detection and 
disruption of the supply of illicit 
tobacco products (78).
Similarly, Spain reduced the 
smuggling of cigarettes by a 
multifaceted approach including 
better intelligence, more customs 
activity in border areas and 
international cooperation, both 
within Europe and with United 
States authorities. In Italy, a dramatic 
fall in customs seizures and a rise 
in legal sales was attributed to legal 
action against the tobacco industry 
and legally binding agreements 
with Phillip Morris International 
resulting from Italian and European 
investigations.
These examples have several 
common factors. Smuggling was 
reduced in these countries by: 
(i) interrupting the supply chain 
from manufacturers to the illicit 
market, (ii) improving international 
cooperation in sharing intelligence, 
(iii) investigating industry activities 
and (iv) prosecuting the industry 
(77). From these and other case 
studies, Sweeting, Johnson and 
Schwartz (77) identified four 
distinct types of illicit tobacco 
trade: legal products illegally 
distributed at national level, legal 
products illegally distributed across 
borders, illegal products destined 
for the domestic market and illegal 
products destined for a cross-border 
market. The authors conclude that 
both the type of illicit trade and 
the means of distribution influence 
the effectiveness of policies and the 
unintended consequences for action. 
Therefore, measures considered to 
be effective must keep pace with 
changes in the type and means of 
illicit tobacco distribution.
4.6 The WHO Framework 
Convention for Tobacco 
Control and the protocol 
on illicit trade 
The global scope and multifaceted 
nature of the illicit tobacco trade 
require a coordinated international 
response. This is the aim of the WHO 
FCTC protocol on illicit trade, 
which is currently being negotiated. 
The protocol should emphasize 
international cooperation in sharing 
intelligence and in investigating and 
prosecuting offenders. In addition, 
the protocol should promote 
enforceable measures to control the 
supply chain including:
•	Licensing and regulating 
all participants in the tobacco 
business;
•	Controlling ‘free zones’;
•	Using systems to track and 
trace 
•	Tobacco products from the 
manufacturer to the point of sale, 
to identify points of diversion to 
the illicit market;
•	 Introducing traceable methods 
of payment at all stages of the 
supply and distribution chain; 
and
•	Strict scrutiny of procedures 
in the selection of contractors 
during the supply process.
 
A regime for tracking and tracing 
tobacco products is a fundamental 
component of the WHO FCTC 
protocol on illicit trade. Tracking 
and tracing tobacco products allows 
detailed analysis of individual 
seizures of genuine tobacco 
products, enables identification 
of points of diversion of tobacco 
products to the illicit market 
and provides important data on 
smuggling trends on a larger scale.
Provisional agreement was reached 
on a system for tracking and tracing 
as part of the protocol, which 
will become meaningful only if 
all the articles of the protocol are 
agreed and the protocol is adopted 
and ratified. Under the tentative 
tracking and tracing regime, all 
Parties shall require that unique, 
secure, unremovable markings form 
part of all cigarette packs within 5 
years. The available techniques for 
tracking and tracing, their current 
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applications and their advantages 
and disadvantages are summarized 
in Table 4.1.
Tracking and tracing consist of more 
than the markings on packages. They 
imply reading or scanning codes, 
linking the codes between packs, 
cartons, master cases and pallets, 
uploading the information onto a 
database, recording any shipment 
and receiving events along the 
supply chain and interconnecting 
the different databases. As 
concluded by Joossens (1), a global 
tracking and tracing system should 
be combined with better regulation 
of the legal tobacco trade and 
should comply with the following 
minimum requirements:
•	All tobacco product packaging 
(packs, cartons, master cases) 
should have a unique code.
•	A link should exist among 
different packaging units, such 
that master cases can be traced 
without having to scan all 
enclosed packs and cartons.
•	A secure system, which cannot 
be fully decrypted by external 
stakeholders, should be introduced.
•	A system, administered 
independently and protected 
from industry interference, 
should be created. At a 
minimum, regular independent 
audits should be required to 
guarantee the validity of the 
system.
•	All shipment and receiving 
events throughout the supply 
chain should be recorded.
•	Databases of supply partners 
and national and international 
authorities should be linked 
and accessible to authorized 
enforcement officials globally.
4.7 Access to data on the 
extent of illicit trade  
Given the illicit nature of tax 
avoidance and tax evasion, it is difficult 
to design measures and adequately 
assess the extent of such activities. 
Data on seizures by manufacturer, 
country of seizure, brand name and 
method for detecting authenticity 
should be made publicly available. 
Furthermore, officially commissioned 
studies of the extent of tax avoidance 
and evasion should be conducted 
independently, with application 
of clear definitions of the type of 
circumvention being addressed and 
transparency in the reporting of the 
methods employed and sources of 
funding and be publicly available and 
open to scrutiny in a timely manner. 
The European Commission has had 
to rely on and collaborate with the 
industry to obtain data on illicit trade, 
but this is insufficient.    
4.8 Education about 
illicit trade 
Efforts are required to educate 
public health professionals, 
politicians, civil servants and the 
general public about the true nature 
and causes of the illicit tobacco 
trade and transnational tobacco 
companies’ complicity in cigarette 
smuggling. Furthermore, public 
health groups must engage with the 
media to ensure accurate coverage 
of the smuggling issue and to 
make sure that industry versions of 
events, including any exaggeration 
of the extent of the problem, are 
counterbalanced by more accurate 
information.
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oN ToBACCoTAxATIoN PoLICy
chApter 5
The taxation of tobacco is of 
particular concern to the tobacco 
industry. As one of the most 
effective measures for reducing 
tobacco consumption, the taxation 
of tobacco threatens the long-
term profitability of the industry. 
The potential of tobacco taxation 
to generate revenue and public 
health gains ensures that it will 
continue to be an intervention 
used as a priority by governments. 
Furthermore, the excise structure—
whether predominately specific 
or ad valorem—and the levels of 
each excise component will affect 
the competitiveness of tobacco 
companies by favouring different 
pricing strategies and thus different 
brand portfolios. Understanding 
tobacco industry influence on 
tobacco taxation policy and the 
pricing strategies they use to 
protect their profits is essential to 
designing and promoting effective 
taxation policy.
The Handbook and WP5 examined 
the published evidence of tobacco 
industry activities, including how 
tobacco product prices change in 
response to changes in tobacco taxes, 
price-related marketing strategies 
used by tobacco companies and the 
industry’s lobbying to shape policy 
decisions on the structure, rates 
and earmarking of tobacco excise 
taxes (1). This section begins with 
a summary of industry activities 
related to tobacco taxation from the 
Handbook (WP7). An examination 
of the industry pricing strategy on 
the British cigarette market is then 
presented (WP5), followed by a 
summary of the findings from a 
series of case studies of industry 
influence on policy and structures 
of excise duties (WP5).
5.1 The impact of tobacco 
tax increases on price
The impact of tobacco taxes on 
prices depends on how the industry 
reacts to a tax increase. Early 
empirical evidence on the extent to 
which taxes were passed through in 
prices, almost entirely from high-
income countries, was conflicting. 
Older studies in the United States 
indicated that cigarette taxes led to 
less-than-comparable price increases 
(2–4); others showed that taxes were 
fully passed on (5), and still others 
showed that prices rose more than 
the tax (6–8).
More recent studies in Jamaica, 
South Africa and the United States 
indicate that tax increases have 
led to price increases larger than 
the tax increase (over-shifting). 
An analysis in the United States 
indicated that cigarette taxes were 
over-shifted, leading to increases in 
retail cigarette prices greater than 
the tax (9–12). van Walbeek (13) 
observed similar over-shifting of 
tax increases in South Africa (since 
1994) and Jamaica (in 2005), while 
Delipalla and O’Donnell (14) found 
undershifting of cigarette taxes in 12 
European Union countries in the 
early 1990s, particularly in markets 
that were less concentrated.
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other than cigarettes to advertise 
or promote cigarettes, retail-value-
added expenditure for promotions 
involving free cigarettes (e.g. 
buy two packs, get one free), 
retail-value-added expenditure 
for promotions involving a 
noncigarette bonus (e.g. buy two 
packs, get a cigarette lighter) and 
coupons for reducing the retail 
cost of cigarettes, redeemed at the 
point-of-sale or by post (20, 21). 
Similar marketing activities have 
been reported for other tobacco 
products in the United States, such 
as smokeless tobacco. Reporting 
of such marketing expenditure 
is required by Federal legislation 
in the United States, although 
the content is not made publicly 
available.
These and other marketing practices 
are prohibited in other countries. The 
WHO report on the global tobacco 
epidemic 2009 (22) indicated that 
79 countries, including many 
with low and middle incomes, 
have some form of restriction 
on price-based marketing. For 
example, a European Council 
Recommendation (2003/54/EC) 
proposed that Member States 
adopt tobacco control measures 
that include prohibiting “the 
use and communication of sales 
promotion, such as a discount, a free 
gift, a premium or an opportunity to 
participate in a promotional contest 
or game.” A subsequent evaluation 
(SEC(2009)1621) suggested that 
most Member States had taken 
the recommended measures but 
did not specify the proportion that 
were implemented. Few countries 
have bans that are comprehensive 
enough to cover all forms of price-
based promotions (an issue explored 
below). Some marketing techniques 
may therefore be used worldwide.
5.3 Tobacco industry 
pricing strategies
Tobacco companies have lobbied 
aggressively against tobacco tax 
increases and earmarking of tobacco 
tax revenues. They try to influence 
the structure of tobacco taxes so 
that it favours their own brands 
over theirs of their competitors.
Tobacco industry arguments 
to keep tobacco taxes low
The four main arguments used by 
the industry to counteract increases 
in tobacco taxes or to request 
reductions of existing levels of 
taxation have been to: emphasize 
the regressive nature of tobacco 
taxation (23–32), link higher taxes 
to illicit trade and organized crime 
(23–25, 33–39), claim that tobacco 
taxes are unfair to smokers (23, 36, 
40–42) and deny links between 
price and consumption (31, 36, 43).
Tobacco industry 
arguments to prevent 
earmarking
The three main arguments raised by 
the industry in opposing earmarking 
are diversion or misuse of the extra 
funds (23–25, 40, 44–46), the 
unfairness of policies that require 
smokers to subsidize policies 
that benefit others (46) and that 
earmarking will result in spending 
cuts for other programmes (46). 
The industry has adopted a number 
of tactics to deter implementation 
of tax increases and earmarking of 
tobacco-tax revenues, including 
schemes previously used in their 
opposition to other tobacco control 
policies:
•	Use of ‘front groups’ to 
promote arguments (23–25, 
27, 32, 41, 44–48) or to recruit 
credible allies (24, 27–30);
Although there are no recent, 
relevant studies on this issue 
in the European Union, the 
market has seen considerable 
consolidation in recent years (15), 
and other evidence suggests that 
the under-shifting observed in the 
1990s (14) has reversed (16, 17). 
Although the countries in eastern 
Europe have, until recently, been 
at different stages of the tobacco 
epidemic, with smoking prevalence 
and tobacco sales still increasing, 
profits are also increasing as a 
result of industry price increases 
and consumers trading-up to more 
expensive brands (18).
The Handbook concluded that 
most tobacco product markets 
are highly concentrated (19), 
indicating that a few large firms 
have large market shares. Recent 
empirical evidence indicates that, 
in these markets, tobacco taxes are 
generally over-shifted.
5.2 Tobacco industry 
price-related marketing 
activities
Tobacco companies use a variety 
of marketing techniques, which 
involve reducing prices on some 
tobacco products or brands 
targeted at specific sections of the 
population, including young people 
and others with low incomes. They 
use these techniques to soften or 
counteract the impact of tobacco 
tax increases and other tobacco 
control interventions.
Tobacco companies have also 
used other marketing activities to 
lower the price or add value to their 
products, including price discounts 
to cigarette retailers or wholesalers 
to reduce the price for smokers of 
specific brands, free samples of 
cigarettes, distribution of special 
branded and unbranded goods 
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•	Working with credible allies 
not usually associated with 
tobacco (24, 26–29, 31, 32, 36, 
40, 41, 44, 47–49);
•	Traditional lobbying of 
decision-makers (24, 27, 28, 33, 
41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 50);
•	Media campaigns and 
other publicity to raise public 
awareness of policy proposals 
and increase public support for 
industry positions (23–25, 29, 
30, 32, 36, 42, 46);
•	Mounting legal and other 
official challenges to proposed 
and existing excise legislation 
(23–25, 40, 42, 45, 46);
•	Commissioning research to 
support and inform industry 
positions on tobacco excise (26, 
28, 32, 36, 40, 44);
•	Employing consultants and 
public relations staff and firms 
to give advice on and assistance 
in lobbying (23, 24, 32, 41, 42, 
45, 49);
•	Working to divert earmarked 
funds from control measures to 
other causes, such as health care 
subsidies for uninsured people 
(23–25, 45–47, 49);
•	Paying or giving gifts to 
policy-makers (26, 41, 47, 49);
•	Mixing debates about tobacco 
tax increases with broader 
debates about general tax 
increases in order to confuse 
the issue and garner opposition 
to proposals for tobacco tax 
increases (28, 32, 40, 44);
•	Proposing alternative weaker 
or irrelevant legislation (23–25, 46);
•	Using friendly ‘experts’ to 
present industry positions and 
boost the credibility of industry 
arguments (24, 35, 46);
•	Trying to undermine tobacco 
control experts (42); and
•	Stimulating smuggling in the 
event of tax increases (39).
Tobacco industry lobbying
In North America, tobacco industry 
lobbying has been successful, 
particularly at the federal level. 
At subnational level, adequately 
funded tobacco control has been 
more successful in overcoming 
industry opposition; however, the 
industry has been more successful 
in combating the earmarking of tax 
revenues at subnational level, arguing 
that the revenues will be diverted or 
misused.
Quantitative and qualitative studies 
on tobacco industry lobbying on tax 
issues were identified, and the 31 
that met the inclusion criteria were 
summarized and assessed with 
critical appraisal criteria adapted 
from Rees et al. (51) and the United 
Kingdom Public Health Resource 
Unit (52). Most of the studies 
(24) were conducted in North 
America and mainly in the United 
States. Tobacco industry activities 
to oppose proposed increases in 
excise taxes (23–32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 
40–42, 44–50) or to lower existing 
taxes (33, 36, 39) were discussed 
in 27 studies. Only four studies 
covered policy influence outside 
North America (33, 34, 37, 38). 
Most of the studies in the United 
States addressed policy proposals 
to increase taxes substantially 
and earmark all or most of the 
revenue raised for tobacco control 
programmes. Therefore, it is difficult 
to determine the extent to which the 
industry was concerned about the 
tax increases per se rather than the 
use of revenues from the increases 
to fund tobacco control.
Seven studies addressed tobacco 
industry activity to influence excise 
structures (34, 37, 38, 53–56). Studies 
in China (53), Hungary (34), Lebanon 
(38), the former Soviet Union (37) 
and the United States show that 
different companies support different 
tax structures, favouring those that will 
benefit their brands at the expense of 
their competitors.
Governments influence tobacco 
product prices by imposing tobacco 
taxes, price regulations and limits 
on price-related marketing. Some 
countries (none in the European 
Union) have imposed minimum 
pricing policies, where such policies 
are allowed under competition law; 
higher specific taxes can have similar 
effects where minimum pricing 
policies are not allowed. Others have 
included bans on price-reducing 
marketing as part of a comprehensive 
ban on industry marketing. WHO 
FCTC Article 5.3, which aims to 
limit tobacco industry influence in 
tobacco control policy-making, may 
help governments to limit lobbying 
by tobacco companies on tax policy 
and other tobacco control policies.
5.4 New findings from 
PPACTE on tobacco 
industry influence on 
tobacco excise policy
Most of the empirical studies identified 
in the review were conducted in the 
United States and a few other high- or 
middle-income countries, despite the 
importance of the influence of tobacco 
companies on tax policy, and most 
address the influence of transnational 
tobacco companies on tax levels rather 
than structures. PPACTE WP5 
addressed this research gap in order 
to add to understanding of tobacco 
industry influence on taxation policy 
and industry pricing strategy in the 
European Union.
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Understanding tobacco 
industry pricing strategy: 
the cigarette market 
in Great Britain
Industry pricing strategy, discussed 
in detail elsewhere (57), was reviewed 
be examining the academic and trade 
literature to identify and categorize 
cigarette brands into price segments 
in the British cigarette market. Four 
segments were identified: premium, 
mid-price, economy and ultra-
low price, the last emerging since 
2006. Brands were categorized 
into price segments on the basis 
of recommended retail price data 
from PriceChecker (1999–2005) 
and actual sales prices from Neilsen 
(a global leader in market research, 
measurement and information) 
(2006–2009)1.  Trends (by volume) 
in the market share by price segment 
between 2001 and 2009 were 
observed.
As shown in Figure 5.1, around half 
the market was held by economy 
segment brands. The share held by 
this segment grew until 2007–2008, 
when it fell slightly because of gains 
in the ultra-low-price segment. As 
the tobacco companies acquired 
supermarket brands and launched 
their own ultra-low-price brands 
after 2006, the share of these brands 
increased substantially. In contrast, 
the market share of premium and 
mid-priced brands fell sharply from 
2001 onwards. While the three 
segments (premium, economy 
and ultra-low priced) have clearly 
separate price ranges, the price of 
mid-price brands now overlaps 
entirely with the price of lower-
end premium brands. Furthermore, 
the range of prices available within 
each segment appears to have 
widened, and the gap between the 
most and the least expensive brands 
has doubled (57).
When trends in price increases 
by price segment were examined 
for 63 individual brands, each 
with a market share of 0.2% or 
greater (as of November 2006) 
between 2006 and 2009, it 
became apparent that the prices 
of brands in the ultra-low-price 
segment had increased much less 
than those of brands in other 
segments (Figure 5.2). The price 
Figure 5.2. Market share of the Great Britain in 2006 and changes in price, 
2006–2009, by brand segment; all brands with share over 0.2% in 2006
From Nielsen
Figure 5.1. Market share of the Great Britain by volume (%) by price segment, 
2001–2009
From PriceChecker and general household surveys (G) for 2001–2005 and from Nielsen (Ni) for 
2006–2009. General household survey market share data based on survey responses during a 
calendar year; Nielsen market share data based on sales data from November each year
 
1 A comparison of these two data sets, supermarket retail prices and manufacturers’ recommended retail prices, showed that the data 
were almost identical, and the two sources could be relied upon to provide comparable data over time.
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of every brand in the ultra-low-
price group increased by less than 
a 1%, and the real price fell in 
some cases. Meanwhile, the price 
of premium brands increased by 
3–5% between 2006 and 2009 
and that of mid-price or economy 
brands by 5–6% (57).
By examining the patterns of 
price changes in real terms 
(deflated against the consumer 
price index, with 2010 = 100), net 
of tax between November–May 
when taxes increase and May–
November when taxes do not 
change, it was possible to establish 
whether tobacco companies 
over-shifted, under-shifted or 
simply passed on tax increases 
to consumers between 2006 and 
2009. Overall, the results suggest 
that tax increases were over-
shifted, with greater price increases 
in November–May when tobacco 
taxes rise than in May–November 
(Table 5.1). The extent to which 
tax increases were passed on to 
smokers differed by brand segment, 
the price increases for premium 
and mid-price segments being 
much higher during November–
May than May–November. This 
suggests that, for these brands, 
cigarette manufacturers were using 
the increases in tobacco duty to 
disguise additional price increases, 
thus over-shifting taxes. The prices 
for the economy segment were 
also being over-shifted, but the 
larger price increase was timed so 
that it did not coincide with the 
tax increase. For the ultra-low-
price segment, the prices net of tax 
actually fell between November 
and May when the tax burden 
rose, with a very slight increase 
in net prices between May and 
November. Overall, taxes on ultra-
low-price brands were under-
shifted.
These findings suggest that 
the tobacco industry is using a 
sophisticated pricing strategy in 
Great Britain to cross-subsidize 
cheaper brands with profits from 
more expensive brands. This 
study shows real price increases 
and over-shifting of taxes in the 
premium, mid-price and economy 
brand segments, while the real 
price of ultra-low-price brands 
did not increase and taxes on 
this segment were under-shifted. 
Consistent with this strategy, the 
price increases were greatest on 
mid-price and economy brands 
and lowest (and often negative 
in real terms) on individual ultra-
low-price brands. Furthermore, 
the price increases appeared to be 
timed to accentuate differences in 
prices between brands in different 
segments at the time when duties 
were increased; however, overall 
prices increased and taxes were 
over-shifted to consumers, a 
pattern that contributes to rising 
industry profits (57).
As a result of this pricing strategy 
and the increase in the number of 
ultra-low-price brands, consumers 
have more opportunities to down-
trade from more expensive to 
cheaper cigarettes. The market 
share by volume of ultra-low-price 
brands has increased in response. 
The availability of cheap brands 
undermines tobacco tax policy 
because it ensures that price-
sensitive smokers, particularly 
the young and the poor, continue 
to initiate and maintain their 
smoking habits.
Price segment
Average price increase (pence per pack of cigarettes)
November–May May–November November–November
Premium 2.8 1.2 4.0
Mid- 4.5 0.7 5.2
Economy 1.9 2.7 4.6
Ultra-low -1.5 0.2 -1.3
All, weighted average 2.5 1.6 4.1
Data from Nielsen  
Price data presented in real terms adjusted according to the consumer price index, with 2010 as the baseline
Table 5.1. Real price increases (net of tax) for cigarettes in the Great Britain in May–November and November–
May, 2006–2009, by brand segment
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Tobacco industry influence 
on tobacco excise policy 
in four European countries: 
case studies in Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, France 
and Poland
The efforts of transnational tobacco 
companies to influence tobacco 
control policy (specifically tobacco 
excise policy) were examined in 
four European Union Member 
States by detailed analyses of 
tobacco industry documents, in 
which a socio-historical approach 
was used. Analysis of documents 
was triangulated and updated 
with the results of interviews 
and secondary data analysis. The 
findings for Bulgaria (1988–2011), 
the Czech Republic (1989–2011), 
France (1990–2011) and Poland 
(1990–2011) are summarized here 
and discussed in detail elsewhere 
(58–61).
The countries selected have several 
attributes that make them interesting 
for analysis. At the time of market 
entry, each country was of particular 
interest to the tobacco industry for 
its strategic importance and the 
opportunity it presented for market 
expansion. Bulgaria was seen as a 
lucrative market for several reasons. 
First, the existing production 
infrastructure, low average salaries 
and high production provided 
opportunities for improving profit 
margins. Secondly, Bulgaria was 
seen as the gateway to accessing 
the then closed markets of Turkey 
and former socialist countries (58). 
Thirdly, joint-venture initiatives with 
Bulgartabac provided opportunities 
for expansion of the existing brand 
portfolio. The Czech Republic was 
of interest because of its strategic 
location in central Europe, bordering 
former socialist countries that the 
transnational tobacco companies 
hoped to access (59). France has 
seen two major tax increases in the 
past twenty years, and also has close 
relationships between the industry 
and state, partly due to the state’s 
former monopoly on tobacco 
products (60).The size of the Polish 
market and the potential for even 
further growth underpinned the 
transnational tobacco companies’ 
interest in penetrating the Polish 
market (61). 
The lack of effective government 
intervention in tobacco control 
provided a favourable business 
environment in each of the case 
countries. Bulgaria’s tobacco control 
is weak, its ranking on the ‘tobacco 
control scale’ falling from 13 out of 
30 European countries in 2007 to 
24 out of 31 countries in 2010 (58, 
60). The Czech Republic has one of 
the poorest tobacco control records 
in Europe, ranked fourth lowest 
in Europe for tobacco control 
policy implementation in 2010 
(62), with senior political figures 
publicly supporting the tobacco 
industry (59). Although France 
ranked sixth on the 2010 tobacco 
control scale, rising one place from 
2007 (62), the Government’s policy 
on tobacco taxation and pricing 
is still considered friendly to the 
industry (60). Unlike most other 
central and eastern European 
countries, Poland had a fledging 
tobacco control movement in place 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
providing some opposition to the 
transnational tobacco companies 
as they entered the Polish market 
(61). While Poland was a leader 
in implementing tobacco control 
policies in 1995, ranking 14 out 
of 30 European countries in 2007, 
it has been described as ‘losing 
momentum’, and its ranking fell to 
19 out of 31 countries in 2010 (62). 
In each of the case studies in the 
central and eastern European 
countries, the period considered 
covers the entry of the transnational 
tobacco companies into the country, 
privatization of the tobacco 
industry (except in Bulgaria where 
privatization is ongoing) and 
accession to the European Union. 
Transnational tobacco companies 
use industry privatization as an 
opportunity to manipulate tobacco 
excise structures in their favour, 
lobby against cigarette excise 
rate increases and influence the 
broader regulatory environment 
(54). Much of this evidence is, 
however, based on studies from 
the former Soviet Union and 
applies to British American 
Tobacco in particular. Accession 
to the European Union required 
elimination of any remaining 
barriers to European imports 
and implementation of European 
Union excise directives, as well as 
other tobacco control legislation; it 
also provided an opportunity for 
industry influence. In France, the 
study specifically addressed the two 
large tax increases in 1991–1993 
and 2003–2004 and the industry’s 
response to them, as there is little 
evidence on the impact of large tax 
increases.
Tobacco industry lobbying 
on tobacco excise 
structure and rates
As in studies in the United States 
and other high- and middle-income 
countries, the evidence suggests that 
the tobacco industry tends to lobby 
collectively against increases in 
tobacco excise rates but separately 
on tobacco excise structure.
One of the criteria for European 
Union accession was to harmonize 
the country’s tobacco excise system 
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with that required by the European 
Union, by implementing a mixed 
system, combining specific and ad 
valorem components, and a total tax 
accounting for a minimum of 57% 
of the most popular price category 
(63). In 1995, a new directive was 
introduced, requiring that the 
specific component represent 5–75% 
of total excise (64). In response to 
these accession requirements, the 
industry formed regional groups to 
discuss taxation issues, including a 
‘central European tax task force’ and 
an ‘eastern European tax working 
group’ (58, 61, 65). The aim of the 
central European tax task force was 
to review likely excise harmonization 
scenarios and devise “strategies for 
halting/slowing the increase in 
excise incidence” (65). The group 
later agreed to encourage only 
“very gradual harmonisation” of 
excise levels and “to develop joint 
argumentation aimed at opposing 
rapid and disruptive excise increases 
in the individual (accession) markets” 
(66). The importance of encouraging 
the governments of central and 
eastern European countries to 
seek derogations on tobacco excise 
was highlighted, amid concern 
that meeting the 57% threshold 
would cause cigarette prices to rise 
considerably in accession states 
(67). Table 5.2 summarizes the 
agreed tax harmonization goals and 
argumentation used by the task force 
in lobbying for these goals.
The transnational tobacco 
companies also used passage of 
the 1992 and 1995 European 
Commission directives on tobacco 
excise harmonization to lobby for 
favourable changes to the French 
tobacco excise system (60). The 
then-State-owned tobacco company 
Societé Nationale d’Exploitation 
Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes 
(SEITA) sold mainly cheap products 
and benefited greatly from France’s 
predominantly ad valorem system; 
the transnational tobacco companies 
sought, unsuccessfully, to persuade 
the Government that a larger 
specific tax would improve the tax 
revenue from tobacco products (60).
Documents on accession countries 
(59) show clearly that the 
transnational tobacco companies 
were concerned to prevent any 
significant increase in excise duties 
with accession and to ensure that any 
such increase would be gradual (68, 
69, 71). The companies collaborated 
to prevent and postpone any increase 
in excise (59, 60, 65, 72) and 
lobbied successfully for derogation 
of increases in the excise level in 
accession countries (59, 60). As a 
result of the derogations and with 
the increase in income with accession 
to the European Union (an issue 
that the industry appears to have 
overlooked when claiming that tax 
increases would lead to rapidly rising 
cigarette prices), cigarettes actually 
became slightly more affordable in 
some accession countries (59, 61).
Although there was support for 
discouraging a rapid increase in 
excise levels, there was disagreement 
about the optimal speed of transfer 
to the European Union’s mixed 
excise structure. British American 
Tobacco is recorded as favouring 
Table 5.2. Transnational tobacco companies’ tax harmonization goals and arguments for central European 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia)
Aims Arguments
Oppose any further large-
scale increase in total tax 
incidence (68, 69).
• Large price increases driven by a rapid tax increase would increase smuggling (67).
• Smuggling could reduce government revenue from tax; therefore, there is no 
guarantee that revenue would increase with European Union harmonization (67).
• The minimum excise tax level is to be reviewed by the European Commission in 
1996, so the target level of 57% might be changed or removed by 2000 (67).
Oppose the 57% minimum 
excise level required by the 
European Union (68, 69).
• Avoid promoting, endorsing or even mentioning this requirement when 
lobbying governments (68, 69).
Encourage derogation for 
implementing the minimum 
excise incidence of 57%, 
for at least 5 years after
integration into the 
European Union (69, 70).
• The European Union white paper on central and eastern Europe encourages 
gradual adoption of European Union legislation and preservation of 
macroeconomic stability during accession (67).
• Rapid restructuring of the tax systems would result in unsustainable price 
increases, which could seriously damage the economies of the accession 
countries (67).
• The European Union permits acceding countries to request derogations (67).
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a swifter move to a mixed excise 
structure than its counterparts (66). 
Its support for an earlier transition 
to the mixed system probably 
reflected its brand portfolio. While 
it then promoted a mixed system to 
advantage itself and disadvantage 
Philip Morris International, the 
latter promoted a specific structure 
to narrow the price gap between its 
lead brand Marlboro and cheaper 
brands (59).
The approach and arguments of the 
transnational tobacco companies 
appear to be context-specific 
(although always with the ultimate 
aim of securing corporate advantage, 
including over competitors) (59). For 
example, in the Czech Republic, 
Philip Morris International 
changed its position on the tiered 
excise structure in accordance with 
its changing market position, first 
lobbying against it and then working 
to maintain it once it acquired Tabak 
(and thereby an interest in local 
cigarettes) (59).
Industry arguments against 
increases in excise
Industry arguments against excise 
increases are questionable and often 
contrary to the international evidence. 
A current British American Tobacco 
employee suggested that the industry 
exploits a lack of expertise in tobacco 
excise to ‘educate’ politicians (59). 
In seeking to delay implementation 
of the European Union’s minimum 
excise requirement, transnational 
tobacco companies argued that raising 
taxes would increase smuggling, a 
claim unsupported by the evidence 
(73), which indicates that smuggling 
is more pervasive in countries with 
low tobacco taxes and loose border 
regulation (59, 74, 75). In fact, greater 
European tax harmonization is likely 
to reduce smuggling (76). In France, 
the transnational tobacco companies 
appear to have increased prices 
(rather than taxes) by 6% per year 
since 2009, with no concern that this 
would result in more smuggling (60). 
The companies also contended that 
increased tobacco taxes could reduce 
government revenue; the French 
case study showed that the large 
tax increases of 2003–2004 raised 
Government revenue by €1 billion, 
and other international evidence 
indicates that increases in tobacco tax 
almost certainly increase government 
revenue (77). The companies further 
claimed that the tax increases required 
to meet the European Union’s 57% 
excise level in the Czech Republic 
should be gradual in order to preserve 
the country’s macroeconomic stability 
(59). It is unlikely that changes in 
the taxation of tobacco, which is 
not an essential good (76), could 
have such a significant impact on a 
country’s overall economy (78), and 
the industry’s approach increased 
the affordability of cigarettes after 
accession. The companies’ preference 
for gradual rather than significant 
tax increases is more probably related 
to their awareness that consumers 
absorb gradual increases more easily. 
The fact that a significant derogation 
period was granted to accession 
states in relation to the minimum 
excise requirement (albeit a shorter 
period than the transnational 
tobacco companies were hoping for) 
suggests the companies were relatively 
successful in influencing this process, 
despite their flawed arguments.
To influence policy, industry targeted 
key government officials at both 
national and European Union 
level, as they have done elsewhere 
(34, 53, 79, 80). Interviewees in 
the Czech Republic suggest that 
this tactic continues and has been 
extended to high-level politicians, 
with whom the industry appears 
to have significant contact and 
influence. Industry documents 
show that the transnational tobacco 
companies targeted the current 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
when he was Minister of the Budget 
(81). Several of President Sarkozy’s 
current advisors and ministers 
previously worked in the tobacco 
industry (60). In the Czech Republic, 
donations were made to ‘friendly’ 
political parties, the transparency of 
political funding being identified 
as a concern (59). Other tactics 
included trying to ensure favourable 
media coverage and commissioning 
third-party research to boost the 
credibility of the industry claims; 
again, tactics seen elsewhere (34, 
82, 83). In Bulgaria and Poland, the 
transnational tobacco companies 
forged strong relationships with 
Government officials, which appear 
to continue (58, 61, 84).
In summary, there is clear evidence 
of an influence of the transnational 
tobacco companies on excise tax 
policy in the countries studied, and 
the influence continues, despite the 
WHO FCTC and its Article 5.3, 
which requires Parties to protect 
policy-making from industry 
influence. There is also evidence 
that ministries other than health are 
under the mistaken impression that 
Article 5.3 does not apply to them.
5.5 Tobacco industry 
rationale for investing 
in smokeless tobacco 
in Europe and their 
interest and rhetori 
on harm reduction  
Current illegal online sales 
of snus
Although the sale of snus has been 
prohibited in the European Union 
outside Sweden since 1992, it is 
sold on the single market via the 
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Internet. It was easily purchased in 
all 10 European Union Member 
States where test purchases were 
attempted (WP5) (85). Online sales 
and promotion of snus contravene 
three aspects of European Union 
legislation. First, they clearly 
contravene the Tobacco Products 
Directive, which bans sales of 
snus outside Sweden. Secondly, as 
the majority of the test purchases 
were taxed in the country of origin 
(Sweden), the sales violate Directive 
2008/118/EC, which requires that 
excise duties on distance sales (i.e. 
via the Internet) be levied in the 
country of destination. Thirdly, 
price-based promotions are 
widespread on the websites selling 
snus, which is in direct contravention 
of the European Union Tobacco 
Advertising Directive, which 
bans Internet tobacco advertising. 
Importantly, online vendors 
deliberately target non-Swedish 
European Union nationals, and 
most operate from Sweden, despite 
Swedish Ordinance 1994:1266 
banning the export of snus to other 
European Union Member States. 
The apparent willingness of the 
tobacco industry to contravene 
European Union and Swedish 
legislation and profit from unlawful 
sales raises questions about the 
legitimacy of their involvement in 
consultations on future policy.
The transnational tobacco 
companies’ interest in 
and approach to 
smokeless tobacco
All the transnational tobacco 
companies have entered the 
Scandinavian snus market, albeit to 
varying degrees, and are lobbying 
for removal of the European Union 
ban on snus, arguing that its use 
can be effective for reducing or 
quitting smoking and is therefore 
part of a harm-reduction strategy. 
Documentary evidence suggests 
that the tobacco companies have 
been exploring opportunities for 
introducing smokeless tobacco 
since the 1970s: British American 
Tobacco examined the market 
opportunities in Europe in the 1970s 
and 1980s, young people being 
their key target. The companies’ 
interest in smokeless tobacco was 
motivated by the possibility of 
creating a new tobacco epidemic 
and not by a desire to reduce 
harm from cigarettes. Indeed, the 
danger of ‘cannibalizing’ cigarette 
sales was specifically recognized. 
Instead, smokeless tobacco was 
seen as a product for ‘beginners’, 
who would previously have taken 
up smoking, and for smokers who 
would otherwise have quit or 
smoked less (such as in smoke-free 
environments). There is no evidence 
that the companies’ current strategy 
is different and some evidence 
that it is the same. For example, 
in countries where smokeless 
tobacco is legal (notably the United 
States), it is being promoted for 
use in smoke-free public places 
and targeted at the young. The 
transnational tobacco companies’ 
current rhetoric on harm reduction 
(see below) contrasts directly with 
evidence of their interest in and 
marketing of smokeless tobacco. 
Removing the European Union 
ban on snus could reduce the impact 
of smoke-free legislation and create 
a new, long-term tobacco epidemic.
Snus in virgin markets 
British American Tobacco’s re-
cent announcement that it has 
scaled back snus test markets in 
Canada and South Africa sug-
gests that snus use is not as easily 
transferred to new markets as 
previously thought. While this 
may remove some of the dan-
gers in markets where smokeless 
tobacco is not already established, 
it would not prevent the indus-
try from continuing to use the 
rhetoric of harm reduction to 
its advantage (see below). The 
potential use of snus as part of a 
population-based harm reduction 
strategy is therefore limited.
Adoption by the 
transnational tobacco 
companies of the term 
‘harm reduction’ and 
subsequent  rhetoric
Documentary evidence shows 
that the transnational tobacco 
companies adopted the term ‘harm 
reduction’ and used it for their 
own benefit after being consulted 
by the United States Institute of 
Medicine in 2000 as part of their 
investigations into the evidence for 
a harm reduction approach (86). 
Since then, harm reduction has 
featured prominently in industry 
discourse and has become a key 
part of their ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ strategies. It provides 
several opportunities: it can be 
used to justify the inclusion of 
transnational tobacco companies 
in policy debates; it infers that 
the companies are committed 
to reducing harm from their 
products (despite evidence to the 
contrary), thereby rehabilitating 
their image; and it helps to establish 
common ground with public health 
professionals, researchers and 
policy-makers, thereby facilitating 
access and influence. Thus, the harm 
reduction debate could allow the 
transnational tobacco companies 
to re-enter the policy area from 
which they have increasingly been 
excluded and thus undermine 
Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.
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Investment of transnational 
tobacco companies 
in smokeless tobacco 
and the mismatch between 
investment, genuine 
interest and rhetoric
Transnational tobacco companies 
began investing in smokeless 
tobacco in 2002, 1 year after 
publication of the report of 
the United States Institute of 
Medicine (86) and the year that 
cigarette volume in western 
Europe peaked (with a continuous 
decline thereafter) and smoke-free 
legislation began to be debated 
seriously in Europe. Despite 
their investments, cigarettes 
remain by far the dominant 
sector of the global tobacco 
market, accounting for 92%, 
with 2% from smokeless tobacco. 
The companies’ investments 
in smokeless tobacco have 
effectively eliminated any genuine 
competition with cigarettes, 
thus ensuring that snus cannot 
‘cannibalize’ the companies’ 
highly profitable cigarette sales, 
and further increasing the already 
considerable pricing power of 
cigarettes. These investments help 
to ensure the industry’s long-
term future (should regulation 
further constrain the cigarette 
market or reduce the companies’ 
pricing power), reassure investors 
(smokeless tobacco sales are 
growing globally, unlike cigarette 
sales) and, in the interim, have 
a vital public relations function. 
There appears to be a mismatch 
between the rhetoric on harm 
reduction and the lack of action 
on snus, which suggests that 
transnational tobacco companies 
do not see smokeless tobacco as 
part of their short-term business 
future.
5.6 Policy implications of 
PPACTE findings on the 
influence of the tobacco 
industry on tobacco 
taxation policy  
Tobacco industry pricing
The tobacco industry both under- 
and over-shifts taxes, its tactic 
depending on the market structure 
and economic context. Under-
shifting is most likely when the 
market is immature and the tax 
increase is relatively small; over-
shifting is less of an issue for public 
health, but it represents a missed 
opportunity for governments to 
increase tobacco excise tax revenue.
The price differences between the 
most expensive and the cheapest 
tobacco products must be narrowed 
to prevent the industry from price-
discounting the cheapest brands, 
cross-subsidizing with their profits 
from more expensive brands. A 
tax structure that includes a high 
minimum excise tax, a predominant 
specific element and a limited ad 
valorem component would achieve 
better approximation of the prices 
of all segments.
Large tax increases are likely 
to benefit public health and 
government tax revenues to a 
greater extent than incremental 
increases. Further research is 
needed to explore this issue.
Tobacco industry claims 
about tobacco taxation    
Tobacco industry claims about 
tobacco excise policies must be 
interpreted with great caution. While 
industry presents its arguments as 
serving the interests of governments, 
their ultimate aim is to serve corporate 
interests. Industry arguments often 
contradict existing evidence.
The complexity of tobacco excise 
tax policy, perhaps more than other 
areas of tobacco control policy, 
enables the tobacco industry to 
make misleading arguments and 
to influence policy inappropriately. 
More effort is therefore needed 
to improve the understanding of 
politicians, civil servants and the 
public health community of effective 
tobacco tax policy and of industry 
efforts to mislead and undermine 
it. This is particularly important for 
governments transitioning from 
a closed market to a free-market 
economy. Such communication 
should be given independently of 
the industry, given its misleading 
statements in this area.
Accession to the European 
Union could be an opportunity to 
improve public health, but it is also 
an opportunity for transnational 
tobacco companies to influence 
policy. The companies may seek to 
capitalize on the excise and policy 
changes required of acceding states 
and to lobby for their own interests. 
Any future European Union 
accession states should receive 
independent advice on tobacco 
excise taxation and how changes in 
income after accession may alter the 
affordability of cigarettes.
Tobacco industry approach 
to smokeless tobacco (snus)
The online snus test purchases by 
WP5 showed that snus is currently 
sold illegally online by Swedish 
vendors to European Union 
nationals other than Swedes. 
As the transnational tobacco 
companies now all have a stake in 
the Scandinavian snus market, are 
profiting from these illegal sales and 
are lobbying for the European Union 
ban on snus sales to be removed, this 
is an important finding.
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Online snus sales contravene 
several pieces of European Union 
legislation, in particular Directive 
2008/118/EC, which requires 
that excise duties on distance sales 
(i.e. via the Internet) be levied in 
the country of destination. The 
European Commission (which 
is responsible for ensuring that 
European Union law is correctly 
applied) should investigate these 
illegal sales and Sweden’s apparent 
failure to fulfil its responsibilities 
under European Union law and 
consider starting infringement 
proceedings; if necessary, it could 
refer the case to the European Court 
of Justice.
Other avenues of tobacco 
advertising are quickly diminishing, 
and the Internet is one of the last 
communication channels left in 
which the industry can have a visible 
presence and can communicate with 
customers worldwide efficiently and 
effectively to promote and sell its 
products. Serious thought should be 
given to monitoring these practices; 
however, unless the responsibility 
and funding are clearly allocated, 
this sort of monitoring is frequently 
overlooked.
Industry access to      
policy-makers
Tobacco control policies, and 
therefore the health of the public, 
suffer when policy-makers maintain 
connections with transnational 
tobacco companies, as this provides 
a direct avenue for influencing policy. 
The companies still meet with and 
hope to influence government 
officials responsible for tobacco 
control policy. For example, the 
tobacco industry continues to have 
contact with high-level political 
figures in Poland, in violation of 
Poland’s commitments under the 
WHO FCTC. Through these 
contacts, industry has ‘helped’ 
Poland to negotiate a later excise 
harmonization deadline and 
influence the speed of meeting 
those requirements. Political links 
such as this contravene WHO 
FCTC Article 5.3, which seeks to 
protect policy-making from industry 
influence.
All policy-makers must be aware 
of the importance of tobacco tax 
policy for public health, the conflicts 
arising from industry’s involvement 
in tobacco control policy and their 
responsibilities under Article 5.3 
of the WHO FCTC. For proper 
implementation of Article 5.3, 
the industry’s activities must be 
monitored and exposed, with greater 
public and political awareness of the 
industry’s tactics. We recommend 
that the European Commission take 
action to ensure that the Tobacco 
Products Directive, including the ban 
on sales of snus, is reviewed without 
the involvement of the tobacco 
industry, in conformity with WHO 
FCTC Article 5.3.
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 ToBACCo TAxATIoN 
AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES
chApter 6
6.1 Inequalities and 
tobacco use
Studies of the social determinants 
of tobacco use reveal an uneven 
distribution of smoking in most 
populations and therefore in their 
tobacco-attributable morbidity 
and mortality. In the past, 
smoking was more prevalent in 
men than in women, men being 
first exposed to the health risks 
of manufactured cigarettes. The 
initial study of smoking and lung 
cancer in the United Kingdom, in 
which lung carcinomas were hugely 
overrepresented in male smokers, 
is an early record of smoking-
associated gender inequality (1, 2). 
The gender divide was corroborated 
decades later by Ezzati and Lopez 
(3), who calculated that the 
worldwide smoking-attributable 
mortality rate was 18% in men and 
5% in women in 2000. Smoking 
became widespread among men in 
high-income countries, increasing 
their exposure to health risks and 
the concomitant health outcomes. 
Social values and norms at the time 
precluded simultaneous initiation 
of the tobacco epidemic in women.
This situation has changed in 
many high-income countries, so 
that gender inequality in exposure 
and health-associated risks has 
decreased. In many countries 
in Europe now, the smoking 
prevalence by sex is similar 
(Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
United Kingdom) or even higher in 
women than in men (Sweden). In 
others, smoking is overwhelmingly 
a masculine habit (Armenia, 
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, 
While no specific work package within PPACTE was dedicated to 
examining the impact of tobacco taxation or other tobacco control 
policies on health inequalities, implications for equity were considered to 
be ubiquitous, and, when the data were available, analyses by age, gender 
and socioeconomic group were considered. In particular, in the European 
survey on the economic aspects of smoking (WP2), smoking prevalence 
was estimated by age, gender and country income level. Furthermore, 
detailed analyses of the industry pricing strategy in the British cigarette 
market and tobacco brand and product preferences from household surveys 
provide interesting insights into how the tobacco industry pricing strategy 
perpetuates health inequalities by providing cheaper tobacco options to 
keep poorer smokers smoking and lead price-sensitive young people to 
take up the habit (WP5). For the Handbook, the international literature 
was reviewed, including the effect of price and tax on smoking among the 
poor (WP7). This section introduces the issue of tobacco use and health 
inequalities, summarizes the comprehensive review on tobacco tax, price and 
smoking among the poor, and provides a synthesis of PPACTE findings 
on tobacco taxation and health inequalities.
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confirms these patterns, with the 
estimate that 26.0% of boys and 
27.0% of girls aged 15–24 years 
were current smokers (4) (Figure 
6.2). For both sexes, the highest 
smoking prevalence was in the 
25–44-year age group (39.8% of 
men and 32.0% of women) and the 
lowest among the elderly (15.3% of 
men and 8.6% of women). Except 
for the youngest group (15–24 
years), in which the smoking 
prevalence was higher among 
females, men were more frequently 
current smokers than women in 
all age groups, the ratio increasing 
with age (0.96 for 15–24, 1.24 for 
25–44, 1.27 for 45–64 and 1.79 for 
> 65 years) (4).
Income level and socioeconomic 
status are strongly associated with 
smoking prevalence. While the 
sample size in individual countries 
in the PPACTE European 
survey was insufficient to derive 
prevalence estimates by gender and 
socioeconomic status, prevalence 
estimates could be calculated 
by gender and country income 
(GDP per capita), categorized as < 
€16 000 or  ≥ €16 000. Among men, 
the prevalence was systematically 
higher in poorer (< US$ 20 000) 
countries (36.0%) than in richer 
(≥ US$ 20  000) ones (28.9%), 
while no significant difference was 
observed for women, with smoking 
prevalence rates of 23.1% and 
24.3%, respectively (Figure 6.2). 
Furthermore, the male-to-female 
smoking prevalence ratio was 
higher in poorer countries (1.56) 
than in richer ones (1.19) (4).
In low- and lower middle-income 
countries, striking differences in 
the prevalence of smoking were 
found by socioeconomic group, the 
prevalence being highest in the least 
advantaged groups, contributing 
to the emergence of health 
inequalities (6). The distribution of 
smoking by socioeconomic group 
also affects the social distribution 
of exposure to second-hand smoke, 
as nonsmokers and children in 
disadvantaged families are exposed 
more often than those in affluent 
households. Exposure to second-
hand smoke is a risk factor for low 
birth weight, preterm delivery, 
sudden infant death syndrome, 
worsening of asthma in children, 
otitis media and other adverse 
health effects (7).
A socioeconomic gradient in 
tobacco-attributable mortality in 
high-income countries has been 
reported to be due to differences 
in smoking prevalence, intensity 
and other factors. Mortality rates 
for 35–69-year-old men in Canada, 
Poland, the United Kingdom and 
the United States in 1996 reflect 
the health disparity inflicted by 
tobacco use across social groups. 
Jha et al. (8) showed that the 
risk of dying from lung cancer, a 
Turkey). Recent, comparable 
estimates of smoking prevalence by 
age and gender from the PPACTE 
European survey of the economic 
aspects of smoking (WP2) illustrate 
these gender inequalities in tobacco 
use. Figure 6.1 shows current 
smoking prevalences separately 
for men and women, overall and 
by country. The prevalence for men 
ranged from 15.7% in Sweden to 
44.3% in Bulgaria, and for women 
from 11.6% in Albania to 38.1% 
in Ireland. The male-to-female 
smoking prevalence ratio was 1.27 
overall; it was highest in Albania 
(3.47) and in Latvia (2.63) and 
lowest in Sweden (0.93), Ireland 
(0.89) and Spain (0.84), where the 
prevalence among women exceeded 
that among men (4).
The Global Youth Tobacco 
Survey showed that boys and girls 
in many countries have similar 
smoking prevalences, indicating 
that tobacco control should be 
targeted to emancipated youth (5, 
6). The PPACTE European survey 
Figure 6.1. Sex-specific prevalences of current smokers, overall* and by country, 
sorted by prevalence of current smokers of each sex (descending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England  
*Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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disease overwhelmingly caused 
by tobacco use, was significantly 
higher in the group with the lowest 
socioeconomic status, whether it 
was defined by education, income 
or social class, than in groups higher 
on the socioeconomic gradient in 
each country. In Poland, the risk 
of dying was more than four times 
higher for people with fewer than 
12 years of education than those 
with the most education (8). 
Hence, despite overall reductions 
in smoking prevalence in high-
income countries, subgroups of 
the population are vulnerable and 
continue to be exposed to tobacco.
Smoking is a heavier economic 
burden on users with a low 
socioeconomic status, given their 
low disposable income. It also 
reduces their ability to cope with 
genuine financial household 
needs, including health care and 
smoking cessation. Smoking 
establishes nicotine dependence, 
which diverts economic resources 
into satisfying the addiction, 
with economic repercussions to 
the whole household as well as 
negative effects on health. There is 
considerable evidence that tobacco 
taxes are one of the most efficient 
policy instruments for reducing 
tobacco consumption and the 
associated health harms. It has been 
Figure 6.2. Sex-specific percentage prevalences of current smokers, overall* and according to age group in the 
total sample Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England 
*Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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argued, however, that excise duties 
on tobacco are regressive, as the 
tax burden generally falls equally 
on the rich and the poor. Smokers 
of low socioeconomic status who 
continue to smoke after increases 
in tobacco taxes allocate more of 
their income to satisfying their 
habit than richer smokers. If more 
smokers in lower socioeconomic 
groups quit smoking than rich 
smokers as a result of increases in 
tobacco taxes, the increases will 
reduce the disparities by income 
and health (9).
The price responsiveness of 
tobacco demand generally varies 
by socioeconomic status within 
and between countries. More 
economically disadvantaged groups 
are more likely than others to 
reduce their tobacco consumption 
in response to an increase in 
tobacco price. The Handbook 
includes a review of the published 
evidence on the demand for tobacco 
products by socioeconomic status 
in low-, middle- and high-income 
countries (10).
Studies based on individual 
or household-level data allow 
estimates of the price elasticity 
of tobacco demand by income, 
education and other socioeconomic 
indicators. Estimates for total 
elasticity (the percentage change 
in consumption of a product that 
results from a 1% increase in price), 
elasticity of smoking prevalence 
(the percentage change in the 
prevalence of use of a product that 
results from a 1% increase in the 
price of that product; also referred 
to as ‘participation elasticity’) and 
elasticity of smoking intensity 
(the percentage change in the 
consumption of a product by 
consumers that results from 
a 1% increase in the price of 
that product; also referred to as 
‘conditional demand elasticity’) 
by socioeconomic status, when 
available, were abstracted from 
studies conducted in high-income 
(Australia: 1 study, Canada: 2, 
the United Kingdom: 2, and the 
United States: 11), upper middle-
income (Bulgaria: 1, South Africa: 
1, Turkey: 1), lower middle-income 
(China: 2, Taiwan, China: 1, 
Egypt: 1, Indonesia: 1, Sri Lanka: 
2, Thailand: 1, and the Ukraine: 
1) and low-income countries 
(Bangladeesh: 1, Myanmar: 2, 
Nepal: 1, and Viet Nam: 1) and 
are summarized in the Handbook.
6.2 Differences in 
price sensitivity by 
socioeconomic status
Evidence from high-income 
countries
The price responsiveness of tobacco 
demand varies by the socioeconomic 
status (such as income, expenditure, 
education, race and ethnicity) of 
the population groups in a country. 
It is consistently higher among the 
poor than the rich in high-income 
countries, which can be explained 
by the ‘present orientation’ of poorer 
people, who tend to discount the 
future health costs and loss of 
earning due to tobacco use at a 
higher rate. Poorer people also incur 
an increasingly higher opportunity 
cost of tobacco use when the price 
increases and thus tend to reduce 
tobacco consumption more than 
the rich would do. As a result, the 
share of the total amount of tobacco 
tax paid by the poor is expected to 
decrease when the tobacco tax and 
prices increase.
Chaloupka (11) was the first 
to investigate socioeconomic 
variations in the price responsiveness 
of tobacco consumption. He 
used individual-level data from 
the Second National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey 
conducted in the United States in 
the late 1970s. The price elasticity 
of cigarette demand was greater for 
people with less than high-school 
education (ranging from -0.57 to 
-0.62) than in people with at least 
high-school education, who were 
relatively unresponsive to price 
changes.
Separate estimates of the price 
elasticity of smoking prevalence 
and smoking intensity were not 
available until 1998. Pooling data 
for 14 years (1976–1980, 1983, 
1985 and 1987–1993) from the 
United States National Health 
Interview Survey, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 
(12) showed that the smoking 
prevalence among people with an 
income level below the median was 
more price responsive than that 
among people above the median 
income level. The opposite was true 
for smoking intensity: the daily 
number of cigarettes smoked by 
smokers above the median income 
level was more price elastic than 
that for smokers below the median 
income level. The overall price 
elasticity was, however, greater 
for people in the lower economic 
class (-0.29) than for those in the 
upper economic class (-0.17). The 
greater price responsiveness of low-
income people was thus driven by 
their greater smoking prevalence 
elasticity.
The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention further observed 
that Hispanics were more price 
responsive than black or white 
populations, with respect to both 
smoking prevalence and smoking 
intensity (12). Blacks were more 
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price responsive than whites with 
respect to smoking prevalence, but 
less so with respect to smoking 
intensity. Studies by Biener et al. 
(13), Evans, Ringel and Stech (14), 
Hersch (15), Farrelly et al. (16), 
Gruber and Koszegi (17, 18), Stehr 
(19), and DeCicca and McLeod 
(20) confirmed the negative relation 
between socioeconomic status and 
the price responsiveness of tobacco 
demand; that is, poorer groups are 
generally more price responsive.
Using data from the 1984–
2004 Behavioural Risk Factor 
Surveillance System surveys in 
the United States, Franks et al. 
(21) found that the elasticity of 
smoking prevalence with respect 
to cigarette price was larger in the 
lowest income group (-0.45) than 
in higher income groups (-0.22) 
in the period before the Master 
Settlement Agreement (1984–
1996), whereas subsequently 
(1997–2004), smoking prevalence 
became price insensitive for all 
income groups. Farrelly and 
Engelen (22) reanalysed the data 
used by Franks et al. (21), adding 2 
years of data after the Agreement 
and limiting the pre-Agreement 
period from 1990 to October 1998 
and found that the lowest income 
group was price-sensitive. The 
difference in the findings of the 
two studies may be associated with 
the period examined. Colman and 
Remler (23) reinforced the finding 
of greater price elasticity in lower 
income groups, with values of -0.37 
for the low-income, -0.35 for the 
medium-income and -0.20 for the 
high-income group.
Ringel and Evans (24) studied 
pregnant women in the United 
States and found that the price 
responsiveness of cigarette demand 
was highest in the best-educated 
cohort and declined with lower 
levels of education. They also found 
lower price responsiveness among 
black and Hispanic pregnant 
women than among whites.
Estimates of the price elasticity of 
smoking intensity in Canada (25) 
showed greater price responsiveness 
among high-school graduates 
(-0.33) than among people with 
less than a high-school education 
(-0.23) or university graduates 
(-0.30), suggesting an inverse-U 
relation between price sensitivity 
and level of education. Gruber et 
al. (26), however, found a more 
systematic relation between income 
and cigarette expenditure elasticity 
in Canada, with considerably 
higher estimates for the lowest 
two quartiles than for the upper 
two quartiles.
Biennial data from the British 
General Household Survey (1972–
1990) analysed by Townsend et al. 
(27) showed that the price elasticity 
of smoking intensity was -1.02 
and -0.88 for men and women 
in the bottom socioeconomic 
group, respectively, and -0.47 
and -0.61 for the total male and 
female population. The elasticity 
of smoking prevalence among 
men was -0.61 in the lowest of five 
socioeconomic groups and -0.08 
for the whole male population. For 
women, the smoking prevalence 
elasticity was -0.51 in the lowest 
socioeconomic group and -0.23 for 
the whole female population. This 
work corroborated earlier findings 
by Townsend (28).
Schaap et al. (29) studied the 
effectiveness of comprehensive 
tobacco control policies, including 
price and taxation, in 18 European 
countries. Of all the tobacco control 
policies examined, price policies 
were most strongly associated with 
quit ratios. No significant difference 
was found between high and low 
education groups.
In Australia, Siahpush et al. (30) 
found a consistently greater price 
sensitivity of smoking prevalence 
among lower-income respondents. 
The difference in price elasticity of 
smoking prevalence estimated for 
low-income groups (-0.32) and 
medium- (-0.04) and high-income 
(-0.02) groups was stark. This 
study is unique in that monthly 
data on smoking prevalence were 
used, representing a significant 
improvement over previous studies, 
which were limited by their use of 
annual prevalence data.
Evidence for low- and 
middle-income countries
Evidence for socioeconomic 
variations in the price responsiveness 
of tobacco demand in low- and 
middle-income countries is mixed. 
The poorest are not necessarily 
the most sensitive to tobacco price 
changes in these countries (31–35). In 
some countries, this can be attributed 
to the availability of untaxed, cheaper 
tobacco products. Therefore, the 
empirical evidence for equity 
implications of tobacco taxation 
increases in low- and middle-income 
countries is inconclusive.
6.3 Price responsiveness 
of smoking initiation,  
quitting and relapse
Studies on socioeconomic variations 
in the price sensitivity of smoking 
prevalence rarely differentiate 
between smoking initiation, quitting 
and relapse, mainly because this type 
of analysis requires longitudinal 
(prospective or retrospective) data 
on individual smoking habits. 
Madden (36), for example, used 
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retrospective data for a sample of 
Irish women aged 48 and under to 
identify the factors that influence 
smoking initiation and quitting and 
obtained mixed results on the effect 
of price by educational status. The 
strongest effect of tax on starting 
smoking was observed among 
people with intermediate education, 
while weaker effects were found for 
both people with the least education 
and those with higher levels of 
education, suggesting an inverse-U 
effect. The differences between 
intermediate and higher levels 
of education were not, however, 
statistically significant. Tax appeared 
to be the most effective factor for 
inducing quitting among people 
with the least education; there 
was little evidence of a significant 
difference in the effectiveness of 
taxation between groups with higher 
or intermediate levels of education.
6.4 Tobacco taxation 
and regressivity
Increasing tobacco taxes in order 
to reduce tobacco use is often 
criticized as being regressive, placing 
a disproportionate burden on people 
with low incomes. It is argued that 
the increase in taxes might reduce 
the overall ability of people with low 
incomes to purchase and consume 
other goods, thereby increasing 
income distribution inequality.
A situation considered to be 
regressive is an increase in the 
tax burden as the income level 
declines. As in many countries 
people with low incomes are more 
likely to smoke and spend a greater 
proportion of their incomes on 
tobacco than people on higher 
incomes, tobacco taxation could 
be considered regressive; however, 
if people with lower incomes are 
more sensitive to price increases 
and reduce their consumption in 
response to a price increase to a 
greater extent than people with 
higher incomes, as the literature 
summarized above suggests, tax 
increases could paradoxically 
reduce the burden of tax on people 
with low incomes. Hence, although 
taxes can be considered regressive 
on average, the tax increase is 
less regressive and reduces total 
regressivity.
6.5 New evidence 
from the PPACTE project 
on tobacco and health      
inequalities
The evidence summarized above 
shows that certain population 
subgroups have higher rates of 
tobacco use and find it harder to quit, 
with declines in smoking over time 
varying by population subgroup. In 
addition to having higher smoking 
rates, the least advantaged members 
of society tend to start smoking at a 
younger age, use more tobacco and 
are less likely to quit (37).
A recent review (37) concluded 
that price increases were the 
intervention most likely to reduce 
such inequalities. The effectiveness 
of tobacco taxation is fully realized, 
however, only if tax increases lead 
to increases in the price of the 
cheapest cigarettes or other tobacco 
product, whether manufactured 
cigarettes or hand-rolling tobacco. 
Otherwise, there is an opportunity 
and incentive for the most price-
responsive smokers to trade-down 
to cheaper brands or products.
Cheap tobacco products are not 
limited to discount brands of 
manufactured cigarettes but include 
illicit tobacco sold at cut prices and 
hand-rolling tobacco, which is 
subject to lower rates of excise within 
the European Union. Estimates of 
the cross-price elasticity of demand 
in Finland (WP3) suggest that 
hand-rolling tobacco is substituted 
for cigarettes as cigarette prices rise. 
The negative short-run income 
elasticity for hand-rolling tobacco 
indicates that it is an inferior good, 
meaning that consumers with 
higher incomes prefer cigarettes to 
cheaper forms of tobacco (38). The 
results of many international studies 
of demand show that people who 
currently use hand-rolling tobacco 
or have switched from expensive 
cigarettes to cheaper pipe and hand-
rolling tobacco tend to be poorer or 
in lower income groups (39).
The extent to which tax increases 
result in increases in the average 
price of the cheapest cigarettes 
depends on the structure of tobacco 
taxes and industry pricing strategies. 
Tobacco companies may use price-
based promotions to position brands 
at various points in the market. 
Furthermore, as discussed above, 
companies may absorb tax increases 
(under-shifting), pass them on to 
consumers or increase prices on 
top of tax increases (over-shifting).
Industry pricing strategy 
and the availability of cheap 
tobacco products
A study of industry pricing 
strategies, discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5 and elsewhere 
(40), categorized cigarette brands 
sold on the British market into four 
price segments: premium, mid-
price, economy and ultra-low price 
(WP5). Trends in market share (by 
volume) by price segment were then 
observed between 2001 and 2009. 
About half the market was held by 
economy segment brands. The share 
held by this segment grew until 
2007–2008, when it fell slightly 
because of gains in the ultra-low-
price segment. After the tobacco 
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companies acquired supermarket 
brands and launched their own 
ultra-low-price brands in 2006, 
the share of ultra-low-price brands 
increased substantially. In contrast, 
the market share of premium and 
mid-priced brands fell from 2001 
onwards. While the three segments 
(premium, economy and ultra-low 
price) have clearly separate price 
ranges, the price of mid-price 
brands now overlaps entirely with 
that of lower-end premium brands. 
Furthermore, the range of prices 
within each segment appears to 
have widened, and the gap between 
the most and the least expensive 
brands has doubled (40).
When trends in price increases by 
price segment were examined for 
63 brands with a market share of 
0.2% or greater (November 2006) 
between 2006 and 2009, the price 
increases of brands in the ultra-
low-price segment were much 
smaller than those of brands in 
other segments (40), with a < 1% 
increase in price for every brand 
in the ultra-low price group and 
real price decreases in some cases. 
Meanwhile, the price of premium 
brands increased by 3–5% between 
2006 and 2009 and that of mid-
priced or economy brands by 5–6%.
These findings suggest that 
the tobacco industry is using a 
sophisticated pricing strategy, in 
which cheaper brands are cross-
subsidized with profits from more 
expensive brands. The study shows 
real price increases and over-
shifting of taxes in the premium, 
mid-price and economy brand 
segments, while the real price of 
ultra-low-price brands has not 
increased and taxes on this segment 
are under-shifted. Therefore, the 
price increases are greatest on 
mid-price and economy brands 
and lowest (and often negative in 
real terms) on individual ultra-
low-priced brands. Furthermore, 
the price increases appear to be 
timed to accentuate differences in 
prices between brands in different 
segments at the point when duties 
are increased; however, overall 
prices are increased and taxes are 
over-shifted to consumers, which 
contributes to rising industry 
profits (40).
As a result of this pricing strategy and 
the increasing number of ultra-low-
price brands, consumers have more 
opportunities to down-trade from 
more expensive to cheaper cigarettes; 
and the market share by volume of 
ultra-low-price brands has increased 
in response. The availability of cheap 
brands undermines tobacco tax policy, 
as it ensures that price-sensitive 
smokers, particularly the young and 
the poor, continue to initiate and 
maintain their smoking habits. If the 
young and most socioeconomically 
deprived parts of the population 
are the predominant users of these 
cheaper tobacco products, their 
availability is contributing to widening 
health inequalities.
Further analysis of annual data from 
the British General Household 
Survey (now known as the General 
Lifestyle Survey) for the period 
2001–2008 provided further insight 
into the trends in the use of cheap 
cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco, 
as well as the profiles of users of such 
products.
Trends in the use of cheap 
cigarettes and hand-rolling 
tobacco in Great Britain
While there was a marked decline in 
the smoking rate in the population 
of Great Britain as a whole during 
the period 2001–2008, from 26.8% 
to 20.8%, this decrease is only in 
the proportion smoking filter 
cigarettes (Figure 6.3), which 
has dropped significantly, from 
20.8% to 14.7%. In contrast, the 
proportion of smokers smoking 
hand-rolling tobacco has not 
changed significantly, hovering 
around 6%. The proportion smoking 
unfiltered cigarettes has remained 
negligible, at 0.1–0.2% (41).
Among people smoking filter 
cigarettes, the proportion smoking 
expensive cigarettes has decreased 
significantly, from 11.1% to 5.1%, 
Figure 6.3 Smoking trends in the population of the Great Britain, 2001-2008:   
Proportions of the population smoking filter cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco
110 PRICING PoLICIES AND CoNTRoL oF ToBACCo IN EURoPE
while the proportion smoking 
cheap cigarettes has not changed 
significantly, remaining at 9.0–
9.7% throughout the 8-year period 
(Figure 6.4) (41).
Among smokers, the proportion 
smoking filter cigarettes has fallen 
and the proportion smoking hand-
rolling tobacco has increased in all 
age groups (Figure 6.5). This trend 
was most apparent for 16–24-year-
olds, among whom the proportion 
using hand-rolling tobacco almost 
doubled, from 16% to 28%. The 
proportions in 2008 are significantly 
different from those in 2001 for all 
groups, although the results are of 
borderline significance for people 
aged 25–39 years (41).
Consistent with the marked 
decline in the proportion of the 
population as a whole smoking 
expensive cigarettes (Figure 6.4), 
significant decreases were seen in 
all age groups except those over 55 
years in the proportion of smokers 
smoking expensive cigarettes, 
with concomitant increases in 
the proportion smoking cheap 
cigarettes. The increase in the 
proportion smoking cheap 
cigarettes was greatest in the 
youngest age group, which now has 
the highest rate of cheap cigarette use. 
Three quarters of 16–24-year-olds 
now smoke cheap cigarettes (41).
Determinants of smoking 
cheap cigarettes and 
hand-rolling tobacco
Analysis of the British General 
Household Survey data suggests 
that the odds of smoking cheap 
cigarettes are higher for women 
than men, for younger than 
the oldest age group, for whites 
than for other ethnic groups 
and for people with the lowest 
socioeconomic and educational 
Figure 6.4. Smoking trends in the population of the Great Britain, 2001–2008: 
proportions of the population smoking cheap (economy and ultra-low-price) and 
expensive (premium and mid-price) cigarettes 
From reference (47) The proportions presented do not add up exactly to the proportions who smoke 
filter cigarettes shown in Figure 6.3 because we were unable to allocate all filter cigarette brands to a 
price category, general household surveys did not identify a brand for each smoker or, for a few brands 
identified, we were unable to obtain price data.
Figure 6.5. Smoking trends in the population of the Great Britain 2001–2008: 
proportions of smokers smoking filter cigarettes and hand-rolling tobacco, by 
age group 
From reference (47)
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status (Table 6.1). Women were 
50% more likely to smoke cheap 
cigarettes than men. People aged 
16–24 were 3.6 times more likely 
to smoke cheap cigarettes than 
those aged over 55 years, and the 
odds for smoking cheap brands 
increased with declining age, 
although the confidence intervals 
for the intermediate age groups 
overlapped. The odds for smoking 
cheap cigarettes were significantly 
higher for all occupational 
groups than for managerial and 
professional occupations, although, 
as for age, a nonsignificant dose–
response relation was seen. The 
proportion of full-time students 
who smoked cheap cigarettes 
was similar to that of managerial 
and occupational classes, but the 
number was too small to reach 
clear conclusions about their 
brand choice. In comparison 
with people achieving A-level or 
higher qualifications, those with 
less education were more likely to 
smoke cheap brands (41).
The odds for smoking hand-
rolling tobacco versus filter 
cigarettes showed similar inverse 
socioeconomic and educational 
gradients to the odds for smoking 
cheap cigarettes and were greatest 
for people with the lowest 
economic and educational status 
(Table 6.2). Marked differences 
were, however, seen. Men were 
more likely than women to smoke 
hand-rolling tobacco, but there 
were no significant differences by 
age group or ethnicity. 
It is notable that women are 50% 
more likely than men to smoke 
cheap cigarettes. Interestingly, 
inequalities in smoking among 
women by socioeconomic factors 
have widened in recent years, 
while those in men have remained 
constant (42). We also found 
that the rates of cheap cigarette 
use increased with declining age. 
Similarly, smoking rates have been 
rising among young adults, who 
are more likely to smoke cheap 
cigarettes, even though overall 
smoking rates decreased and then 
remained steady during 2007–
2009 (42).
Studies of cessation interventions 
indicate that quit rates are lower 
among disadvantaged smokers. 
Given recent evidence that 
disadvantaged smokers attempt 
to quit at the same rate as more 
advantaged smokers (43), this 
pattern appears to be attributable 
to lower rates of success in quitting 
among the disadvantaged. While 
several explanations have been 
considered, including lack of 
support for quit attempts, in part 
because other people in their social 
network are more likely to smoke, 
greater addiction to tobacco and 
poorer compliance with treatment 
(43, 44), the role of the availability 
and use of cheap, legal sources of 
tobacco has been overlooked. These 
findings, well-established evidence 
on the importance of price in 
reducing tobacco use (11, 13, 26, 
45), particularly among poorer 
smokers, and newer evidence that 
the availability of cheap cigarettes 
reduces the ability of price to 
promote cessation (46) suggest 
that the availability of cheap 
tobacco may partly explain the 
high smoking rates and low quit 
rates of the most disadvantaged 
members of society (41).
These findings suggest that the 
availability and use of cheap 
cigarettes play a key role in 
determining inequalities in 
smoking (41). Moreover, given 
recent evidence from the British 
market that the major tobacco 
Figure 6.6. Numbers of cigarettes (manufactured and hand-rolled) smoked 
per day by current smokers, separately for men and women, overall* and by 
country, sorted by the consumption of cigarettes by current smokers of each sex 
(descending order) 
Data from PPACTE WP2 Survey, 2010 - UK refers specifically to England   
* Computed by weighting each country in proportion to the population aged ≥ 15 years
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companies have been absorbing tax 
increases on the cheapest cigarette 
brands (so that the price of these 
products has not increased in real 
terms) and using price promotions 
to sell these brands (sometimes at a 
loss) (47), this study suggests that 
tobacco industry pricing may play a 
role in explaining smoking patterns, 
including inequalities (41).
While this analysis was limited 
to the British market, where the 
number of hand-rolled cigarettes 
as a proportion of daily cigarettes 
is higher than in other European 
Union countries (Figure 6.6), the 
findings are likely to be relevant 
to numerous other markets. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, hand-
rolling tobacco represents a 
substantial proportion of total 
releases for consumption in 
Albania, Austria, Croatia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, releases for 
consumption of fine-cut tobacco 
increased between 2002 and 2010 
in the European Union overall and 
particularly in Cyprus, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Poland and 
Spain. Euromonitor data confirm 
these trends, indicating that sales 
of hand-rolling tobacco have 
increased in the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, Poland and 
Spain, and the share of cheap 
cigarettes is growing in Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovakia and Sweden.
6.6 Policy implications 
of the PPACTE project 
findings for tobacco 
taxation and health 
inequalities
Urgent action should be taken 
to narrow the price differentials 
between the most expensive and 
the cheapest tobacco products (both 
manufactured cigarettes and hand-
rolling tobacco) and to prevent the 
industry from price-discounting the 
cheapest brands, cross-subsidizing 
this practice with profits from more 
expensive brands. A tax structure that 
includes a high minimum excise tax, 
a predominant specific element and 
a limited ad valorem component 
would achieve greater convergence 
of prices across price segments, and 
comparable rates of excise on other 
tobacco products would discourage 
product substitution. Furthermore, 
price promotions and below-cost 
selling should be banned. Tighter 
controls on illicit trade could also 
contribute to reducing inequalities in 
smoking and associated inequalities 
in health outcomes, by restricting the 
supply of cheap tobacco products.
6.7 Data required to 
identify inequalities in 
tobacco use and the 
effectiveness of policy 
in reducing inequalities
Regularly collected data from 
surveys on tobacco use by product 
type and brand and price paid and 
by age, gender and socioeconomic 
status based on standardized 
definitions and measures would 
facilitate more detailed analyses of 
the effectiveness of tobacco taxation 
and its impact on health inequalities.
Moreover, data on price trends by 
price segment or brand would allow 
closer monitoring of the tobacco 
industry.
Future research on quit rates should 
include far more consideration of 
the role of price in cessation, and 
research on inequalities in smoking 
should consider the impact of 
price differences between the most 
expensive and the cheapest products.
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CoNCLUSIoNS AND 
RECoMMENDATIoNS FoR ToBACCo
 FISCAL PoLICy IN THE EURoPEAN UNIoN
chApter 7
Background
The recommendations below 
derive from PPACTE research on 
the following policy themes: the 
effectiveness of tobacco taxation 
for public health (Chapter 2); 
tobacco price, tax structures and 
rates (Chapter 3); illicit tobacco 
trade (Chapter 4); tobacco industry 
influence on tobacco taxation 
(Chapter 5); and tobacco taxation 
and health inequalities (Chapter 
6). These aspects were covered in 
research conducted over the past 3 
years (2009–2012).
Approximately 650 000 people 
in the European Union die 
prematurely each year from 
smoking-related diseases. Across 
the European Union, there are 
threefold differences in cigarette 
prices and in smoking prevalence, 
with higher prevalences clearly 
related to lower tobacco prices. The 
aim of the European Commission 
Directive on tobacco taxation is 
to harmonize tobacco taxes in 
Member States, and public health 
is now also a consideration.
Tobacco tax increases
The results of the PPACTE work 
packages confirm convincingly 
that price is a major determinant of 
demand for cigarettes. This can be 
seen in Figures 2.1–2.13 (Chapter 
2), which show an average price 
elasticity of demand of -0.3 to 
-0.4. Income is also shown to affect 
demand, with an average income 
elasticity of demand for cigarettes 
of +0.3 to +0.4. Price is another 
significant factor in the demand for 
pipe tobacco and snus, but income 
appears to be negatively related 
to the demand for these tobacco 
products. Price and tobacco 
taxation are therefore key factors 
both for public health and for 
generating national revenue.
Recommendation 1: 
We strongly recommend a 
continuing increase in tobacco 
taxes, so that the price of cigarettes 
and other tobacco products is 
greater than the general rise in 
price of other goods and rises in 
incomes. This would make tobacco 
increasingly less affordable to 
smokers and potential smokers 
and result in increased national 
revenues from tobacco taxes for 
Member State governments.
Evidence compiled by WP5 
suggests that large, intermittent 
tax increases may have greater 
public health benefits than small, 
gradual increases. While further 
research is required to explore this 
issue in more detail, consideration 
should be given to implementing 
tax increases in this way.
Support for increases 
in tobacco taxes 
among smokers and 
nonsmokers in the 
European Union
The PPACTE study (WP2) 
sought the opinions of smokers and 
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nonsmokers in Member States on 
the acceptability of raising cigarette 
prices. The findings demonstrate 
strong public support for tax 
increases when at least some of the 
tax is earmarked (hypothecated) 
to support smoking cessation and 
for prevention. Overall, 79% of 
nonsmokers and 49% of current 
smokers supported a price increase 
of 5%, with revenues allocated 
to support smoking cessation 
measures; 74% of nonsmokers 
and 40% of smokers supported a 
20% increase in price; and 76% of 
nonsmokers and 67% of smokers 
perceived the provision of free 
smoking cessation support to be 
useful for controlling smoking. 
These results clearly show general 
support in Member States for 
significant increases in tobacco 
taxes.
Recommendation 2: 
The European Commission 
should consider and act upon 
the high level of support from 
the citizens of Member States for 
substantial increases in tobacco 
taxes, particularly if some of the 
tax revenue is used to support 
cessation, public education and 
prevention.
Tobacco tax structure 
based on high minimum 
tax to discourage 
trading-down
Because price is an important 
factor in both tobacco demand 
and tobacco industry profits, 
tobacco companies continually 
try to persuade the governments 
of Member States to abstain from 
raising taxes, to lower them or to 
change tax structures to suit their 
interests. Tobacco companies 
seek to minimize the impact of 
a given excise policy on demand 
by providing cheaper alternatives 
(both cigarettes and hand-
rolling tobacco), particularly for 
poor smokers who are the most 
price sensitive. These pressures 
have undermined the basis 
and intentions of European 
Commission legislation and 
European Union directives on 
tobacco tax. The main issues to be 
addressed in future directives are: 
the availability of cheap and ultra-
cheap cigarettes, including ‘dumped’ 
cheap cigarettes; the relatively very 
low taxes on alternative products 
such as fine-cut tobacco used for 
roll-your-own cigarettes; illicit 
trade and smuggling; price-based 
promotions; and the pernicious 
interference and influence 
of tobacco companies in the 
preparation of tobacco tax policy. 
It is no easy matter to address these 
problems or loopholes, but changes 
to the tobacco tax structure and 
other supportive legislation could 
go a long way to achieving these 
aims.
Addressing the problem of low-
priced cigarettes will require that 
a high minimum tax in monetary 
terms be set in each country as the 
main tobacco tax, to eliminate the 
tax advantage of cheap or ultra-
low-price cigarettes. For example, 
the tax could be such that the 
minimum excise tax plus VAT is 
80% of the weighted average price 
of cigarettes (or preferably 83%, 
as in Turkey). As some countries 
have very low pre-tax prices, the tax 
would have to be set at a minimum 
in euro equivalents, if higher than 
the 80% of weighted average 
price, possibly initially at €125 
per 1000 cigarettes in 2012 terms, 
subsequently increasing to allow 
for future inflation and income 
changes. Member States would 
be free, and encouraged, to set this 
minimum tax at a higher level.
Recommendation 3: 
We also suggest that selling 
cigarettes below cost and low-
price-based marketing, including 
selling below the tax level, should 
be banned, as the deleterious 
effects of these practices were 
demonstrated in WP5. Member 
States should be transparent 
about all aspects of the taxes and 
publish an annual report showing 
all aspects of tobacco taxation and 
revenue and the weighted average 
price.
Recommendation 4: 
We recommend that the European 
Commission move to a tobacco 
tax structure that makes trading 
down to cheap cigarettes less 
attractive. This would avoid the 
unintentional widening of health 
inequalities promoted by existing 
tax structures.
Extra ad valorem tax for 
cigarettes priced above 
the weighted average 
price
Frequently, while persuading 
Member States that tobacco tax 
increases reduce tax revenue or 
increase smuggling, the tobacco 
companies raise their own prices, 
particularly for higher-price 
cigarettes. This serves to increase 
industry profit, while the Member 
States miss out on potential 
increases in tobacco tax revenue 
and opportunities to optimize 
the health benefits. The industry 
recognizes the segmentation of 
the market and the low, often 
zero, price elasticity of higher-
income smokers by raising the 
price of higher-priced cigarettes 
to subsidize the ultra-low-
price market. They increasingly 
circumvent the high price 
sensitivity (higher price elasticity 
of demand for cigarettes) of low-
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income smokers and attempt 
to retain them as smokers by 
providing ultra-low-priced 
cigarettes.
Recommendation 5: 
To avoid this anomaly, we 
recommend that the ad valorem 
tax proposed above (minimum 
80%, ideally 83%) be applied to 
all cigarettes priced above the 
weighted average price. This 
means that the excise tax plus VAT 
would be at least 80% of the retail 
price, with a minimum monetary 
tax equivalent to at least 80% of 
the average weighted retail price, 
or €125 per 1000 cigarettes, 
whichever is higher. Examples of 
the effects of these rates are given 
in Annex 4.
Adjustment for cost of 
living and affordability
Incomes and cost of living 
vary among Member States, 
creating differences in the level 
of affordability for a given tax or 
price. At present, the minimum 
monetary tax is set at €64 per 1000 
cigarettes, but it must be raised to 
€90 per 1000 cigarettes by January 
2014 to comply with Directive 
2010/12/EC. Even at this low 
level, some Member States, under 
pressure from tobacco companies, 
have negotiated for derogation for 
several years, allowing their taxes to 
remain at even lower levels. This has 
the effect of causing governments 
to lose valuable tax revenue and 
increasing both cigarette use and 
the prevalence of disease related 
to smoking. (These Member 
States are mostly those with the 
highest smoking rates.) This also 
aggravates the problem of cross-
border shopping by neighbours 
with higher tax levels.
This adjustment could be based 
on the ‘comparative price level’ or 
‘purchasing power parity’, which 
are available for all countries. The 
basic minimum tax could be set for 
the lowest-income Member State 
and adjusted upwards for others. 
The basic minimum tax would then 
be adjusted annually in line with 
inflation, income levels and the 
relative cost of living. The minimum 
could be set, for example, at €125 
per 1000 cigarettes for a specific 
low-price country and adjusted by 
comparative price level for all other 
countries.
Recommendation 6:
We recommend consideration of 
tailoring the minimum tax so that 
it is comparable in affordability 
between countries, thereby 
allowing higher levels to be set 
automatically in higher-income 
countries.
Taxing fine-cut tobacco 
for roll-your-own at the 
same level as cigarettes
At present, all countries tax fine-
cut hand-rolling tobacco for roll-
your-own cigarettes at a lower 
rate than manufactured cigarettes. 
Evidence from WP2 shows that, in 
many European Union countries, 
considerable numbers of smokers, 
particularly in low-income 
groups, have been switching 
from manufactured to roll-your-
own cigarettes. The proportion of 
smokers of hand-rolling tobacco 
was highest in England (32%), 
France (17%) and Finland (14%). 
Some tobacco companies are 
exploiting this tax difference 
further by selling kits to convert 
hand-rolling tobacco to cigarettes, 
at a price much below that of the 
equivalent manufactured cigarettes.
The conversion rate used by the 
European Union between fine-
cut and manufactured cigarettes 
is based on the assumption that a 
roll-your-own cigarette contains 
1 g of tobacco; however, there is 
evidence from PPACTE WP2 
that the weight of tobacco in one 
roll-your-own cigarette is nearer 
to 0.7 or 0.8 g. The ISO norm 
15592–3 for measuring tar and 
nicotine in hand-rolling tobacco 
gives a somewhat lower estimate 
of 0.4–0.75 g of tobacco per hand-
rolled cigarette. In whose interest is 
it to tax fine-cut and pipe tobacco 
at such low rates?
Recommendation 7: 
We recommend that there be full 
alignment of tax rates, so that 
fine-cut tobacco for roll-your-own 
cigarettes (and also pipe tobacco) 
is taxed at the same rate as 
manufactured cigarettes and at an 
appropriate conversion rate. The 
tax should include both a specific 
component, based on the weighted 
average price of cigarettes, and an 
ad valorem component and not 
provide a choice between specific 
and ad valorem, as at present.
Dealing with illicit trade 
and the WHO FCTC 
proposed protocol 
on illicit trade in tobacco
Illicit trade in tobacco, in the form 
of both smuggled and illicitly 
produced products, represents a 
serious threat to tobacco tax policy, 
government revenue and public 
health. Estimates from WP5 
suggest that tax avoidance and 
evasion represent about 11.8% of 
consumption in middle- and 9.8% 
in high-income countries. There 
are, however, few transparent or 
public data on illicit tobacco trade 
in European Union countries. 
Research on illicit tobacco trade 
has been carried out by KPMG 
as part of an agreement between 
the European Union and the 
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tobacco company Philip Morris 
International. According to the 
KPMG report, total cigarette 
consumption in the European 
Union was 685 billion units in 
2009, 8.9% of which was from 
illicit trade. A redacted version 
of the report has now been 
published, but the full version 
and the methods used are still 
confidential and available only to 
European Union or Member State 
officials. This makes it difficult for 
independent authorities to verify 
the data. Evidence from Bulgaria, 
which suggests that the industry 
exaggerates the extent of illicit 
trade, highlights the importance 
of independent, public scrutiny of 
such data.
Following lawsuits by the 
European Union against 
tobacco companies, enforceable, 
legally binding agreements were 
concluded with Philip Morris 
International and Japan Tobacco 
International and subsequently 
with British American Tobacco 
and Imperial Tobacco. These 
agreements have been somewhat 
successful in reducing illicit 
trade in some jurisdictions but 
entail close relations between 
the tobacco industry and the 
European Union, such that the 
industry is involved in monitoring 
and measuring illicit trade. This 
contravenes Article 5.3 of the 
WHO FCTC. It is important 
that the European Commission 
instigate monitoring of illicit 
trade that is unbiased and fully 
independent of the tobacco 
industry.
The Parties to the WHO FCTC 
are negotiating a protocol on a 
universal system for counteracting 
illicit trade in tobacco. The main 
element of the protocol is tracing 
(re-creation of the route of seized 
illicit cigarettes) by the use of 
unique, secure, non-removable 
markings on all unit packets, 
packages and outside packaging 
of cigarettes within 5 years (and 
of other tobacco products within 
10 years) of entry into force of 
the protocol.
There is extensive illicit trade into 
the European Union, particularly 
from its eastern border with 
the Russian Federation and the 
Ukraine, indicating major supply 
factors. Public data are needed on 
the extent of this illicit trade and 
on the transparency of the contacts 
between the transnational tobacco 
companies and enforcement 
officials, including information 
on any agreements.
Corruption contributes to the 
success of illicit trade and must 
be confronted. Member States 
that have not ratified the key 
anticorruption treaties should 
do so and then implement 
their provisions in a targeted, 
comprehensive, strategic manner. 
Corrupt customs, tax and other 
officials should be reformed. The 
European Union must agree 
on a comprehensive, practical 
anticorruption strategy.
Tax verification must remain the 
independent domain of Member 
States and not be conducted with 
the tobacco companies. For this to 
be effective, everyone engaged in 
tobacco production, distribution 
and retail sales should be licensed. 
Sufficient resources must be 
provided to support strong, 
effective enforcement, with severe 
penalties for people engaging in 
illicit trade.
Regular, independent audits are 
necessary to guarantee the validity 
of the system. The current KPMG 
audit is neither independent nor 
transparent and should undergo 
peer review and be open to scrutiny. 
PPACTE will provide a brief 
critical appraisal of its method 
and findings, if they are made 
available. Smuggling of cigarettes 
is a particular problem on the 
European Union eastern border, 
and we commend the recent 
European Commission anti-fraud 
strategy to address the problem. 
The European Union must 
continue working with officials 
in the Russian Federation, the 
Ukraine and other neighbouring 
countries on harmonization of 
taxes with the European Union.
Recommendation 8: 
We recommend that, to support 
tobacco tax reforms, the European 
Union supports the proposed 
WHo FCTC protocol on illicit trade 
in tobacco products. This should 
include linking codes for individual 
packs with cartons and master 
cartons, a measure that is both 
feasible and essential. It should 
also be entirely independent of 
the tobacco industry.
Halting the influence 
of the tobacco industry
The European Union and all its 
Member States except the Czech 
Republic (at the time of writing) 
are Parties to the WHO FCTC 
and, under Article 5.3, are bound 
to prohibit the influence of the 
tobacco industry in the formulation 
of public health policy. The 
FCTC states that “in setting and 
implementing their public health 
policies with respect to tobacco 
control, Parties shall act to protect 
these policies from commercial 
and other vested interests of the 
tobacco industry in accordance with 
national law.” As the PPACTE 
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case studies and research by WP5 
show clearly, however, governments 
continue to engage with the tobacco 
industry in formulating tobacco 
taxation policy, allowing tobacco 
companies to lobby Member State 
governments constantly to persuade 
them to keep tobacco taxes low, 
arguing incorrectly that if taxes go 
up tobacco revenue will decrease 
and smuggling will increase greatly.
Recommendation 9: 
We recommend that the European 
Commission educate Member 
States and the public about the 
beneficial effects of increased 
tobacco taxes and of improved 
tobacco tax structures in terms of 
government tax revenue and better 
health of citizens. The International 
Monetary Fund recommends, 
even insists, that European Union 
countries with high debt should 
increase their tobacco taxes, and 
the European Commission should 
reinforce that policy to counteract 
the misinformation from the 
tobacco industry.
There should also be greater 
recognition of, and publicity 
about, the known influence of 
transnational tobacco companies 
on the level and structure of 
tobacco taxes, particularly to the 
public in accession countries, 
where derogations harm health 
and financial interests and also 
harm revenue and public health 
in other Member States. The 
European Commission should 
consider becoming more closely 
involved in determining tobacco 
taxation levels in accession states 
and, in particular, in calculating 
likely increases in price after 
accounting for increases in income.
Recommendation 10: 
We recommend that European 
Union institutions and Member 
States take action to ensure 
that tobacco taxation policies 
are developed without tobacco 
industry involvement, in conformity 
with Article 5.3 of the WHo FCTC.
Smokeless tobacco
The surveys in WP2 included 
questions on the use of and access 
to snus in 18 selected countries. 
Snus is sold legally in Sweden, 
where 18.9% of men and 3.5% 
women report using it regularly 
and a further 1% occasionally. 
Use was relatively low elsewhere, 
with 2.7% of men in the Czech 
Republic and Finland being 
regular users. In the other countries 
surveyed, regular use varied from 
zero to 1.4%, with some occasional 
use. Use by women was generally 
low or rare, although in Poland 
and Spain snus was used slightly 
more often by women than by men 
(1.8% of women and 1.4% of men 
were regular users in Poland, and 
2.9% of women and 2.1% of men 
were occasional users in Spain). 
In Sweden, 93% of users said they 
obtained snus from legal tobacco 
shops, 1.6% from duty-free outlets, 
2.6% from smuggled sources and 
3.3% from friends. Of the non-
Swedish users, 75% obtained snus 
from legal tobacco shops, 11% from 
the Internet, 11% from shops in 
other countries, 6% from duty-free 
shops and 2.3% from smuggled 
sources; 3.5% were offered snus. 
There is no clear agreement on 
the safety of snus, its relevance to 
smoking cessation or the extent to 
which it is used as a temporary or 
permanent alternative to smoked 
tobacco. Continued research is 
needed to answer these questions.
Online test purchases of snus by 
WP5 indicate that snus is currently 
sold illegally online by Swedish 
vendors to European Union 
nationals other than Swedes. 
As the transnational tobacco 
companies now all have a stake 
in the Scandinavian snus market, 
are profiting from these illegal 
sales and are lobbying to have 
the European Union ban on snus 
sales removed, this is an important 
finding.
Recommendation 11: 
We recommend that the embargo 
on snus remain, unless clear 
evidence is provided on its safety 
and its overall beneficial effects on 
health. Reversing the European 
Union ban on snus sales without 
an appropriate regulatory framework 
would present a danger to public 
health and should therefore be 
considered extremely cautiously.
Recommendation 12: 
We recommend that the European 
Commission (which is responsible 
for ensuring that European Union 
law is correctly applied) should 
investigate illegal sales of snus and 
Sweden’s apparent failure to fulfil 
its responsibilities under European 
Union law. To remove any ambiguity, 
a specific clause should be inserted 
in the text of the revised Tobacco 
Products Directive, prohibiting the 
sale of snus via the Internet, with 
a clear indication of the penalties 
facing those who contravene the 
legislation.
Tobacco tax structure 
and health inequalities
Groups with lower socioeconomic 
status, lower incomes or lower 
educational attainment have a 
greater tendency to smoke tobacco. 
As a consequence, the burden of 
smoking-related ill health and 
mortality (including lung cancer, 
ischaemic heart disease and chronic 
obstructive airways disease) is 
increasingly concentrated in these 
groups. Tobacco companies tend to 
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target low-income groups, young 
people and women, whom they 
consider to be growing or continuing 
markets. The tax structure we have 
proposed would tend to equalize 
the tax on cheap and high-price 
cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco 
and so help to reduce inequalities 
in smoking and smoking-related 
diseases.
Recommendation 13: 
We recommend the tax levels and 
structures proposed above as 
important contributions to reducing 
health inequalities resulting from 
socioeconomic inequalities in the 
prevalence of smoking.
Other tobacco control 
measures: cessation, 
media campaigns and 
plain packaging
Raising the tobacco tax leads some 
smokers to give up smoking. Many 
smokers achieve this without 
much support; however, smoking 
is a serious addiction, cessation 
is difficult for many and support 
should be offered, particularly 
to smokers in low-income 
groups. The SimSmoke analyses 
described in WP4 highlight the 
gains that can be achieved from 
improving smoking cessation 
services, as well as the importance 
of good mass media campaigns to 
support low-income smokers in 
quitting. A training manual for 
SimSmoke has been produced for 
15 European countries to allow 
them to explore the possible 
beneficial interactive effects of 
various policy interventions with 
taxation.
Recommendation 14: 
We recommend that a 
percentage of the extra revenue 
from increases in tobacco tax 
be earmarked (hypothecated) 
for smoking cessation services 
and well-designed mass media 
campaigns, particularly focused 
on the needs of low-income 
smokers.
Given the industry’s documented 
willingness to sell ultra-low-priced 
brands at a loss and evidence of 
a growth in price-based cigarette 
marketing, our research on the 
industry pricing strategy (WP5) 
supports a prohibition on below-
cost selling and price-based 
marketing. Packages displaying 
the product price are one form 
of price-based marketing used by 
the industry. Current discussions 
on revision of the Tobacco 
Products Directive 2001/37/EC 
include the introduction of plain 
packaging. This would prevent 
the use of price-marked packs 
and thus limit the industry’s use 
of this price-based marketing 
strategy.
Further research
Detailed evaluation of the 
effectiveness of tobacco taxation 
across Europe is hindered by 
limited availability and access to 
comparable, adequate data sets. 
The researchers on this project 
found it expensive and sometimes 
difficult or even impossible to 
obtain adequate up-to-date 
information. Effective tobacco 
taxation policy requires access 
to the necessary data to allow 
independent observers to calculate 
the price and tax elasticities of 
demand, to verify the direction of 
tax revenues, to detect movements 
to lower-priced tobacco products, 
to estimate the extent of illicit trade 
and to describe annual changes in 
smoking prevalence and levels of 
initiation and relapse.
At a minimum, data on the 
following variables should 
be reported by the relevant 
government departments of 
Member States to the European 
Commission and made publicly 
available through Eurostat:
•	Annual weighted average 
price by tobacco product 
type (e.g. cigarettes, pipe 
and hand-rolling tobacco, 
smokeless tobacco, including 
snus, snuff and chewing 
tobacco); and
•	Annual tax-paid sales or 
releases for consumption of 
tobacco, by tobacco product 
type.
To allow more detailed 
monitoring and more 
sophisticated analysis of 
the effectiveness of tobacco 
taxation across Europe, data on 
the following variables should 
be reported to the European 
Commission and made publicly 
available through Eurostat:
•	Annual (or more frequent) 
weighted average price by 
tobacco product type and price 
category;
•	Annual (or more frequent) 
tax paid sales or releases for 
consumption of tobacco by 
tobacco product type and price 
category;
•	Market share by tobacco 
product type and price category;
•	Annual tobacco tax revenue;
•	Tobacco tax structures and 
rates;
•	Data on illicit trade when 
available; and
•	Lists of licensees and 
registered products.
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Furthermore, Eurobarometer 
and/or national population-based 
surveys should regularly collect and 
make publicly available data on:
•	Tobacco use prevalence by age, 
gender, socioeconomic status 
and tobacco product type, with 
agreed definitions and measures; 
(In particular, smoking rates 
at early ages, such as 15–17, 
18–21, 21–24 and 25–29 years 
are needed.) and
•	The prevalence of former 
smokers by the number of years 
since they quit, so that cessation 
rates can be estimated and 
tracked.
Recommendation 15:
We recommend that all Member 
States be required to collect data 
and make them public, to allow 
monitoring and analysis of tobacco 
taxation and smoking prevalence.
Further research is needed on the 
impact of increased flexibility in 
the tobacco excise structure on: the 
demand for cigarettes, industry 
pricing strategy and illicit trade. 
Research is needed to provide 
evidence on the methods and 
consequences of further tobacco 
tax harmonization in the European 
Union and to facilitate alignment 
of tobacco taxes in neighbouring 
non-European Union states. The 
effects of changes in tax rates on 
revenues generated should be 
monitored. Research is needed 
into the relevant conversion 
rate between roll-your-own and 
manufactured cigarettes. Further 
methods for measuring illicit 
trade are required, with more 
detailed examination of its public 
health consequences. The effects 
of Internet sales and advertising 
on smuggling and illicit trade in 
the European Union should be 
evaluated. Lastly, independent 
research into the safety and role 
of smokeless tobacco is required.
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GLoSSARy oF TERMS
Ad valorem excise Excise levied as a percentage of some measure of product value (currently the weighted average price of tobacco)
Counterfeit tobacco
Tobacco produced and distributed bearing a trademark without the approval 
of the trademark owner. These products are illegally produced and often bear 
counterfeit tax stamps. 
Cross-price elasticity 
of demand
A measure, with no units, of how responsive the demand for one product is to 
the price of another 
Comparative price level
The ratio of purchasing power parity to market exchange rate in each country. 
Provides a measure of the difference in cross-border price levels by indicating for 
a given product the number of units of the common currency required to buy the 
same volume of the product group in each country.
Down-trading When consumers switch to a cheaper brand of a product in response to a price increase
European currency unit
A precursor to the euro, consisting of a basket of the currencies of the European 
Community Member States, used as the unit of account before replacement by 
the euro on 1 January 1999, at parity
Framework Convention for 
Tobacco Control
An evidence-based public health treaty negotiated under the auspices of the 
World Health organization; sets standards and provisions for tobacco control 
that Parties to the treaty have a legal obligation to implement
Forestalling
When tobacco manufacturers or wholesalers accumulate stocks of tobacco and 
declare production prior to an increase in tobacco excise in order to avoid paying 
the higher rate of excise
Gross domestic product Market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period
Hand-rolling tobacco Also known as fine-cut tobacco for rolling cigarettes or tobacco for roll-your-own cigarettes
Illicit trade
Any practice or conduct prohibited by law and which relates to production, 
shipment, receipt, possession, distribution, sale or purchase, including any 
practice or conduct intended to facilitate such activity 
Income elasticity of demand
A measure, with no units, of how responsive demand for a product is to income, 
calculated as the proportionate change in demand divided by the proportionate 
change in income
MPOWER
Policy recommendations issued by the World Health organization: M, monitor 
tobacco use and prevention policies; P, protect people from tobacco smoke; o, 
offer help to quit tobacco use; W, warn about the dangers of tobacco; E, enforce 
bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; R, raise taxes on 
tobacco
Most popular price category The category of cigarettes with the largest market share in the previous year 
Normal good A good for which demand increases as the real income of an individual or the economy increases 
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Over-shifting 
Passing tobacco excise increases on to consumers at a rate greater than one-
to-one. When taxes are over-shifted, consumer prices increase by more than the 
tax increase. 
Purchasing power parity Amount of money needed to purchase the same goods and services in two different countries; used to calculate an implicit foreign exchange rate
Purchasing power standard
Name given by Eurostat to the artificial currency unit in which purchasing power 
parity and real final expenditures for the 25 Member States of the European 
Union are expressed, namely, euros
Price elasticity of demand A measure, with no units, of how responsive demand is to price, calculated as the proportionate change in demand divided by the proportionate change in price
Retail price index
In the United Kingdom, a measure of inflation published monthly by the Office for 
National Statistics; measure of the change in the cost of a basket of retail goods 
and services
Smuggling 
A type of illicit trade and products illegally traded across borders. Small-scale 
smuggling, or bootlegging, involves the purchase by individuals of quantities 
of lower-taxed tobacco products exceeding customs regulations, concealed 
across borders or for resale in higher-tax jurisdictions. Large-scale smuggling 
involves illegal transport, distribution and sale of large quantities of tobacco 
products, generally avoiding all taxes. This typically involves large organized 
crime networks transporting recognized international brands over long distances 
using ‘in-transit’ regimes, tax-free zones and sophisticated distribution systems 
in destination countries. 
Specific excise Excise levied as a fixed monetary amount of tax per quantity, volume or weight of tobacco
Tax avoidance
Legal activities for paying less or no tobacco taxes; for example, individuals 
purchasing tobacco products in lower-tax jurisdictions for personal consumption 
within customs constraints (e.g. cross-border shopping, tourist shopping, duty-
free shopping, internet purchases)
Tax evasion
Illegal methods of circumventing tobacco taxes, involving the purchase of small 
or large quantities of smuggled and illicitly manufactured tobacco products; may 
involve criminal networks, tobacco companies or other large-scale operators. 
The Handbook Effectiveness of tax and price policies for tobacco control (IARC Handbooks of Cancer Prevention, Vol. 14), funded by the PPACTE Project. 
Under-shifting
When all or part of a tobacco excise increase is absorbed, rather than passed 
on to the consumer. When taxes are under-shifted, consumer prices increase by 
less than the value of the tax increase.
Weighted average price
Reference value for calculating the total tax burden, calculated by reference to 
the total value of all cigarettes released for consumption, based on the retail 
selling price including all taxes, divided by the total quantity of cigarettes released 
for consumption in the preceding calendar year
Work package Division of research work within the PPACTE Project
 
ABBREVIATIoNS
Abbreviations 129
AL Albania
AT Austria
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
EL Greece
ES Spain
FR France
FI Finland
HU Hungary
HR Croatia
IE Ireland
IT Italy
LV Latvia
LU Luxembourg
LT Lithuania
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
UK United Kingdom
The country abbreviations used on some of the graphs are:
DG TAXUD  Directorate-General for the Taxation and Customs Union 
ECU   European currency unit
FCTC   Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
GDP   gross domestic product
IARC   International Agency for Research on Cancer
ISO   International organization for Standardization
PPACTE  Pricing Policy and Control of Tobacco in Europe
VAT   value-added tax
WHO   World Health organization
WP   work package of the PPACTE project
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Country Institution Principle Investigator Researchers
Finland National Institute for Health and Welfare
Markku Perkurinen
*Gunnar Rosenqvist
Markku Pekurinen
Lien Nguyen
Satu Kapiainen
France
International Union 
Against Tuberculosis and 
Lung Disease 
Fiona Godfrey  
Ireland Tobacco Free Research Institute Ireland Luke Clancy Laura Currie
Italy
Istituto di Ricerche 
Farmacologiche 
Mario Negri
Silvano Gallus
Carlo La Vecchia
Alessandra Lugo
Irene Tramacere
Matteo Franchi
Cristina Bosetti
Claudio Pelucchi
Ivana Garimoldi
Spain Institute Catala d’oncologia Esteve Fernández  
United Kingdom University of Bath Anna Gilmore
Katherine Smith
Simon Williams
Silvy Peeters
Valeria Skafida
David Clifford
Karin Silver
Behrooz Tavakoly
Risako Shirane
United States Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation David Levy Kenneth Blackman
World Health 
Organization
International Agency for 
Research on Cancer Maria Leon Roux
IARC Secretariat:
Qian Li
Farhad Islami
Sylvia Moutinho
John Daniel
Nicolas Gaudin
Paolo Boffetta
Kurt Straif
Joachim Schüz
* Professor Gunnar Rosenqvist became the Principle Investigator on 15 May 2010
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External Scientific Advisory Board
Country Institution Scientific Advisor
United Kingdom London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Joy Townsend
United Kingdom Information Services Division, National Health Services Scotland Colin Fischbacher
United States University of Illinois at Chicago Frank Chaloupka
United States Harvard School of Public Health Howard Koh
PPACTE Publication Committee
Country Institution Scientific Advisor
Ireland TobaccoFree Research Institute Ireland Luke Clancy
Italy Istituto di Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario Negri Silvano Gallus
Spain Institute Catala d’oncologia Esteve Fernández
United Kingdom Information Services Division, National Health Services Scotland Colin Fischbacher
United States International Prevention Research Institute, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New york Paolo Boffetta (Chair)
World Health 
Organization International Agency for Research on Cancer Maria Leon Roux
 
PPACTE Publication Committee
Country Institution Scientific Advisor
Belgium Smokefree Partnership Florence Berteletti
European 
Commission
Directorate-General for the Taxation and Customs Union Frank van Driessche
Directorate-General for the Taxation and Customs Union Rainer Holz
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers Sigrid Wimmer
Italy Istituto di Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario Negri Carlo La Vecchia
Spain University of Cartagena, Murcia Angel López Nicolás
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External consultants
Country Consultant Contribution
Austria Hanns Moshammer Advice on data collection WP3/WP4
Austria Ernest Groman
Belgium Luk Joossens Report on illicit trade, contribution to WP2 survey
Finland Antero Heloma
Finland Patrick Sandström
France Bertrand Dautzenberg
France Sylviane Ratte Contribution to WP5 case studies
Germany Martina Potschke-Langer
Germany Ute Mons
Italy Paolo Colombo Contribution to WP2 data collection
Italy Giuseppe Gorini
Netherlands Daniel Rijckborst
Netherlands Marc Willemsen
Portugal Silvia Fraga
Russian Federation Polina Kuznetsova
Sweden Mathias Janson
Sweden Cecelia Birgersson
Ukraine Konstantine Krasovsky
United Kingdom Amanda Sandford
United Kingdom Marloes Holtkamp
United Kingdom Julia Hurst
United Kingdom Boika Rechel
United Kingdom Howard Reed Contribution to WP5 pricing work
United Kingdom Ilze Bogdanovica Report on corruption and tobacco control in the European Union for WP6
United States Christina Ciecierski
United States Hana Ross
Contribution to WP5 case studies, reports on 
cigarette excise policy in the Russian Federation 
and the Ukraine
United States John Colledge
United States Michal Stoklosa
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IARC Working Group for Volume 14 of the IARC Handbooks of Cancer 
Prevention: Effectiveness of Tax and Price Policy for Tobacco Control
Country Organization Participant
Bangladesh University of Dhaka Nigar Nargis
Belgium Framework Convention Alliance Luk Joossens
Belgium European Commission, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union Frank van Driessche
Brazil Alliance for Tobacco Control Roberto Iglesias+
Finland National Institute for Health and Welfare Lien Nguyen
Finland National Institute for Health and Welfare Markku Pekurinen+
France International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease Fiona Godfrey
Ireland TobaccoFree Research Institute Luke Clancy
Ireland TobaccoFree Research Institute Laura Currie
Italy Istituto di Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario Negri Silvano Gallus
Italy Istituto di Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario Negri Carlo la Vecchia
South Africa University of Cape Town Corne van Walbeek
Spain Catalan Institute of oncology Esteve Fernández
Turkey Bilkent University Zeynep onder
United Kingdom University of Bath Anna Gilmore
United Kingdom University of Bath Katherine Smith*+
United States University of Illinois at Chicago Frank Chaloupka, Chair
United States American Cancer Society Evan Blecher
United States University of California Teh-Wie Hu
United States HBSA Ltd, Pacific Institute of Research and Evaluation David Levy
United States American Cancer Society Hana Ross
United States University of Illinois at Chicago John A. Tauras
World Health 
Organization Tobacco Free Initiative Sofia Delipalla**
World Health 
Organization Tobacco Free Initiative Anne-Marie Perucic
World Health 
Organization Tobacco Free Initiative Ayda yurekli
+
*  Current affiliation: University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
**Current affiliation: University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki 
+ Unable to attend the Handbook Meeting in Lyon on 17-22 May 2010
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Name and year 
of measure Number Key requirements
Labelling directives 
(1989, 1992)
89/622/EEC
92/41/EEC
Rotating health warnings on tobacco products
Ban on the marketing of certain tobacco products for oral use
Advertising directives 
(1989, 1997, 1998, 
2003)
89/552/EEC
97/36/EC
98/43/EC1
2003/33/EC
2007/65/EC
Ban on all forms of television advertising for tobacco products
Ban on tobacco advertising in the press, radio and on the Internet
Ban on tobacco sponsorship of events with cross-border effects
Ban on all forms of audiovisual commercial communication, 
including product placement
Tar yield Directive 
(1990) 90/239/EEC
Sets a maximum tar yield of 15 mg per cigarette by 31 December 
1992 and of 12 mg per cigarette from 31 December 1997
Tax directives 
(1992, 1995, 2002, 
2003, 2010)
92/78/EEC
92/79/EEC
92/80/EEC
95/59/EC
2002/10/EC
2003/117/EC
2010/12/EU
Set minimum levels of excise duties on cigarettes and tobacco
Tobacco product 
regulation Directive 
(2001)
2001/37/EC
Requires larger warning labels on all tobacco products; bans 
descriptors suggesting that one tobacco product is less harmful 
than another; requires manufacturers and importers to submit a 
list of all ingredients used in the manufacture of tobacco products; 
defines maximum levels of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide for 
cigarettes
Asbestos Directive 
(1983) 83/477/EEC Prohibits smoking in areas where asbestos is handled
Workplace air quality 
directives (1989, 1992)
89/654/EEC
92/57/EEC
92/91/EEC 
92/104/EEC
Require employers to ensure that workers have access to fresh air 
and ventilation
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Framework Directive 
on Health and Safety 
in the Workplace 
(1989)
89/391/EEC
Requires a health assessment to be carried out on employees, 
which should include exposure to second-hand smoke in the 
workplace
Resolution on  
smoking in public 
places (1989)
 Invites Member States to adopt measures banning smoking in public places and on all forms of public transport (non-binding)
Pregnant women 
Directive (1992) 92/85/EEC
Requires employers to take action to protect pregnant and 
breastfeeding women from exposure to an exhaustive list of 
substances including carbon monoxide from tobacco smoke
Carcinogens Directive 
(1990) 90/394/EEC
Restricts smoking in workplace areas where carcinogenic 
substances are handled
Council resolutions 
(1992, 1996, 1999)  
Propose measures to combat smoking to Member States and the 
Commission (non-binding)
Council 
Recommendation 
on the prevention 
of smoking and on 
initiatives to improve 
tobacco control (2003)
2003/54/EC
Encourages Member States to take further tobacco control action. 
Concerns tobacco sales to children and adolescents, tobacco 
advertising and promotion that has no cross-border effects, 
provision of information on advertising expenditure, environmental 
effects of tobacco smoke (non-binding)
Council 
Recommendation on 
smoke-free 
environments (2009)
Call on Member States to act in three areas: 1) adopt and 
implement laws to protect citizens fully from tobacco smoke 
exposure as cited in Article 8 of the WHo FCTC within 3 years 
of adoption of the recommendation; 2) enhance smoke-free laws 
with supporting measures such as protecting children, supporting 
smoking cessation and introducing graphic health warnings; and 
3) strengthening European Union cooperation for tobacco control
1 Annulled by the European Court of Justice in October 2000 
From references (1, 2)
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The proposal also included a 
suggestion that the specific 
element levied on cigarettes be 
adjusted annually in line with the 
general European Union consumer 
price index (2).
Considerable debate ensued 
in response to this proposal, 
particularly with regard to the 
uniform excise duty structure 
for each product type for the 
whole Community. Introducing 
Cigarettes
• A specific excise of ECU 19.5 per 1000 cigarettes 
• Ad valorem and VAT (as a percentage of retail price) at 52–54%
Cigars and cigarillos
• Ad valorem and VAT (as a percentage of retail price) at 34–36%
Smoking tobacco
• Ad valorem and VAT (as a percentage of retail price) at 54–56%
Other manufactured tobacco
• Ad valorem and VAT (as a percentage of retail price) at 41–43%.
The economic recession of the early 1980s distracted attention from the 
harmonization of indirect taxation; however, momentum was regained in 
1985 with the publication by the European Commission of a White Paper 
on ‘Completing the internal market’, which sought to abolish all physical, 
technical and tax-related barriers to free movement within the Community 
by the end of 1992 (1). The Commission proposal of 1987 contributed to 
the programme of action for the 1985 Commission White Paper (2). The 
proposal covered two broad areas: (i) the changes that would be required in 
the operation of value-added tax (VAT) and excise duties once all controls 
at intra-Community frontiers had been abolished, and (ii) the rates of 
VAT and excise duties that Member States could levy (2). Specifically, 
the Commission proposed that Member States should be required to set 
VAT rates within two bands: a standard rate of between 14% and 20% 
and a reduced rate of between 4% and 9% for basic goods and services. 
In addition, the Commission proposed that excise duties on tobacco 
(and alcohol and mineral oils) be set at uniform levels throughout the 
Community, generally at the average level of existing rates, to minimize 
disruption to the most Member States possible. With regard to excise 
duties, the proposal was that the following rates should be achieved by 1992:
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uniform excise duty levels 
throughout the Community 
would require major adjustments 
in many Member States and face 
considerable resistance. “Not only 
would uniform levels of duty 
have had wide-ranging political 
and social policy implications in 
both high and low tax countries, 
but it would dramatically alter 
the tobacco market and have 
adverse implications for the 
competitive positions of individual 
manufacturers” (p. 37). Therefore, a 
new proposal was issued in 1989, 
which suggested more modest 
alterations of VAT, simplified the 
clearing mechanism and allowed 
Member States more discretion 
with regards to rates. With regard 
to excise duties, the rates proposed 
in 1987 became reference values, or 
long-term targets with rate bands 
around them, and a minimum 
excise rate that had to be achieved 
by 1993 (3).
72/464/EEC and 
79/32/EEC
In the case of tobacco, a limited 
degree of harmonization was 
achieved through Directive 
72/464/EEC. This Directive 
defined the structures of excise duty 
on manufactured tobacco (defined 
to include cigarettes, cigars and 
cigarillos, smoking tobacco, snuff 
and chewing tobacco); provided 
for harmonization in successive 
stages and defined a range of 
relations between specific duty 
and the total duty (4). While this 
Directive defined the first stage of 
harmonization, subsequent stages 
were to be decided on the basis of 
a progress review and proposal by 
the Commission to the Council 
and could be deferred if the 
revenue of any Member States 
would be substantially adversely 
affected. Further, Directive 79/32/
EEC laid out specific definitions of 
the various types of manufactured 
tobacco.
In order to further harmonize 
the structures of excise duty 
on manufactured tobacco, the 
Commission report of 1990 
presented a proposal for amending 
certain articles of directives 
72/464/EEC and 79/32/EEC 
(5). The main aim of the proposed 
directive was to eliminate structural 
differences in excise duty systems 
in advance of the abolition of 
tax frontiers on 1 January 1993. 
Prior to the removal of frontiers, 
it was necessary to establish an 
overall minimum excise duty for 
cigarettes. In response to this 
proposal, directives 92/79/EEC 
and 92/80/EEC were introduced, 
the former applying to taxes on 
cigarettes and the latter to taxes 
on manufactured tobacco other 
than cigarettes.
92/79EEC
Council Directive 92/79/
EEC of 19 October 1992, on 
the approximation of taxes on 
cigarettes, required Member 
States to apply a specific excise 
duty per unit of the product and a 
proportional excise duty calculated 
on the basis of the maximum retail 
selling price of the price category 
most in demand (6). To guarantee 
a minimum level of excise duties 
on cigarettes in all Member States 
and to achieve approximation of 
tax rates, this Directive required 
an overall minimum excise duty 
of 57% of the retail price for 
cigarettes in the most popular price 
category as of 1 January of each 
year and a minimum excise duty of 
€60 per 1000 cigarettes of the most 
popular price category, increasing 
to €64 per 1000, effective on 1 
July 2006. This Directive allowed 
a 2-year transitional period for 
Spain and provided the possibility 
of a reduced rate for small-scale 
cigarette producers in remote areas 
of Portugal.
92/80/EC
Complementing Directive 92/79/
EEC, Council Directive 92/80/
EEC of 19 October 1992, on 
the approximation of taxes on 
manufactured tobacco other than 
cigarettes, enabled Member States 
to determine the structure of their 
taxes, ad valorem, specific or a mixed 
structure, as long as minimum rates 
were achieved (7). The minimum 
rates for these duties specified by 
this Directive were: 36% of the tax-
inclusive retail selling price or €32 
per kilogram for fine-cut smoking 
tobacco intended for hand-rolling, 
5% of the tax-inclusive retail selling 
price or €11 per 100 items (or 
kilogram) for cigars and cigarillos 
and 20% of the tax-inclusive retail 
selling price or €20 per kilogram 
for other smoking tobacco. This 
Directive provided the possibility 
of imposing a lower rate of tax 
on cigars and cigarillos until the 
end of 1998 for Italy and Spain. 
Furthermore, Article 4 of directives 
92/79/EEC and 92/80/EEC 
required that the overall incidence 
and structure of excise duties be 
adjusted every 2 years, on the 
basis of a report and proposal by 
the Commission, to consider the 
functioning of the internal market 
and the wider objectives of the 
Treaty, such as health protection.
95/59/EC
On 13 September 1995, the 
Commission issued its first 
report, in accordance with Article 
4 of 92/79/EEC and 92/80/EEC, 
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which required a review of rates 
and structure of excise duty every 
2 years (8). This report noted that 
little approximation had taken 
place, drew attention to difficulties 
encountered in implementation 
of the directives, showed that 
adaptations to the structure and 
rates of excise were not needed 
in the short-term and concluded 
that a broad consultation should 
be held before further decisions 
were made. Council Directive 
95/59/EC of 27 November 
1995 therefore did not introduce 
fundamental changes but rather 
consolidated the substantially 
amended directives 72/464/EEC 
and 79/32/EEC into a single one 
(9). This Directive redefined the 
various categories of manufactured 
tobacco (cigarettes, fine-cut 
tobacco for rolling cigarettes, cigars 
and cigarillos, and other smoking 
tobacco) and laid down the general 
principles governing taxation of 
manufactured tobacco (9).
Specifically, Directive 95/59/
EC required that excise duties 
on manufactured tobacco be 
harmonized in several stages. 
Progression through the stages 
was decided by the Council, on 
a recommendation from the 
Commission, on the basis that 
Member States had implemented 
measures in their excise duty 
systems in compliance with criteria 
defined for each stage (9). During 
the first stage ( July 1973–June 
1978), the amount of specific 
excise duty levied was established 
for the first time with reference to 
the cigarettes in the most popular 
price category on 1 January 1973; 
this could not be less than 5% or 
more than 75% of the aggregate 
amount of proportional excise duty 
and specific excise duty levied on 
these cigarettes. In the second 
stage of harmonization (from 
July 1978), the amount of specific 
excise duty levied continued to be 
in reference to the cigarettes in the 
most popular price category on 1 
January 1978 and could not be less 
than 5% or more than 55% of the 
aggregate amount of proportional 
excise duty, specific excise duty and 
VAT levied on those cigarettes. In 
addition, Member States were 
required to levy a minimum excise 
duty on cigarettes and fine-cut 
tobacco; however, this could not 
raise the total tax above 90% of the 
total tax on the most popular price 
category of cigarettes or fine-cut 
tobacco. In the final stage, the same 
ratio between specific and the sum 
of ad valorem tax and VAT should 
be established such that the range 
of retail selling prices fairly reflects 
the differences in manufacturers’ 
costs. In addition, the rules for 
collecting excise duty should be 
harmonized during this stage.
1999/81/EC
During the broad consultation 
between the first and second 
review, neither national authorities 
nor the trade organizations spoke 
in favour of fundamental change to 
the existing tax structure (10). The 
Commission therefore concluded 
that fundamental change was 
unnecessary but that a number 
of technical adjustments were 
required to address the issues 
encountered in implementing 
existing directives. The second 
review of directives, published 
in 1998, outlined these technical 
adjustments, which formed the 
proposal for amending Directive 
1999/81/EC, adopted on 29 July 
1999.
First, there were a number of 
differences in how Member 
States applied the 57% incidence 
rule. The overall minimum excise 
duty on cigarettes was expressed 
as a percentage of the retail selling 
price. If the retail selling price or 
VAT rate changed during the 
year, this changed the excise duty 
incidence. Some Member States 
checked compliance with the 
incidence rule on 1 January of 
each year when the most popular 
price category was established, 
while others interpreted this rule 
as an ongoing requirement that 
should be checked and adjusted 
throughout the year. The review 
proposed that Member States 
could delay adjusting the overall 
minimum excise duty until 1 
January of the second year after 
the change. Further, the review 
suggested that Member States 
be authorized to temporarily 
neutralize the impact of an increase 
in VAT on excise duties, even if 
the overall minimum excise duty 
temporarily fell below 57% of the 
retail selling price of cigarettes in 
the most popular price category.
Secondly, the Commission adapted 
legislation to give Member States 
the flexibility to apply a minimum 
excise duty on cigars, cigarillos 
and smoking tobacco expressed 
as both a percentage of the retail 
selling price and a specific amount. 
With inflation, the gap between 
these two factors widens, and the 
specific minimum amount must 
be adjusted in line with inflation 
to maintain the ratio established 
between the two components 
when the rates were initially set. 
The Commission proposed that 
the minimum rates be increased 
in two stages: the first stage would 
adjust for inflation between 1992 
and 1998 and take effect on 1 
January 1999. The rates were 
ECU9 for cigars and cigarillos, 
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ECU24 for hand-rolling tobacco 
and ECU18 for other smoking 
tobacco. To allow for forecasted 
inflation between January 1999 
and December 2000, the minimum 
rates applied effective 1 January 
2001 were ECU10 for cigars and 
cigarillos, ECU25 for hand-rolling 
tobacco and ECU19 for other 
smoking tobacco.
Finally, the review suggested 
that the current 2-yearly reviews 
of structure and rates of excise 
duty required in accordance with 
Article 4 of directives 92/79/
EEC and 92/80/EEC did not 
provide sufficient time for a 
proper evaluation of changes in 
Community legislation, and 5-year 
periodic reviews were proposed 
instead (10).
This report was accompanied 
by a proposal for a directive 
amending the tobacco legislation 
to incorporate the recommended 
technical adjustments discussed 
above (10). With a minor 
amendment to the review period 
(from 5 to 3 years) requested by the 
European Parliament, the proposal 
was adopted by the Council on 29 
July 1999 as Directive 1999/81/
EC.
2002/10/EC
At the request of a number of 
Member States after the adoption 
of Directive 1999/81/EC, the 
Commission initiated another 
broad consultation to consider 
a more fundamental review of 
the structure and rates of excise 
duties on tobacco products (11). 
The Commission surveyed and 
engaged in bilateral discussions 
with Member States on a 
possible review of structures and 
rates of excise duty. Furthermore, 
trade associations were invited 
to submit position papers and 
engage in bilateral discussions. 
Of significant concern was the 
divergence between Member 
States in the total percentage of 
excise duties on tobacco and the 
real amount of excise on cigarettes. 
At this time, the percentage rates 
ranged from 50.47% to 65.14%, 
and the real amounts from €48.44 
to €210.57 per 1000 cigarettes in 
the most popular price category—a 
difference of about 430%.
Among the concerns highlighted 
by Member States during the 
broad consultation were fraud 
and smuggling attributable to 
the price differentials between 
Member States. While Member 
States acknowledged that intra-
Community fraud was decreasing 
because of better control measures, 
they raised concern about 
smuggling of tobacco products from 
eastern European states with low 
prices and taxes (11). Furthermore, 
cross-border shopping (exceeding 
travellers’ allowances), contraband 
and Internet sales were brought 
up as issues of concern. Further 
convergence of tax rates to 
reduce the price differentials, 
which provide incentive for these 
activities, were considered a priority 
for a functioning excise system, 
particularly with the predicted 
European Union expansion. 
Following the consultation, the 
Commission published a review 
containing proposals, which 
were adopted by the Council 
in Directive 2002/10/EC of 12 
February 2002.
Analyses carried out during the 
review suggested that application 
of a minimum rate alone would not 
result in greater approximation of 
rates, and the review concluded 
that a minimum fixed amount, 
expressed in euros, should be 
introduced, in addition to the 
existing minimum percentage 
requirement for excise incidence. 
This Directive introduced an 
overall minimum excise duty 
(specific and ad valorem duty 
excluding VAT) of 57% of the 
tax-inclusive retail selling price 
that could be no less than €60 per 
1000 cigarettes of the most popular 
price category (increasing to €64 
per 1000 cigarettes effective 1 July 
2006). Member States that levied 
an overall minimum excise duty of 
at least €95 per 1000 cigarettes of 
the most popular price category 
(increasing to €101 per 1000 
cigarettes effective 1 July 2006) 
were not required to comply 
with the 57% incidence rule. The 
minimum fixed amount was €11 
per 1000 items or per kilogram 
for cigars and cigarillos, €29 
per kilogram (€32 per kilogram 
effective 1 July 2004) for fine-
cut rolling tobacco and €20 per 
kilogram for other smoking 
tobacco. Phased introduction was 
permitted for countries in which 
immediate introduction of the 
minimum euro amount would 
create economic problems, and 
this was extended to the accession 
states Greece and Spain.
In addition, the review concluded 
that Member States should be 
allowed greater flexibility to 
levy a minimum excise duty 
on cigarettes. This amendment 
was proposed in response to 
the concern of certain Member 
States that cheap cigarettes were 
flooding the market. Article 16 (5) 
of Directive 95/59/EC allowed a 
Member State to levy a minimum 
excise duty as long as it did not 
raise the total tax above 90% of 
the tax on the most popular price 
category. Each pack of cigarettes 
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was required to bear at least a 
minimum rate of excise, to prevent 
sales at prices below market levels. 
This mechanism did not, however, 
prove effective in some Member 
States in preventing an increased 
supply of discount brands. The 
Commission therefore proposed 
an amendment, allowing Member 
States to levy a minimum excise 
duty on cigarettes, provided that 
it did not exceed the excise duty 
levied on cigarettes belonging to 
the most popular price category.
Another issue emerging from the 
review was increasing sales of a 
cigarette-like tobacco product that 
was taxed at the considerably lower 
rates of cigars and cigarillos. The 
product was similar to a cigarette in 
function, taste, filter, manufacture 
and presentation; however, it had 
the colour of a cigar or cigarillo 
and contained cut tobacco rather 
than a threshed blend. Under the 
definitions set out in Directive 
95/59/EC, this product was 
categorized as a cigar. The review 
proposed an amended definition 
of cigars and cigarillos to exclude 
these cigarette-like products. 
Also, the review concluded that 
the minimum rates for fine-
cut tobacco intended for rolling 
cigarettes should be gradually 
adjusted upwards to discourage 
substitution of this product for 
cigarettes.
Subsequently, Directive 2003/117/
EC proposed a derogation from 
1 January 2003 to 31 December 
2009, authorizing France to 
prolong the application of lower 
rates of excise duty to tobacco 
products released for consumption 
in Corsica on the grounds that 
applying later directives would 
have significant economic 
consequences
2010/12/EU
Council Directive 2010/12/EU 
of 16 February 2010 amended 
directives 92/79/EEC, 92/80/
EEC and 95/59/EC on the 
structure and rates of excise duty 
applied to manufactured tobacco 
and Directive 2008/118/EC. On 
the basis of a recommendation in 
the KPMG report, this Directive 
abolished use of the most popular 
price category as the basis for 
calculating minimum rates for 
cigarettes. Instead, it introduced 
the weighted average retail selling 
price (weighted average price) as 
the base for calculation, with the 
weighted average price equal to the 
total value of all cigarettes released 
for consumption (tax-inclusive 
retail selling price) divided by the 
total quantity of cigarettes released 
for consumption. The weighted 
average price is now also used as 
the reference for measuring the 
proportion of specific excise duty 
within the total tax burden and for 
determining the minimum excise 
requirement for rolling tobacco.
To reflect this change in the 
reference value for calculating tax 
incidence, Directive 2010/12/EU 
requires that the overall excise 
duty (specific and ad valorem) 
on cigarettes represent 57% of 
the weighted average price of 
cigarettes released for consumption 
and maintains the minimum tax 
floor of €64 per 1000 cigarettes, 
irrespective of the weighted average 
price. The escape clause also 
references the weighted average 
price: Member States that levy 
an excise duty exceeding €101 per 
1000 cigarettes on the basis of the 
weighted average price need not 
comply with the 57% rule. In order 
to achieve greater convergence of 
prices and reduce consumption, 
this Directive increases the 
minimum levels of taxation 
for cigarettes (as well as rolling 
tobacco). Effective 1 January 2014, 
Member States are required to levy 
an overall excise duty of at least 
60% of the weighted average price 
with a minimum tax floor of €90 
per 1000 cigarettes. The reference 
value for the escape clause is also 
increased: from 2014, Member 
States that levy an excise duty 
exceeding €115 per 1000 cigarettes 
based on the weighted average 
price will not have to comply with 
the 60% requirement. Derogations 
were introduced for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania 
until 31 December 2017.
The total tax burden of specific 
excise must also be calculated with 
reference to the weighted average 
price. This Directive introduced 
a change in the band of specific 
excise from between 5% and 55% 
of the total tax burden (specific, ad 
valorem and VAT) levied on the 
weighted average price to between 
5% and 76.5% of the reference 
value until the end of 2013. In 
2014, this band will be narrowed 
to 7.5–76.5%.
To prevent distortion of 
competition, diversions of trade 
and any associated revenue losses 
for the Member States that comply 
with the higher excise rates (both 
proportional and monetary 
minimum requirements) described 
above, Directive 2010/12/EU 
introduced quantitative restrictions 
limiting the number of cigarettes 
that may be brought into a 
Member State with a higher tax 
to at least 300 without further duty 
payment from a Member State 
applying a transitional period. 
Similarly, if a Member State is 
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applying a transitional period and 
has reached a monetary level of €77 
per  1000 cigarettes, it may impose 
a quantitative limit on the number 
of cigarettes that may be brought 
in from other Member States in 
the transitional phase that have not 
reached this monetary limit.
Furthermore, to discourage the 
substitution of fine-cut rolling 
tobacco for cigarettes in response 
to increasing cigarette prices, 
amendments were introduced to 
create a partial alignment of excise 
on rolling tobacco and cigarettes. 
First, the minimum rates of excise 
on fine-cut rolling tobacco are 
based on the new weighted average 
price as the reference value for 
calculations. Secondly, the rates of 
excise will be gradually increased 
to bring greater approximation 
between the rates for fine-cut 
tobacco and the rates for cigarettes, 
such that the rates on fine-cut are 
up to two thirds of the rates for 
cigarettes. Effective 1 January 
2011, the minimum rate of excise 
on fine-cut tobacco was 40% of the 
weighted average price or at least 
€40 per kilogram. This will increase 
to 43% of the weighted average 
price or at least €47 per kilogram by 
January 2013, 46% of the weighted 
average price or at least €54 per 
kilogram by January 2015, 48% of 
the weighted average price or at 
least €60 per kilogram by January 
2018 and 50% of the weighted 
average price or at least €60 per 
kilogram by 2020 (in comparison 
with 60% of the weighted average 
price of cigarettes and €90 per 
1000 cigarettes by 2014). Gradual 
increases were also introduced for 
cigars and cigarillos, bringing the 
minimum rate to 5% of the tax-
inclusive retail selling price or €12 
per 1000 items or per kilogram, 
with derogations for Germany 
and Hungary until January 2015. 
Similar increases were introduced 
for other smoking tobacco, 
bringing the minimum rate to 20% 
of the tax-inclusive retail selling 
price or €22 per kilogram.
Lastly, in an effort to ensure 
uniform, fair taxation, Directive 
2010/12/EU introduced revised 
definitions of the different tobacco 
products. These definitions ensure 
that competing products are taxed 
similarly. For example, under the 
new definitions, rolls of tobacco, 
which could be considered two 
cigarettes on the basis of their 
length, should be treated as two 
cigarettes for excise purposes. 
These new definitions restrict the 
freedom of the tobacco industry 
to counter increasing excises with 
product innovations.
2011/64/EC
As Council directives 92/79/
EEC, 92/80/EEC and 95/59/
EC were substantially amended 
several times and in the interests 
of clarity and rationality, those 
directives have been repealed 
and codified in a single act. This 
combined Directive defines the 
various categories of manufactured 
tobacco (cigarettes, fine-cut tobacco 
intended for rolling cigarettes, 
cigars and cigarillos, other smoking 
tobacco), lays down the general 
principles governing taxation of 
manufactured tobacco and provides 
for overall minima to be applied to 
the various tobacco product types 
established by Directive 2010/12/
EC. This Directive entered into 
force retroactively from 1 January 
2011.
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Member State with relatively low-priced cigarettes:
Present price per pack, €2.50  
Present tax (including VAT) at 60%, €1.50 
Pre-tax price, €1.00
Under the proposed tax tariff: 
Pre-tax price (weighted average price), €1.00 
Tax at 80% retail price, €4.0  
Retail price (weighted average) is raised to €5.0  
Tax at 80% is greater than the minimum of €125 per 1000, which is €2.5 per pack  
So  
Tax would remain at €4.0 per pack.
(even lower pre-tax price) 
Present price (weighted average), €2.50 
Present tax at 80%, €2.00 
Pre-tax price, €0.50 
Under the proposed tax tariff: 
Pre-tax (weighted average price), €0.50  
Tax at 80% retail price would be €2.0, for a retail price of €2.50, but a minimum tax of €125 or 
€2.5 per pack is higher than 80% of the weighted average price 
So 
Tax is €2.50 
Retail price is raised to €3.00.
Member State with relatively high-priced cigarettes but range allowing major down-trading: 
 Weighted average price, €6.00 
Pre tax price €1.60 
Tax 80% €6.40  
Pack retails at €8.00 (high-price cigarette)
Pre-tax price €0.80  
Tax 80% €3.20  
Pack retails at €4.00 (50% high-price cigarettes) 
Under the proposed tax tariff: 
Pre-tax price €0.80  
Minimum tax (80% of weighted average price, €6.00), €4.80  
Price rises to €5.60, and the differential narrows to 70% of the high price.
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